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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the economics of human capital
formation. In these essays, I explore how parents determine the skills developed
in children, how these skills lead to important economic outcomes and the issues
involved in the measurement of these skills in children.
In the first chapter, “The Effect of Maternal Psychological Distress on Chil-
dren’s Cognitive Development”, I study the relationship between maternal men-
tal health and children’s cognitive skills. I develop a model that allows me to
separate the different mechanisms that relate maternal mental health to chil-
dren’s cognition. In order to identify the causal effect of maternal mental health,
I exploit variation among U.S. states in mental health insurance coverage laws,
which improved access to mental health care services. I find that maternal men-
tal health problems mainly affect children through a decrease in the productivity
(quality) of maternal time investments.
The second chapter, “The Economic Value of Breaking Bad : Misbehavior,
Schooling and the Labor Market”, studies the relationship between childhood
misbehavior, schooling and labor market outcomes. We show that externalizing
behavior (linked, for example, to aggression), reduces educational attainment
yet increases earnings. This finding illustrates our main point that, different
than cognition and health, non-cognitive skills can be productive in some eco-
nomic contexts and counter-productive in others. As a result, policies designed
to promote human capital accumulation could have mixed effects or even nega-
tive economic consequences, especially for policies targeting non-cognitive skill
formation for children aimed solely at improving educational outcomes.
ii
In the third and final chapter, “ When Mothers and Teachers Disagree: Ob-
server Reports and Children’s Noncognitive Skills”, I explore the methodological
challenges involved in measuring noncognitive skills in children. The usual ap-
proach involves asking parents or teachers about different child behaviors. This
is problematic, as I show that mothers and teachers rarely agree when report-
ing on these behaviors. More importantly, I show that maternal and teacher
reports are measuring different aspects of child development. While teacher re-
ports mainly measure child misbehavior associated with adult risky behaviors,
maternal reports also measure behaviors related to the child’s mental health.
Primary Reader: Nicholas W. Papageorge
Secondary Reader: Robert A. Moffitt
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Chapter 1





There is a growing interest, in a multitude of fields, towards understanding
intergenerational transmission of human capital. Studies have shown that in-
equality in family resources is translated into inequality in children’s outcomes
(Heckman and Mosso, 2014; Duncan, Kalil, and Ziol-Guest, 2013; Currie and
Almond, 2011; Alexander, Entwisle, and Olson, 2014). Moreover, we now know
I would like to thank Robert Moffitt, Nicholas Papageorge and Richard Spady for their
helpful comments, suggestions, encouragement and guidance. I gratefully acknowledge help-
ful comments from Matthew Wiswall, Yingyao Hu and Jorge Balat, along with seminar par-
ticipants at Johns Hopkins University, the WEAI Graduate Student Workshop, Escola de
Economia de So Paulo, Insper, Universit de Montral, Aarhus University, IZA Workshop on
Gender and Family Economics and SOLE 2017. All errors are my own.
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that at least half of the variation in lifetime earnings is determined in child-
hood (Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005). Many factors have been shown to
explain the transmission of poverty, including for example genetic endowments
or the number of words spoken to the child in infancy. These results are of-
ten discouraging as many of these factors are not easy policy targets. This is
not the case for maternal mental health, which has been shown to be highly
correlated with both socioeconomic status and child outcomes (Cogill et al.,
1986; Caplan et al., 1989) and proven to be malleable through policy (Earls
et al., 2010; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014). However, maternal mental health
has been understudied in Economics and as a result we know very little about
the mechanisms through which it affects child outcomes.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the mechanisms that explain the
effect of maternal mental health on children’s cognitive development. I build on
many strands of the child development literature to describe the different mech-
anisms that relate maternal mental health to children’s cognitive development.
In order to estimate these different mechanisms, I estimate policy functions for
different maternal investments jointly with the child’s technology of skill forma-
tion. This approach allows me to assess the effect of maternal mental health on
the quantity as well as on the productivity (quality) of maternal investments.
I use variation in parity laws that determine mental health care access and
coverage across states to estimate the causal effect of maternal mental health.
I find that maternal mental health matters for children’s development. More-
over, I find that maternal psychological distress mainly affects children through
a decrease in the productivity (quality) of maternal time investments. Next, I
investigate policy interventions that mitigate these effects. My findings suggest
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large payoffs for children from mental health treatment for at-risk mothers. My
findings also suggest that programs that improve maternal parenting can have
large benefits for these children. Moreover, both policies are significantly more
cost effective than comparable income transfers.
Different fields use different models to understand human capital formation
in children. I bring together these different models by incorporating mater-
nal mental health into a standard economic model of maternal investments.
Economists understand child development through the family investment model
(Becker, 1981; Becker and Tomes, 1986). In this model, parents influence chil-
dren through biological endowments (genetics) and social endowments (values)
as well as through time and monetary investments. In this basic framework
there are at least five mechanisms that explain how maternal mental health can
have an effect on children. The first mechanism comes from the idea in psy-
chology that mental illness can be contagious, so children of distressed mothers
are more likely to develop mental health problems of their own, which would
impair their cognitive development (Rosenquist, Fowler, and Christakis, 2011;
Currie and Stabile, 2006). The second mechanism is the idea from the family
stress model in sociology that maternal mental health problems can affect the
quality of mother-child interactions as it diminishes the mother’s ability to be
supportive and engaged with her child (McLoyd, 1990; Conger et al., 1994; Ye-
ung, Linver, and Brooks-Gunn, 2002). The third and forth mechanisms come
from the idea in psychology that mental health problems can increase the cost
of spending time in productive activities, and as a result can affect the amount
of time the mother spends with her child as well as her labor force participation
(Blair, 2010; Frijters, Johnston, and Shields, 2014). The last mechanism come
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from the economics literature, which has shown that mental health problems
could lead to lower labor market productivity (Chatterji, Alegria, and Takeuchi,
2011). In turn, lower earnings could translate into lower monetary investments
in children.
Identifying these mechanisms is important for policy, as different mecha-
nisms point towards different policy proposals. For example, if mental health
affects the quality of maternal parenting, home visitation programs that im-
prove the quality of mother-child interactions might be highly beneficial for
children of mothers in poor mental health. Alternatively, if the effect is through
a change in the mother’s labor market productivity, then income supplement
programs such as the earned income tax credit (EITC) might be important for
these families. Identifying these mechanisms can also highlight heterogeneous
effects of mental health treatment across families. For example, the benefits of
treatment will be higher for children of working mothers if the mental health
effect is through the mother’s labor market productivity, and possibly larger for
stay-at-home mothers if the effect comes through the quality of mother-child
interactions.
In estimating the causal effect of maternal distress, I confront two empirical
challenges: measurement error in the mental health construct and the endogene-
ity of mental health. In order to control for the measurement error problem, I
use an item response theory (IRT) model. IRT is a common method in psychol-
ogy used to identify and construct unobservable scales from a series of discrete
measurements. Mental health scales, including the Kessler 6 psychological dis-
tress scale that I use in this paper, are constructed from multiple self-reported
discrete responses about different psychological symptoms. The IRT approach
4
recognizes and controls for the intrinsic measurement error in these self-reported
questionnaires. Moreover, it controls for the fact that measurements differ in
quality, each providing a different signal about the unobserved mental health.
I find that not controlling for these problems, and instead using a simple sum-
mation score, leads to biased and unreliable estimates.
In order to address the endogeneity of maternal mental health, I use varia-
tion in state mental health parity laws. These laws require insurers in the state
to provide an equal level of benefits for mental illness and physical disorders.1
These laws are generally thought to improve access to mental health services
in the state, and have been shown to increase utilization of mental health care
services and contribute to improve mental health outcomes (Harris, Carpenter,
and Bao, 2006; Lang, 2013). In theory, these laws only enter the model through
an effect on the mother’s mental health and as a result serve as exclusion re-
strictions that identify the model. Otherwise, I would not be able to identify
the causal effect of the mother’s mental health, as it is possibly correlated with
unobservable investments in children.2 3 The literature has struggled to cor-
rect for this problem often relying on poor instruments, bounding or propensity
score methods (see Frank and Meara (2009) and Dahlen (2016) as examples).
Exceptions are papers that use exogenous variation in stressors that could trig-
ger mental health illness, such as terrorist attacks (Camacho, 2008) or the death
of a relative or close friend (Persson and Rossin-Slater, 2014; Frijters, Johnston,
1These benefits include visit limits, deductibles, copayments, and lifetime and annual
limits.
2For example, I do not observe neighborhood characteristics, such as the crime rate or
school quality, that we know are important for children’s development.
3Another problem is reverse causation. At the same time that maternal mental health can
influence labor market and child outcomes, lack of financial resources and poor child outcomes
can lead to maternal mental health problems (Dohrenwend et al., 1992).
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and Shields, 2014).4
My findings show that maternal mental health, measured by mothers’ psy-
chological distress, has large effects on children’s cognitive development. The
main mechanism explaining these large effects is the effect of maternal mental
health on the returns of maternal time investments (quality of mother-child in-
teractions). This channel alone explains 70% of the effect of maternal distress on
children. I also find evidence of a direct effect of maternal distress on children’s
cognitive development, possibly explained by the contagion of mental health. I
find no evidence of the other mechanisms once I control for measurement error
and endogeneity of maternal distress. These findings point towards two pol-
icy interventions for children of psychologically distressed mothers. The first is
mental health treatment, either with therapy or medication. I find that treat-
ment for at-risk mothers can have huge payoffs for children that are 16 times
more cost effective than comparable income transfers. The second policy would
be to improve the quality of mother-child interactions, as in ,for example, home
visitation programs may do. Policies that improve maternal parenting reduce
the negative effect of maternal distress on the returns of maternal time invest-
ments, and as a result produce large benefits for children of distressed mothers.
These programs can be thought as complementary to mental health treatment
and a viable option when treatment does not work.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe the
data and my measure of mental health. In Section 1.3, I describe the conceptual
model of maternal investments and highlight the different mechanisms through
4One issue with these instruments, when studying postpartum mental health, is that they
can directly influence children and as a result would not be valid exclusion restrictions.
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which maternal mental health can influence children’s development. In Section
1.4, I describe my econometric framework and estimation strategy. In Section
1.5, I describe my main findings. In Section 1.6, I discuss the policy implications
of these findings. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Data and Preliminary Analysis
In this section, I first provide details on the data used and on how I construct
the analytic sample. Then I discuss my measure of mental health and provide
background information on the measure that might be informative for some
readers. Lastly, I report estimates from a preliminary econometric model relat-
ing maternal mental health with child cognition and maternal investments. In
particular, I demonstrate that maternal distress is negatively correlated with
both child cognition and other relevant maternal investments.
1.2.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
In this paper, I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
its Child Development Supplement (CDS). The PSID is an ongoing dynastic
longitudinal survey. It started as a nationally representative sample of 18,000
individuals living in 5,000 families in 1968 in the United States. The CDS col-
lected information on 3,563 children living in 2,394 PSID families. Information
was collected in three waves: 1997, 2002 and 2007. Eligible children were be-
tween the ages of 0 and 12 in 1997, at the time of the first survey. These surveys
include a broad array of developmental outcomes as well as information on the
home environment of the child. The PSID-CDS is particularly well-suited for
this study since it provides information about mothers’ mental health together
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with information about the quantity of mother-child interactions and mothers’
labor market outcomes. Therefore, the data set allows me to relate the mother’s
mental health to maternal investments in the child.
From the main PSID survey, I collect data on mothers’ labor supply decision,
labor income, total family income and relevant demographic variables from the
year the child was born until she reaches 16 years old. This data collection goes
as far as 1985 and as recent as 2013. From the CDS, I collect information on the
child’s cognitive ability, on the mother’s mental health and on the mother’s time
with the child. This data is collected from the three CDS surveys in 1997, 2002
and 2007. In constructing my analytic sample, I keep respondents with valid
information on the child’s cognitive test score, mother’s labor supply, mental
health and time with her child. I drop individuals with missing information on
the child’s race, gender, birth-order, as well as those with missing information
on the mother’s education and age at the child’s birth. The resulting analytic
sample has information on 2,459 children and their mothers.
I measure the child’s cognitive development with the Letter-Word (LW)
module of the Woodcock-Johnson aptitude test. The Letter-Word Identification
test assesses symbolic learning and reading identification skills. The test is ideal
as it can be administered to children between the ages of 3 and 17 and as a result
most children were eligible for the test in two CDS surveys.
I use the child’s time diary to measure the time the mother spends with
her child. This is a distinctive feature of the PSID-CDS. The CDS asks par-
ticipant children, or their primary caregivers, to record a detailed, minute by
minute timeline of their activities for two days of the week: one random week-
day and one random weekend day. Activities were coded at a fine level of detail.
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From this data, I construct a measure of maternal time investments by taking
a weighted sum (5
7
for the weekday and 2
7
for the weekend) of the total hours in
which the mother is recorded as actively participating with the child in each
diary activity. Active participation can be thought of as a measure of maternal
engagement with the child.
1.2.2 Psychological Distress
I use the Kessler 6 (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (Kessler et al., 2002) to
measure the mother’s mental health. The K6 scale is a simple and widely
used measure of general psychological distress.5 Psychological distress is largely
defined as a state of emotional suffering characterized by symptoms of depression
(e.g. lost interest, sadness, hopelessness) and anxiety (e.g. restlessness, feeling
tense) (Mirowsky and Ross, 2003; Drapeau, Marchand, and Beaulieu-Prévost,
2011).
The K6 scale involves asking 6 questions about the individual’s emotional
state in the previous four weeks. Each individual is asked ‘in the last 4 weeks,
about how often did you feel’: 1) nervous, 2) hopeless, 3) that everything was an
effort, 4) so sad that nothing could cheer you up, 5) worthless, and 6) restless or
fidgety. Each question is scored on a scale of five values (0-4), where 4 indicated
“All of the time” and 0 indicated “None of the time”.6.
5Other scales have also been developed with the intent to measure psychological distress.
Other examples are the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), the Kessler K10 scale and the
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI).
6I use a simple item response theory (IRT) approach to construct a continuous measures
that controls for measurement error in the six responses . I discuss this approach in detail
in Section 1.4.4 In comparison, the usual approach is to sum the scores on the six questions
and use cut points to separate individuals in three levels of distress. As a general rule, a cut
point of 13+ is used as the optimal cut point for assessing the prevalence of serious mental
disorder in the national population (Kessler et al., 2010). A cut point between 5 and 8 can
9
The prevalence rate of psychological distress is non-trivial for the U.S. adult
population. Psychological distress is usually measured on a continuous scale, but
more often than not individuals are classified into three groups: those suffering
from moderate psychological distress, those suffering from serious psychological
distress, and those under no distress. Moderate levels of distress are very com-
mon, with a prevalence rate of 20-30% for the U.S. adult population.7 Serious
psychological distress is much rarer, with a prevalence rate of about 3% for the
U.S. population.
In spite of being quite common, psychological distress can lead to serious
life impairments. Individuals in serious distress report lower productivity in
the home and in the labor market, and problems in interactions with friends
and family members. Individuals with moderate levels of distress suffer similar
impairments but at a lesser rate. For instance, 85% of individuals under serious
distress report facing some work impairment, while about 60% of individuals
under moderate distress report the same (Prochaska et al., 2012).
The prevalence of psychological distress is fairly constant across geographical
regions, but there are important group differences (Drapeau, Marchand, and
Beaulieu-Prévost, 2011). In particular, the prevalence of psychological distress
is higher for women than for men, and peaks during early adulthood (18-29
years old).8
also be used to indicate a moderate mental disorder (Prochaska et al., 2012; Herrick, 2015).
This separation is often used to analyze the prevalence rate of psychological distress in the
population.
7These numbers depend on the cut-off being used.
8Also, there are no significant differences in prevalence across races or ethnic groups, but
the prevalence is higher for immigrants (Nemeroff, Midlarsky, and Meyer, 2010; Drapeau,
Marchand, and Beaulieu-Prévost, 2011).
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1.2.3 Summary Statistics
In this section, I discuss the most important patterns in the data. I first demon-
strate that both child cognition and maternal distress are highly correlated with
family income, a result that motivates this paper. Next, I describe the other
key variables: the mother’s time investments in the child, hours of work and
her wage offer.
This paper is motivated by the fact that maternal mental health is strongly
correlated with both socioeconomic status and child cognition and, as a result,
can be thought of as a mediator of the intergenerational transmission of human
capital. Figure 1.1(a) plots the association between psychological distress and
family income. The pattern is striking. Individuals in the lower end of the
income distribution face much higher levels of distress (1 s.d. higher) than
individuals with high levels of income. Moreover, this negative relationship
is stronger at lower levels of income, suggesting that psychological distress is
strongly related to financial strain and poverty.9
Similarly, child cognition is also highly correlated with family income. This
can be seen in Figure 1.2(a), which plots average standardized letter-word score
for different percentiles of family income. This gap in cognitive skills can be as
large as one standard deviation. Moreover, this gap tends to grow over time,
as can be seen in Figure 1.2(b). The gap doubles from .6 to 1.2 points of a
standard deviation from age 3 to age 15. One of the goals of this paper is to
9Figure 1.1(b) plots the density distribution of psychological distress for the mothers in
my sample. There is a very clear clustering of scores around zero. This is due to the fact that
in my sample about 15% of the mothers respond “none of the time” to all 6 questions in the
K6 scale. As a contrast, only 6% of the individuals respond “all of the time” to any question
and only 4 individuals respond “all of the time” in all 6 questions.
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explore the role of maternal mental health in explaining this gap.
Besides maternal mental health, family time and goods investments can
also explain this gap and, as a result, are part of my model. Table 1.1 provides
summary statistics on these variables. On average, mothers spend 19 hours per
week engaged in activities with their children. However, as can be seen in Figure
1.3(b), there is large variation in time investments across child ages. Mothers
spend more than double the amount of time with young children than with
teenagers. Similar patterns can be found for maternal labor force participation.
On average, mothers spend 1,209 hours working every year; their labor force
participation is lower in the first years of the child’s life and increases steadily
as the child ages, as can be seen in Figure 1.3(c). Perhaps due to human
capital accumulation and depreciation through work experience, mothers’ wages
decrease when children are young, when mothers take time off from the labor
market, and increase steadily over time, as mothers accumulate labor market
experience. This can be seen in Figure 1.3(d).
One important thing to notice in Table 1.1 is that I do not observe all vari-
ables at all ages for each child. For example, I only observe the letter-word score
for 4,582 child-age observations, close to two observations per children. Simi-
larly, I only observe 25,795 observations for mothers’ labor force participation,
about 10 observations per mother. However, I do observe these same variables
at all ages for at least some children, as can be seen in Figures 1.3(a)-1.3(d).
As a result, I can construct moments that will allow me to estimate the model
proposed in the next two sections. That is, these patterns in the data motivate




In my main econometric analysis, I control for endogeneity of maternal mental
health using variation in state mental health parity laws. Moreover, I simu-
late maternal investments and jointly estimate these with the child’s cognition
production function. However, for the preliminary analysis conducted here, I
assume maternal mental health is exogenous and explore its correlation with
child cognitive development and its correlation with other relevant maternal
investments. These preliminary results serve to illustrate important patterns
in the data and to demonstrate that my main results are not driven by my
estimation strategy.
I start by estimating a static model of children’s cognitive development.
The main outcome of interest are age-standardized logged letter-word scores. I














where the letter word score for individual i at time t is given by Ait, and Hit,
MTit, Incit refers to the mother’s psychological distress, maternal time invest-
ments and family income respectively. Xi1 is a vector of covariates and εi1 is a
normally distributed disturbance.10
Estimates for equation 1.1 are presented in Table 1.2 for varying sets of
covariates Xi1 and family investments. Column [1] displays the raw relationship
between maternal psychological distress and children’s cognition. A ten percent
increase in maternal psychological distress is related to a decrease of about
10I use children’s scores at t   5 in order to capture the idea that today’s investments
determine future cognitive skills. The analysis with cognitive scores measured at t yield
qualitatively similar results.
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1.2 percentage points in children’s cognitive skills. This relationship is also
plotted in Figure 1.4(a). In column [2], I add family controls, such as the
mother’s education. Including these controls decreases the magnitude of the
association with maternal psychological distress by about a half. This illustrates
the strong endogeneity problem due to unobserved investments. In column [3]
and [4], I include my measure of maternal time investments and family income
respectively. Including these variables further decreases the magnitude of the
association with the mother’s distress by about 10%. In the end, it looks that
maternal mental health is 70% as important in determining child cognition as
family income. These results, however, should be taken as correlations since
they assume investments are exogenous and ignore the dynamic nature of child
development.
Given that time and goods investments are important determinants of chil-
dren’s skills, I would like to understand the correlation of maternal distress
with the determinants of these investments. In order to do so, I estimate OLS








where Yit measures weekly maternal time investments, annual hours at work
or log hourly wages for individual i at time t. As before, Hit refers to the
mother’s psychological distress, Xi2 is a vector of covariates and εi2 is a normally
distributed disturbance.
Estimates for equation 1.2 are presented in Table 1.3 for varying sets of
covariates Xi. Figure 1.4 also plots the relationship between family investments
and psychological distress using linear polynomials. Column [1] displays the raw
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relationship between maternal psychological distress and weekly maternal time
investments. Each percent decrease in maternal psychological distress is related
to an increase of 0.825 hours in maternal time investments. These are relatively
large associations as can be seen in Figure 1.4(b). However, this relationship
decreases by a third when I add family controls, such as the mother’s education
(Column [2]). Similar effects can be seen for the effect of distress on the mother’s
labor supply (Columns [3] and [4] and Figure 1.4(c)). Each percentage increase
in maternal distress is associated with a decrease of about 40 hours worked in
a year. Perhaps related, psychological distress is also strongly correlated with
labor market productivity. As can be seen in Columns [5] and [6] and Figure
1.4(d), a ten percentage increase in psychological distress is associated with a
five percentage decrease in hourly wages.
The results in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 and Figure 1.4 provide preliminary ev-
idence that maternal mental health matters for children’s cognitive develop-
ment. Moreover, they provide suggestive evidence that maternal mental health
can affect children through its effect on other family investments. However,
these results have several shortcomings. They do not control for endogeneity in
the child cognition production function as a result of unobserved investments
(omitted variable bias). Moreover, they ignore the fact that child development
is a dynamic process and that investments interact in non-obvious ways in de-
termining child outcomes. The model developed in the next couple of sections
takes these issues seriously. Moreover, it formally describes the different chan-
nels through which maternal mental health can affect children.
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1.3 A Model of Cognitive Skills Formation
In this section, I describe a standard model of maternal investments in chil-
dren’s cognitive development. This model allows me to distinguish the channels
through which maternal mental health can affect children. I start by describ-
ing the technology of cognitive skill formation in children. I argue that the
child’s cognitive skills are determined over multiple periods by mother’s time
and goods investments as well as by the mother’s mental health. I then discuss
the determinants of these maternal investments. I show that maternal time and
goods investments are determined by the mother’s preferences, the constraints
she faces and her productivity in the labor market, and that maternal mental
health can affect these investments. At the end of this section, I comment in
some detail on the different channels through which maternal mental health
can influence the child’s cognitive skills formation. Throughout this section, I
treat mental health as exogenous and address the endogeneity problem later, in
Section 1.4.3.
It is worth noting at this point that the ideas developed in this section are
mainly used to motivate the empirical model described later in Section 1.4.
In that model, I will approximate the maternal time allocation decisions with
policy functions and estimate these jointly with the child’s skill production
function and the mother’s wage offer equation, where the technology of skill
formation is estimated in its structural form. I will argue that this approach
provides some advantages over fully structural estimation and that this approach
is closely related to what has been done in the literature (see Cunha, Heckman,
and Schennach (2010) and Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016) for two examples).
16
1.3.1 Cognitive Skill Formation
Child cognition is determined over multiple periods (t P t0, 1, ..., 16u). Each
period is equivalent to a year in the child’s life. The model starts when the child
is born (t  0) and ends when she reaches age 16 and can leave the household.
The child’s stock of cognitive skills (At) is determined at the beginning of every
period. In the initial period, the child is born with an initial ability stock (A0),
which is determined by genetic and in-utero investments. At each subsequent
period, the mother determines her child’s skill evolution by allocating time
(MTt) and goods investments (Gt) for the child. This is a common assumption
in the literature (see Becker and Tomes (1986) as an early example). Expanding
on the literature, I also allow the mother’s mental health (Ht) to influence the
child’s accumulation of skills. Formally, the child’s skills evolve as follows:
At 1  ftpAt, Gt,MTt, Ht, ηtq (1.3)
where ηt captures shocks and unobserved inputs that affect the child’s develop-
ment. The technology ftpq is allowed to change as the child ages in order to
capture different stages of development.
The specification of the technology of skill formation (ftpq) should take into
account two important features of child development: dynamic and static com-
plementarities of investments. Dynamic complementarity suggests that the re-




As a result, returns to current investments will depend on past investments
in the child ( B
2At 1
BIt1BIt
 0) (see (Cunha and Heckman, 2007) for a thorough dis-
cussion). Moreover, static complementarity suggests that the technology should




 0. This second feature is especially important when incorporating
maternal mental health.
Maternal mental health can enter the human capital production function
in two ways. First, maternal mental health can be thought as a ‘direct’ com-
ponent of the child’s human capital production function in the same way as
financial investments or maternal time investments. One explanation is that
children suffer from their parents’ psychological distress and in turn develop
psychological problems of their own (Rosenquist, Fowler, and Christakis, 2011;
Eisenberg et al., 2013; Ross, 2000). In turn, psychological problems inhibit
children’s cognitive functions such as planning and attention leading to further
developmental problems (Blair, 2010; Blair et al., 2011). Second, maternal men-
tal health can influence the productivity of maternal time investments. The idea
comes from the family stress theory in sociology, which proposes that maternal
psychological distress can provoke harsh, inconsistent and low nurturing parent-
ing (Conger et al., 1994, 2002). In a sense, the idea is that the mother’s mental
health is an important determinant of the quality of maternal time investments.
The technology of skill formation should take into account these two different
mechanisms.
In order to accommodate these features, I assume the technology of skill for-
mation follows the translog (transcendental logarithmic) specification. Perhaps
the most obvious alternative approach would be to follow Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010) and assume child development is described by a CES produc-
tion function. The CES is appealing because it contains both the Leontief and
the Cobb-Douglas functions in the limit as the complementarity parameter ap-
proaches 8 or 0. Moreover, the CES specification allows mental health to
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have a ‘direct’ effect on children’s development. It also allows for maternal time
investments and mental health investments to be complements in the child’s
human capital production function. However, the CES is problematic because
it assumes identical elasticities of substitution between all input factors. This
restriction is limiting as it does not allow the estimation of the separate effects
of the mother’s mental health on the productivity of her time with the child.
On the other hand, the translog allows that.11 Using the translog specification,
I write the technology of skill formation as:
lnpAt 1q  lnpKtq   α1tlnpAtq   α2tlnpGtq   α3tlnpMTtq   α4tlnpHtq
  α5tlnpAtqlnpGtq   α6tlnpAtqlnpMTtq   α7tlnpAtqlnpHtq (1.4)
  α8tlnpGtqlnpMTtq   α9tlnpGtqlnpHtq   α10tlnpMTtqlnpHtq   η
a
t
where Kt corresponds to the total factor productivity of investments.
The translog is a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas, which is the special
case where the interaction parameters are all zero (αjt  0 @j P t5, 10u). These
same interaction parameters allow for non-constant elasticity of substitution
between inputs, which is not allowed in the Cobb-Douglas, and for different
partial elasticities of substitution between inputs, which are restricted in the
CES.12 α5t,α6t and α7t capture the degree of dynamic complementarity (beyond
the one implied by the Cobb-Douglas), where early investments are allowed to
11Another alternative is a Nested CES production function. In a Nested CES two inputs,
maternal mental health and time investments, are combined in a CES production function,
which is then nested in a further CES production function which includes goods investments
and the child’s original human capital. I find qualitative similar results when I use a Nested
CES production function.
12The translog function could be expanded to include additional terms to provide an ap-
proximation to any unknown production technology.
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influence the returns of today’s investments (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach,




Similarly, α10t describes the elasticity of substitution between maternal mental
health and maternal time investments. If α10t  0 the elasticity of substitution
between maternal mental health and maternal time investments equals the one
implied by the Cobb-Douglas specification.
It is also important to note that all parameters are subscripted by t. Fol-
lowing Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), I assume there are two stages
of development, ages 0-5 and ages 6-16. There are many reasons for this dis-
tinction. For one, at age 6, the child enters formal schooling and as a result is
no longer exposed to only the home environment. Also, the interpretation of
the returns of maternal time changes at age 6. Both the types of activities the
mother engages with the child and the types of activities the child engages with-
out the mother changes once the child enters formal schooling. As a result, we
should expect the return of maternal time to be different across developmental
stages. The same is true for the other investments.
Since the child initial ability A0 is unobserved, I also need to make some
assumptions on how it is realized. I assume A0 is a function of the mother’s and
child’s observed characteristics at the child’s birth (Xa
0
), such as the mother’s











picks up the idea that in-utero investments and children’s genetic
endowments differ by family types.
13The Cobb-Douglas imposes dynamic complementarity of investments, so even if α5t   0
it is possible for dynamic complementarity to be present.
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1.3.2 Maternal Investment Decisions
As described in the previous section, the child’s cognition is determined by
mother’s time (MTt) and goods (Gt) investments. These investments are deter-
mined by the mother’s time allocation decisions. That is, in every period, the
mother rationally chooses the amount of hours to spend in the labor market and
the amount of hours to spend with the child in the form of time investments.
She takes into account how these decisions affect her own and the child’s human
capital accumulation. By working more hours, the mother accumulates labor
market experience, which will influence her future earnings potential. Similarly,
by spending quality time with her child she improves the child’s human capital
stock. Her decision depends on both her preferences and constraints.
Preferences
In every period t, the mother chooses dt  pHWt,MTtq, where HWt represents
the choice for annual hours of work and MTt represents the choice for hours
engaged with the child in cognitive productive activities. A woman’s prefer-
ences over the choice set is defined by her period utility function. Her period
utility depends on her current mental health status Ht and observed individual
characteristics Xut . The utility function is separable across consumption (Ct),
leisure (Lt) and the child’s human capital (At).
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The function λcp.q allows the marginal utility of consumption to vary with
the mother’s mental health status as well as observable characteristics such
as her education and age. Mental health enters λcp.q in order to capture the
idea that individuals in poor mental health receive different enjoyment from
consumption than individuals in a good mental health state. Similarly, mental
health enters λlp.q as a result of the fact that individuals suffering from mental
illnesses are more likely to spend time out of the labor market and miss days
of work, and thus could have a higher cost of working (Frijters, Johnston, and
Shields, 2014). It is less obvious but also possible that mental health could
influence how mothers value their children’s human capital development λap.q.
Constraints
The model assumes women face two constraints in every period, a budget con-
straint and a time constraint. The budget constraint is given by:
Ct  Gt  Inct  wtHWt  Nt  Bpτst, wt, HWt, Ntq (1.7)
where Gt corresponds to the income share that is spent on the child as goods
investments, Inct is the total family income, Nt is the part of income that
does not depend on the woman’s labor supply and includes for example the
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husband’s labor income if the woman is married, family transfers and gifts, and
Bpτt, wt, HWt, Ntq are government transfers received by the family such as food
stamps, welfare benefits and earned income tax credits. Government transfers
are assumed to depend on state-year welfare rule parameters τst, the wage rate
wt, hours of work HWt and other family income Nt.
14 15 16
One assumption that is commonly made in the literature and that I follow
here is that all families spend an equal and fixed proportion of their income
on their child in the form of goods investments. That is, Gt  a  Inct. This
assumption is necessary since many goods investments, such as the quality of
the child’s toys, the number of books she has access to and whether she has
access to a computer, are usually unobserved or hard to quantify monetarily.
The time constraint is given by:
Lt  TT HWt MTt (1.8)
where TT is the total time available for the women in a year and leisure will
depend on how many hours are left after taking into account the number of
hours spent in the labor market and the number of hours spent interacting with
the child.
14As was noted by Moffitt (1983), many women who are eligible for welfare benefits based
on their income do not collect them. The model explicitly ignores the welfare participation
decision. This is to keep the model simple and tractable.
15It is important to note that these welfare rules should affect individuals differently de-
pending on their previous welfare participation. For example, work requirements might be
binding for some individuals but not for others depending on the age of their youngest child
and on their previous labor force and welfare participation. The model ignores these impor-
tant dynamics.
16Welfare rule parameters (τst) provide important exclusion restrictions as they influence
the woman’s decisions but do not affect her labor market productivity directly and only enter
the child’s human capital production function through the family income. I explain this
identification argument in more detail in Section 1.4.3.
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The Wage Process
The mother’s labor market productivity determines the budget constraint she
faces as well as the amount of monetary resources to be invested in the child for
any given time allocation decision. As a result, both goods and time investments
received by the child should depend on the mother’s labor market productivity.
The wage process takes into account the women human capital accumulation
through work experience, or learning by doing. The wage offer at each period
is assumed to be determined by the woman’s observable characteristics (Xwt ),
which include her age, race and education. It is also assumed to depend on
her experience stock at the beginning of the period (EXt) , her employment
decision in the previous period (HWt1), her mental health state in the current











where βwx allows the model to capture returns to education and possible labor
market discrimination based on the woman’s race, and β1 captures the idea that
mental health disorders are associated with a loss in productivity in the labor
market, leading to lower wages and a higher probability of being unemployed
(Ettner, Frank, and Kessler, 1997). The third term in Equation 1.9 captures the
labor market returns to human capital accumulation through work experience,
and β3 captures the temporary labor market penalty for spending time out of
the labor market. That is, the dynamic wage process allows for endogenous
state dependence through human capital accumulation and the dependence of
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the current wage offer on the woman’s previous work choice. βws is a vector that
translates labor market conditions (ζst) into offered wages.
17 Work experience
accumulation is determined by the following process: EXt 1  EXt  HWt.
Value Functions
The solution for the mother’s time allocation decision can be derived from the
value functions implied by the model. That is, let Ωt be the state space faced by
the mother that arises from her decisions made up to period t then the mother’s




Where the utility of choice j for individual i at any period is given by:
VtpΩtq
j  U jt pCt, Lt, At|dt  j,Ωtq   βErVt 1pΩt 1q|dt  j,Ωts
where her choice (dt  tHWt,MTtu) will depend on the state space she faces
in period t (Ωt) as well as on her beliefs on the state space evolution given her
choices ErΩit 1|dt  j,Ωts.
1.3.3 Mental Health Mechanisms
The relationship between maternal mental health and child cognitive develop-
ment can be represented through five key mechanisms. I discuss these different
pathways below.
The first mechanism corresponds to the direct effect of maternal mental
health on children’s human capital accumulation. This mechanism is captured
17State variation in labor market conditions (ζst) are important for the identification of the
empirical model described in Section 1.4.
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by α4t in Equation 1.4. The direct mechanism can be thought as the effect
maternal mental health has on children that is not captured by the other chan-
nels. Theoretically, one possible explanation is contagion of mental health,
where children suffer from their parents’ psychological distress and in turn de-
velop psychological problems of their own (Rosenquist, Fowler, and Christakis,
2011; Eisenberg et al., 2013; Ross, 2000). Higher stress inhibits planning, emo-
tional control and attention, and as a result can lead to cognitive developmental
problems (Blair, 2010; Blair et al., 2011). This channel also has dynamic impli-
cations. First, parents might increase investments in their child in the current
period as a way to compensate for this decrease in human capital. Second, due
to dynamic complementarity, a decrease in current human capital could affect
the returns of family investments in subsequent periods.
The second mechanism corresponds to the effect mental health has on the
productivity of maternal time investments. That is, this mechanism is related
to a change in the quality of these investments. This idea comes from the
family stress model in sociology, and suggests that a distressed mother can lose
her ability to be supportive and to interact in a consistent manner with her
child. This decrease in quality of mother-child interactions results, in turn,
in fewer learning experiences for the child (McLoyd, 1990; Mayer, 2002). The
model captures this channel with the parameter α10t in Equation 1.4. This
parameter captures the degree of complementarity between maternal mental
health and maternal time investments, and as a result, captures how the returns
to maternal time investments change with the mother’s mental health status.
A high degree of complementarity between these two inputs implies that the
value of maternal time investments is much higher for mothers in good mental
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health when compared to those in poor mental health.18
The effect mental health on the value of leisure leads to two other mecha-
nisms. That is, the effect of maternal mental health on the quantity of maternal
time investments and on her labor force participation. In the model, this effect
is described by the marginal utility parameter λlpHt, X
u
t q in Equation 1.6. The
idea is that mental health problems can influence impulse, attention and emo-
tional control, so that spending consistent time in productive activities, such as
time in the labor market or engaged with the child, becomes more costly (Blair,
2010; Frijters, Johnston, and Shields, 2014). This increase in cost is captured
by an increase in the marginal utility of leisure and will result in a reduction
in investments in the child. An increase in leisure implies either a decrease in
monetary investments due to lower labor force participation or a decrease in
time investments. A reduction in labor force participation will also reduce the
mother’s human capital accumulation.19
These reductions in the woman and her child’s human capital also have
dynamic implications. A decrease in the mother’s experience capital can lead
to a decrease in her future labor market productivity, as captured by β2 in
Equation 1.9. This, in turn, leads to lower resources available in the future to
be invested in the child. Similarly, a decrease in the child’s human capital will
influence the returns of future family investments. This comes from the idea
of dynamic complementarity, where the returns of current investments depend
on the amount of past investments received by the child (see Aizer and Cunha
18The same could be true about the complementarity between maternal mental health and
family income. It is possible that financial investments in the child are more productive for
mothers in good health. This would be captured by α9t in Equation 1.4.
19Similarly, mental health can affect the value the mother places on consumption (λc) and
on the child’s human capital development (λa), also influencing her investment decisions.
27
(2012) and the discussion in Section 1.3.1).
The fifth and last mechanism corresponds to the mental health effect on the
mother’s productivity in the labor market (Ettner, Frank, and Kessler, 1997).
This effect is captured by β1 in Equation 1.9. A reduction in the mother’s
labor market productivity, conditional on hours worked, implies a reduction in
resources to be invested the child. This mechanism is especially important for
single women, who are the sole bread-winner in the household. This channel
also has dynamic implications due to an ambiguous effect on the mother’s labor
force participation.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
This Section describes the estimation strategy used in the paper. I start by
describing how I approximate mothers’ time allocation decision rules with policy
functions. I also discuss the benefits and costs of this approach. I then move
to explore the main threats to estimation - measurement error and endogeneity
of inputs - and how I handle these issues. At the end of the section, I describe
the method of simulated moments (MSM) procedure that I use to estimate the
empirical model.
1.4.1 Approximation to the Decision Rules
The empirical strategy involves approximating maternal time allocation deci-
sions with policy functions and estimating these jointly with the child’s tech-
nology of skill formation and the mother’s wage offer. This approach is similar
to that of other papers in the literature (see (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach,
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2010) and (Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2016) for two examples). The alterna-
tive approach would be to fully estimate the dynamic model described in the
previous section. That would allow me to estimate the preferences parame-
ters described in Equation 1.6. However, it would require me to make explicit
assumptions regarding the mother’s knowledge of her child’s skills and of the
technology of skill formation. Moreover, it would require me to make strong
assumptions regarding maternal investments in other children in the household,
or to restrict my sample to single child families.
As explained in Section 1.3.2, the mother’s choices in time t (dt  tHWt,MTtu)
will depend on the whole state space she faces in period t (Ωt) and on her be-
liefs on the state space evolution given her choices ErΩit 1|dt  j,Ωts. The
specific form of the policy functions for the mother’s time allocation decision
will depend on how one specify the mother’s preferences as well as the mother’s
knowledge about both her child’s ability and the technology of cognitive skill
formation. However, without taking a stance on these issues, we could write
the policy functions for the mother’s time allocation as a general function of
the state space faced by the mother in period t. This approach accommodates
most models of maternal behavior. That is, we can write the policy functions









where ηhwt and η
mt
t capture shocks to the mother’s decision.
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This estimation approach proposed has some clear advantages and disadvan-
tages. There are two main advantages. First, it avoids making strong assump-
tions about the investment process and can approximate multiple models of
household behavior. For example, it avoids making assumptions on the mother’s
knowledge about the technology of skill production.20 These assumptions can
heavily influence policy simulation exercises. Second, it allows me to estimate
the model for households with multiple children by allowing the mother’s de-
cisions to depend linearly on the family composition. This is not possible on
a fully structural model. As a matter of fact, since allocation of investments
across all children in a household is rarely observed in data, most papers that try
to recover individual preferences have focused on one-child families (see Bernal
(2008); Griffen (2012); Brilli (2014) for examples).21
The main disadvantage of the proposed empirical strategy is that it does
not allow me to recover deep utility parameters from the model (Equation 1.6).
This can be problematic in counterfactual policy analysis as I cannot estimate
the effect of policies on mothers’ preferences. Moreover, it does not allow me
to estimate the effect of the mother’s mental health on the these preferences.
For example, the overall effect of mental health on labor force participation in
Equation 1.10 captures both the effects of mental health on the marginal value
of leisure and consumption as well as its effects on the mother’s wages and the
child’s cognition, and how these affect the mother’s labor force participation.
20As a matter of fact, Cunha (2013) provides evidence that mothers have biased beliefs
about the production function of child skills.




Ideally I would like to estimate the policy functions nonparametrically as shown
in Equations 1.10 and 1.11. However, given the large state space, large num-
ber of parameters (100+) and the number of observations ( 2, 500), for com-
putational and identification reasons, I assume that the policy functions are
linear-in-parameters.
The state space is composed of many different variables described in the con-
ceptual model. There are three state variables that evolve endogenously in the
model: labor market experience (EXit), the history of hours in the labor market
(tHWizu
t
z0) and the history of maternal time investments (tMTizu
t
z0). These
variables determine the wage offer received by the mother and the child’s ability
in period t (see Equations 1.4 and 1.9). There are also exogenous state variables
that are fixed over time or evolve exogenously from the model. These include
exogenous variables that determine the child’s initial ability (Xai0), exogenous
variables that determine the wage offer (Xwit ), exogenous variables that enter
the flow utility function (Xuit) and the mother’s mental health (Hit), see Equa-
tions 1.5, 1.9 and 1.6. Moreover, it includes state level variation in welfare rules
(τst) and state variation in labor market conditions (ζst) that determine fam-











it, ζst, τstu is
the vector of exogenous state variables.
As a result, the linear-in-parameters policy functions for the mother’s time
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it ¥ 0
0 if HW it   0
where ηhwit captures shocks to the mother’s decision. The policy function for
maternal time investments is assumed to follow the exact same structure.
1.4.2 Empirical Model
The empirical strategy constitutes estimating the policy functions described
above jointly with the child’s technology of skill formation and the mother’s
wage offer. As a result, the empirical framework can be summarized by the
22In order to specify the expectation over the evolution of the state variables, these approach
needs two assumptions. First, I assume that the mother’s decision in the previous period




u). This is required for tractability. Otherwise, I would have to
re-write the child human capital production function so as to reduce the state space (see
(Bernal and Keane, 2010) as an example). Second, I assume that current state level variables
(tζst, τstu) are sufficient statistics for future changes in state level conditions.
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following system of equations:
lnpAt 1q  lnpKtq   α1tlnpAtq   α2tlnpGtq   α3tlnpMTtq   α4tlnpHtq
  α5tlnpAtqlnpGtq   α6tlnpAtqlnpMTtq   α7tlnpAtqlnpHtq



























































































where goods investments are assumed to be determined by a fixed proportion of
family income (Git  a  Incit), and as a result I substitute family income for
goods investments in the empirical model. Moreover, family income is assumed
to be determined by: Incit  HWitwit Nit Bit, where Inct is the total family
income, Nit is the part of income that does not depend on the woman’s labor
supply and Bit are government transfers received by the family.
This empirical model allows me to capture most of the mechanisms described
in Section 1.3.3. α4t captures the direct effect the mother’s mental health has
on children. One explanation is that it picks up contagion of mental illnesses
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(Rosenquist, Fowler, and Christakis, 2011). The effect of mental health on the
productivity of maternal time investments is captured by the complementar-
ity parameter α10t. Similarly, α7t and α9t captures possible complementarities
between the mother’s mental health and the child’s skill and family income re-
spectively. Moreover, β1 captures the effect mental health has on labor market
productivity, as discussed in Section 1.3.2. All these parameters are capturing
the deep parameters in the model — the structural effects of mental health.




are ‘reduced form’ parameters. These capture
the overall effect of the mother’s mental health on her labor supply and time
investment decisions. These parameters are reduced form because they capture
multiple effects. They capture the effect mental health has on the marginal
utility of leisure and consumption (λs in Equation 1.6), as well as the ‘indirect’
effect through its effect on the wage offer and on the child’s ability, and how
these affect her time allocation decision.
1.4.3 Endogeneity and Identification
One important issue for estimation is the endogeneity of investments in the
production of children’s cognitive skills. So far I have avoided any discussion
about endogeneity and identification. In this section, I discuss the source of the
endogeneity — unobserved investments — and how I address this issue — using
time invariant family types and exclusion restrictions.
The main source of endogeneity has to do with unobserved investments that
affect child outcomes and which may be correlated with observed investments.
I allow family income, the mother’s time and the mother’s mental health to
influence the technology of cognitive skill formation. By doing so I ignored
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many other investments that have been shown to be important for children’s
development. For example, children differ in whether they attended preschool
and in the quality of instruction they receive in school (preschool and compul-
sory). These investments are key for children’s development and are ignored in
the technology of skill production in this paper (assuming they are not picked
up by family income). Moreover, these schooling investments are correlated
with both family income and maternal time investments. For example, mothers
spend less time with children that attend preschool. Similarly, I have ignored
investments made by the father of the child (e.g. the father’s time with the
child). Again, it is possible that fathers compensate by spending more time
with the child when the mother is absent or is suffering from a mental health
condition.
Another endogeneity problem arises when estimating the effect of mental
health on the mother’s time allocation and on her productivity in the labor
market. Here, I worry about reverse causation. For example, just as poor
mental health can lead to lower labor market productivity, lower wages can
lead to financial strain and higher mental health problems (Dohrenwend et al.,
1992).
I control for the endogeneity of mental health in two ways. First, I model
the correlation in unobserved shocks across equations with time invariant family
types. Second, I use exclusion restrictions derived from the model to identify
the causal effect of the mother’s mental health, family income, and maternal
time investments in children.
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Mental Health Function
In order to control for the endogeneity of mental health, I need to specify how
mental health is determined. I assume a reduced form specification for the
mother’s mental health. That is, I assume the mental health function is a log-
linear function of the mother’s observed characteristics and state variation in
mental health parity laws, which are described in detail in Section 1.4.3.
Despite a large literature describing the production function of physical
health, there is surprisingly very little work in economics discussing the pro-
duction function of mental health. Psychologists describe that psychological
distress, and mental health illnesses in general, develop from the inability of the
individual to cope effectively with stressors and emotional turmoil (Horwitz,
2007; Ridner, 2004; Drapeau, Marchand, and Beaulieu-Prévost, 2011). As a
result, mental health can be thought as a function of these different stressors as
well as protective factors. Some stressors are economic in nature, and as such
are considered to be endogenous, such as poverty and economic strain (Conger
et al., 1994, 2002). Other are not, and are usually thought to be exogenous,
such as the death of a relative (Persson and Rossin-Slater, 2014), or exposure
to stressful events such as terrorist attacks (Camacho, 2008).
Protective factors can be thought as conditions that help the individual
cope with the stressful event. For example, Evans and Garthwaite (2014) shows
that government programs such as the EITC, which is thought to alleviate
financial strain, can lead to reductions in maternal depression. Moreover, access
to mental health services in the form of therapy and medication can alleviate and
treat the symptoms related to mental disorders. In general, policies that improve
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the access to mental health services are expected to lead to improvements in
mental health.
Following these ideas, I assume, psychological distress is a function of the
mother’s observable characteristics, such as her education and marriage status,
as well as the state level variation in mental health parity laws. Observable
characteristics capture the fact that certain groups are more likely to be exposed
to stressful events than others. Similarly, it captures the idea that certain social
groups have more resources to cope with stress than others (Drapeau, Marchand,
and Beaulieu-Prévost, 2011). On the other hand, parity laws capture variation
in access and coverage to mental health services across states. These services can
be thought as helping the mother cope with the different stressors. Formally,
the mental health function can be described by:
lnpHitq  X
h
itδx   ωstδs   η
mh
it (1.14)
where Xhit are observable characteristics of the mother, ωst is a dummy for
whether state s has passed a mental health parity law by year t and ηmhit is a
shock to the mother’s psychological distress.
Unobserved Types
In order to control for the endogeneity of investments, I allow for the unobserved








it) to be correlated across equations. I assume
these unobserved shocks have two components: a time invariant component that
is common to all shocks, and a time variant component that is assumed to be
independently distributed over time and across equations.
These time invariant family types capture the idea that families differ in
similar but unobservable ways. For example, it is possible that some families
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are more likely to send their children to preschool (unobservable in the model),
and as a result these children develop at a fast pace even though we observe
that they faced lower mother-child interactions. The time-invariant types are
assumed to capture these important unobserved differences across families and
as a result allow me to model the endogeneity in the empirical model.
Formally, I assume each unobserved shock (ηit) has two components. One
that is time-invariant and common to all shocks (κi) and another that is in-
dependent and identically distributed over time and across equations (εit). I
further assume that the time invariant component (κi) follows a discrete distri-




ρJl 1rκi  ls   ε
J
it @J P ta, hw,mt, w,mhu (1.15)
Moreover, I allow for the distribution of these different family types to differ
across the population. I do so in order to account for differences in in-utero
investments and genetic endowments across family types. That is, I allow for
the probability of mother i to belong to family type k to be a function of her
educational attainment at the time the child is born as well as for her mental
health status before the child’s birth. The hope is that educational attainment
and early mental health conditions capture maternal skills and mental health
endowments that are unobservable by the econometrician. Moreover, these
endowments are correlated with in-utero investments and genetic endowments
transmitted to the child, which are also unobserved.




exppθ0k   θ1kSi   θ2kDiq
1 
°K
l2 exppθ0l   θ1lSi   θ2lDiq
@k P 1, ..., K (1.16)
where θ01  0, θ11  0 and θ21  0, Si correspond to educational attainment
of woman’s i and Di is a dummy for whether she experiences depression before
age 17.
In theory, the number of family types (K) can be as large as the number
of individuals in the sample or as low as one. A piori, there is no theoretical
reason to choose one number over another. The usual practice is to increase the
number of types sequentially until the probability of a given type becomes “small
enough”.23 For example, in my preferred empirical specification, I assume there
are three family types since the estimated probability of belonging to the forth
type was small (  0.06) for most individuals when I allowed a forth type.24
Exclusion Restrictions
There are three endogenous variables in the model: the mother’s mental health,
monetary investments measured by family income, and maternal time invest-
ments. I use exclusion restrictions to identify their causal effects.
In order to identify the causal effect of the mother’s mental health, I use
variation in state mental health parity laws. In order to estimate this effect, I
need a factor that affects the mother’s mental health but does not enter any-
where else in the model. That is, something that does not directly influence her
labor market productivity, her time allocation decisions, or child cognitive skills.
23This is arbitrary since it is up for each researcher to decide what number is considered
“small enough”.
24Moreover, when I allowed for a forth type, I did not observe any qualitatively changes in
my results.
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Finding such variation is not easy and the literature has struggled with this is-
sue. Here, I use variation in mental health care access and coverage across states
and over time. This variation comes from mental health parity laws passed by
states in the 1990s. These laws are described by ωst in Equation 1.14. I discuss
these laws in more detail below.
In order to estimate the causal effect of family income (goods investments)
for children’s cognitive development, I use variation in both labor market condi-
tions (ζst) and welfare rules (τst). In order to estimate this effect, I need a factor
that affects family income but does not influence children’s cognitive develop-
ment directly. Both variation in labor market conditions and welfare rules serve
this purpose. Labor market conditions determine the wage offer received by the
mother (ζst in Equation 1.9), and as a result influence family income indirectly.
Variation in welfare rules determine government benefits received by the mother
(τst in Equation 1.7), and as a result influence family income directly. I use the
same variation (labor market conditions and welfare rules) to identify the ef-
fect of maternal time investments for children’s cognitive development. Both
of these variables change the budget constraint faced by the mother, and as a
result, influence the mother’s time allocation decision (labor supply and time
with the child). I describe these variables in more detailed below.
Mental Health Parity Laws.One long standing feature of the U.S. health
system has been the unequal coverage by insurance plans of mental health care
in comparison to general medical care. Until recently, with the passage of the
Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
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Act of 2008, 25 federal law provided few restrictions on this disparity.26 In order
to counter this lack of legislation, beginning in the 1970s and more aggressively
in the 1990s, states passed a series of mandates requiring employers and insurers
to regulate mental health benefits in their offered plans.
These laws varied significantly across states. Some states required insurance
plans to provide mental health coverage in all offered plans. Moreover, they
required that these benefits, including those for substance abuse, to be equal to
the benefits for general physical conditions. This is the strongest type of men-
tal health law that was approved. These laws are considered ‘full parity’ laws.
Other states passed milder versions. Some only required insurance plans to of-
fer mental health care coverage but left the purchase decision to the individual
buyer. These laws are generally called ‘mandate offering’ laws. Other states
passed weaker laws requiring parity in benefits only if a mental health plan was
offered - ‘mandate if offered’ laws. Besides these distinctions, there were also
significant variation across states on which mental health conditions were cov-
ered by the law and whether it excluded some important groups. For example,
some laws did not apply to individual plans, while others excluded plans offered
by companies with less than 50 employees. This variation in the ‘quality’ of
these laws makes it tricky to separate states into parity and non-parity states.
25In 2008 Congress passed the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act, a law that prohibits financial requirements, treatment limitations and
benefits for mental health and substance use disorders to be more restrictive than medical
and surgical benefits.
26One exception, is a 1996 mandate established by the congress that prohibited discrimina-
tion with respect to annual benefit limits on employer plans that chose to offer mental health
coverage. However, besides annual limits employers were free to discriminate or not offer any
mental health benefits.
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In order to address this issue, I use information provided by the National Al-
liance on Mental Illness (NAMI), which separated parity laws into two groups:
‘comprehensive’ and ‘limited’ laws. Limited laws excluded some important men-
tal health condition or group from the parity restrictions. Following their def-
inition, I assigned a state as having passed a parity law if they passed a ‘com-
prehensive’ full parity or mandate offering law. That is, I define that, at year t,
state s has a parity law (ωst) in place if by time t it had passed a ‘full parity’ or
‘mandate offering’ law that did not exclude individual or group plans and did
not excluded important mental health conditions.27
I argue that these laws only enter the model through their effect on the
mother’s mental health status. However, one possible threat to identification
would be if these laws also improved access to mental health services for children.
In that case, these laws could improve child outcomes directly. I argue this is
probably not the case in two ways. First, mental health coverage is less of
an issue for children since they generally have higher rates of coverage from
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) since 1997. As
an evidence, pediatricians are less likely than other caregivers to report not
providing outpatient mental health services because of lack of or inadequate
coverage (Cunningham, 2009). Second, previous research provides evidence that
state parity laws did not affect the likelihood of a child receiving outpatient
mental health services (Barry and Busch, 2008) or receiving needed mental
27In order to construct these laws, I follow information collected by the National
Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) (see: http://www.kantorlaw.net/documents/articles-
and-information/2010-IAEDP/Mental-Illness-State-Mental-Health-Parity-Laws.pdf). When-
ever needed, I supplemented this information with results in Lang (2013) and in-
formation provided by the National Conference of State Legislature NCLS (see
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-benefits-state-mandates.aspx).
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health care (Barry and Busch, 2007).28 In contrast, previous research does show
evidence that parity laws improved utilization of mental health care services in
adults (Harris, Carpenter, and Bao, 2006).29
Labor Market Conditions. I use two variables to capture variation in
labor market conditions. The median wage rate in the state for workers in the
service sector and the share of the population in the state that works in the
service sector. These variables were measured at the state and year level using
data from the current population survey (CPS). These variables are commonly
used in the literature as exogenous variation in the wage rate and are described
in more detail in Table 1.4.
A possible threat to identification in using labor market conditions is that
they are possibly related to the father’s labor supply decision. The fact that
they affect the father’s wage is not a problem since I control for family income
in the model. However, they might also influence the amount of time the father
spends with the child, which is treated as an unobservable in the technology of
skill production function.
Welfare Rules. I use the large variation in welfare rules across states and
over time in the U.S. as exclusion restrictions in the model. Welfare rules have
been shown to significantly affect the labor supply of single mothers (Moffitt,
1992). Moreover, these rules have been used in previous work to identify the
effect of maternal work decision on child outcomes (Bernal and Keane, 2010,
28Although there is evidence that these laws reduced children’s annual out-of-pocket health
care spending exceeding $1,000 (Barry and Busch, 2007).
29Another threat to identification would be if these laws were correlated with other state
level conditions. For example, these laws could be correlated with state level labor market
conditions. I cannot rule out this possibility, however, I find that these laws are only weakly
correlated (  0.2) with other state level conditions I use in this paper, such as state level
unemployment rate and welfare rules.
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2011). I use state variation in waivers and requirements under the Tempo-
rary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) program after 1997 and state variation in
benefits and income requirements under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program before 1997. In addition, I supplement these with
state and time variation in the shape of the earned income tax credit (EITC)
schedule for a family of three. This variation is important as it also affects the
labor supply of married women (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006). These variables are
described in more detail in Table 1.4.
One issue with these welfare policies is that there are too many of them (18
variables in total), each having a small effect on women’s labor supply decision.
This is problematic for estimation as it creates unnecessary computational bur-
den. Preferably, I would like to have a smaller set of variables with a stronger
predictive power. In order to do that, I follow the approach proposed in Bernal
and Keane (2011). I summarize the information contained in these 18 variables
into two scores via factor analysis. These scores are estimated using the princi-
pal factor method and the varimax rotation. These scores have two important
properties. First, these factors are linear functions of the original policy vari-
ables, and as a result, are also valid exclusion restrictions. Second, these scores
have a much stronger predictive power than each policy variable separately.
These rules are commonly used as instruments for maternal investments in
children. However, I should still mention possible threats to identification. One
important threat is the fact that these laws changed significantly in 1997 with
the introduction of the TANF program. However, also in 1997, the federal gov-
ernment introduced the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).
This program largely expanded health insurance coverage for children, and as a
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result is arguably correlated with child outcomes. I hope that by using variation
in welfare rules from 1983 to 2013 and the variation in the EITC schedule this
becomes less of a problem.
1.4.4 Measurement Error
Another issue that can lead to biased estimates is measurement error. Most con-
cerning for this paper is the measurement error in the mental health construct.
The Kessler 6 psychological distress scale used in this paper suffers from both
the intrinsic measurement error in these self-reported questionnaires as well as
measurement error from aggregating information from different measurements -
the scale consists of six different questions. In order to control for this problem,
I use an item response theory (IRT) approach.
The Kessler 6 psychological distress scale is composed by 6 questions scored
on a scale of five values (0-4). The usual approach in the literature is to sum
the answers to the 6 questions to end up with a score ranging from 0 to 24.
There are, however, many issues with this simple approach. If we think that
each question is measured with some noise and that the variance in the noise
is different across questions, then summing up the scores on each question will
provide a very unreliable and noisy measure of the underlying mental health.
Moreover, each question provides different information about the underlying
psychological distress that it is measuring. There is no reason to believe that a
score of 4 in one of the measures imply the same level of psychological distress
as a score of 4 in another measure. For example, feeling nervous “all of the
time” might indicate something different than feeling restless or fidgety “all
of the time”. This is evident as the prevalence rates of scores are different
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across questions. Similarly, we have no reason to believe that different changes
in scores within a measure provide the same information about the change in
the underlying psychological distress. For example, answering 4 versus 3 might
imply a greater increase in psychological distress than answering 2 versus 1 in
one of the questions. Summing up the scores, again, ignore these issues.
A better approach, common in the psychological literature, is to use an
item response theory (IRT) model to control for the measurement error in the
measurements as well as this difference in information across questions. Many
different IRT models have been proposed in the literature. Here, I use the
grade response model proposed by Samejima (1969), which is appropriate for
multidimensional ordinal items. Formally, letMij  k correspond to the answer
to question j by individual i, which can take 5 different values k  t0, 1, 2, 3, 4u.
The IRT model is interested in estimating the probability of observing answer
k or higher for question j and individual i given the underlying psychological
distress level θi. This probability is assumed to be given by:
PrpMij ¥ k|θiq 
exppajlnpθiq   bjkq
1  exppajlnpθiq   bjkq
(1.17)
where aj captures the information value of question j and bjk is the kth cutpoint
for question j and is usually understood as the difficulty in answering k or higher
in item j. Alternatively, the probability of observing outcome k is given by:
PrpMij  k|θiq  PrpMij ¥ k|θiq  PrpMij ¥ k   1|θiq (1.18)
where PrpMij ¥ 0|θiq  1 and PrpMij ¥ 5|θiq  0.
I compute these probabilities outside the main model estimation. This part
of the model is computed by simulated maximum likelihood. Let kij be the
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observed answer to question j by individual i, then the likelihood for individual






PrpMij  kij|θi, aj, bjkqfpθiqdθi (1.19)
where lnpθiq is assumed to be normal distributed with mean 0 and variance 1
and the model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood.
The value of the unobserved psychological distress for each individual is es-
timated in a second step by the empirical Bayes method. The value is estimated











j1 PrpMij  kij|θi, âj, b̂jkqfpθiqdθi
dθi (1.20)
where âj and b̂jk are the estimated parameters in the first step and fpθiq is
the prior distribution of theta. The estimated θ̂i is the main measure for the
individual psychological distress scale.
1.4.5 Estimation: Method of Simulated Moments
I estimate the parameters of the model using the method of simulated moments
(MSM). The estimation method follows an iterative process. First, I calculate
the moments from the data. Then, given an initial guess of the parameter vector,
I simulate 10 paths for each woman and her child. That is, I first simulate the
path for the mother’s psychological distress for the 17 periods (ages 0-16). Then,
I simulate the hours of work and the time investment decisions at each period
using the structure described in Section 1.4. Following that, I simulate the wage
offer received by the mother at each period following the structure described in
Section 1.3.2, and path for the child’s cognitive ability described in Section 1.3.1.
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Once I have these, I can calculate the moments from the simulated data and
the weighted distance between the sample moments and the simulated moments
from the data. The iterative process continues until this distance is minimized.
More formally, let Ω denote the parameter vector, MSpΩq denote the vector
of moments from the simulated data and MO the moments from the observed





1W pMO MSpΩqq (1.21)
where W is a symmetric, positive-definite weighting matrix. I construct W
to be the inverse of the covariance matrix of MO estimated by bootstrap with
500 replications. That is, I compute the vector of moments M qO for each of
the Q resamples from the original N data points, which leads to the following


























The moments that form MO and consequently MS include the mean and
standard deviation of the child’s cognition for each of the child’s age. They also
include the mean of the child’s cognition by different maternal characteristics
such as maternal education. I also include the mean of the child’s cognition
by different percentile levels of maternal investments five years prior to the es-
timated cognition. Moreover, I include the mean and standard deviation of
maternal work hours, maternal time with the child, observed wages and the
mother’s psychological distress, as well as the mean of each variable by the
percentiles of maternal and the child observed characteristics. I also include
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the correlations between the observed wage rate, hours worked and the mater-
nal time with the child, correlations between the contemporaneous wage rate
and lagged work hours, and between the two contemporaneous time allocation
choices and the two lagged time allocation choices.
1.5 Empirical Results
I start by describing the main estimation parameters and how these compare
with estimates from a static model and a model that does not control for the
endogeneity of mental health. These comparisons highlight the importance of
controlling for endogeneity and allowing for dynamic effects. Next, I describe
the overall effect of maternal psychological distress on children’s cognitive devel-
opment, and the relative importance of each proposed mechanism in explaining
this effect. I will argue that maternal mental matters since a 1% increase in
maternal distress in all periods results in a 0.17% decrease in children’s cogni-
tive scores at age 16. I will also show that the effect of maternal distress on
the productivity of maternal investments explains 70% of the effect of maternal
mental health on children.
1.5.1 Human Capital Production Function
Table 1.8 presents the estimated parameters for the main outcome of interest,
the child human capital production function described in Equation 1.4. The
estimates show some interesting patterns. The first evident pattern is that the
total factor productivity (K) is about 50 percent higher in the second devel-
opmental period than in the first. This suggests that inputs in the production
function explain a much larger share of cognitive development in the first period
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than in the second. This finding is similar to previous research that highlight the
higher return of investments early in life (see Heckman and Mosso (2014)). The
estimated parameters also show that the relative self-productivity of children’s
cognitive skills (captured by α1) is much greater in the second developmental
stage than in the first stage. The high self-productivity parameter in the sec-
ond stage also highlights the importance of investing in children early in the life
cycle.
Given these results is perhaps not surprising that I find that the relative
productivity of family income (α2) and maternal time investments (α3) are sig-
nificantly higher in the first developmental period than in the second. However,
I also find that the productivity (or penalty) for the mother psychological dis-
tress (α4) is similar across both periods. This finding could be explained by the
idea that the contagion of mental health does not depend on the child’s age. It
also underlines possible benefits of mental health interventions at later stages
in the child’s development.
Parameters α5, α6 and α7 in Table 1.8 are not significantly different than
zero. This implies that my model rejects evidence of dynamic complementarities
beyond the what is already implied by the Cobb-Douglas. This result is not that
different from other papers in the literature. For instance, Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010) find similar evidence under some specifications.30 I also do not
find evidence of static complementarity between family income and the maternal
time investments beyond the one implied by the Cobb-Douglas function (α8
in Table 1.8). Moreover, I find economic large but statistically insignificant
30Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) cannot reject the Cobb-Douglas formulation
when they estimate the production function using only cognitive skills.
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static complementarity between maternal mental health and family income (α9
in Table 1.8). Also, this complementarity has an opposite sign in the two
developmental stages.
In contrast, I find a large and significant static complementarity between
maternal mental health and maternal time investments in both developmental
stages. This is one of the key findings in the paper. It suggests that the returns
to maternal time investments are highly dependent on the mother’s mental
health. It suggests that the value of maternal time investments are very high
when the mother is in a good mental health state. Moreover, it suggests that
the value of maternal time investments can be negative for children of mothers
in poor mental health.
1.5.2 Time Allocation
Tables 1.10 and 1.11 present the estimated parameters for the two time alloca-
tion decisions as described by Equation 1.12. As I discussed in Section 1.2.2,
the direction of the effect of maternal psychological distress on the time allo-
cation decisions is uncertain since the estimated linear effect captures many
different channels. For instance, it captures the effect of maternal distress on
the marginal utility of leisure, which is expected to be positive. It also cap-
tures the effect of maternal distress on maternal wages, which in turn changes
the budget constraint. Moreover, it captures the effect of maternal distress on
the child’s human capital, which is part of the woman’s utility function. One
would expect an increase in the utility of leisure to decrease the time spent in
either the labor market or interacting with the child. However, a decrease in
her productivity in the labor market could have an ambiguous effect due to
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substitution and income effects. The same thing is true for a decrease in the
productivity of maternal time investments.
My findings point to small and economically insignificant effects for the work
decision and a negative but small effects for the maternal time investments
decision. For instance, I find that a one standard deviation increase in maternal
distress increases labor force participation by only 16 hours per year (see Table
1.10). As a comparison, in the preliminary analysis, I ignored both endogeneity
and dynamic issues and found an effect on labor force participation that was
four times larger and of a different sign (column [4] in Table 1.3). This change in
sign is also present in a model that allows for dynamic interactions but ignores
the endogeneity of mental health. Parameter estimates for this model can be
seen in Table A.4 in A.1.31 This results is different than other papers in the
literature that have estimated a negative effect of mental health on labor force
participation (Frijters, Johnston, and Shields, 2014; Ettner, Frank, and Kessler,
1997). Moreover, they highlight the importance of modeling the dynamics of
the mother’s labor force participation.
Similarly, I find that a one standard deviation increase in maternal distress
decreases maternal time with the child by only 0.06 hours per week (see Table
1.11). As a comparison, this estimated effect is around ten times smaller than
in models that do not control for the endogneity of mental health (see column
[2] in Table 1.3 and results in Table A.5).
The remainder results in Tables 1.10 and 1.11 are unsurprising. I find that
highly educated mothers spend both more time in the labor market and more
31For the results in A.1, I re-estimate my main empirical model under the assumptions that
the shocks in each equation are uncorrelated across equations. In other words, I assume that
there are no unobserved family types
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time with their children. This is a well known result from the child development
literature (Kalil, Ryan, and Corey, 2012). I also find that mothers spend more
time with girls than boys and that higher non-maternal labor income is related
to a lower time spent with the child. Finally, I also find that the two welfare
rules factors are significantly predictive of the two time allocation decisions.
1.5.3 Wage Offer
Table 1.12 presents the estimated parameters for the hourly wage equation
described in Equation 1.9. According to the intuition described in Section 1.2.2,
one would expect maternal psychological distress to be negative related to the
productivity in the labor market. However, I do not find that to be the case
once I control for the endogeneity of maternal distress. A one percent increase in
psychological distress causes a 0.002 percent decrease in maternal hourly wages,
which is economically insignificant.
Before controlling for the endogeneity of mental health the estimated rela-
tionship between distress and wages was between ten to twenty times larger.
These can be seen in column [6] in Table 1.3 and in Table A.6). Moreover, the
estimated results are much smaller than the reported numbers in the rest of
the literature (see (Ettner, Frank, and Kessler, 1997) as an example). These
results highlight the importance of properly accounting for the selection into
employment and for the endogeneity of mental health.
The other parameters in the wage equation follow standard economic theory.
I find that maternal years of education is positively related to labor market
productivity, that the offered wage increases as the woman ages, and that a
stronger labor market, as measured by median service sector wages, is positive
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related to hourly wages. Moreover, I find a positive relationship between labor
market experience and wages and a strong penalty for spending a period outside
the labor market.
1.5.4 Decomposition
When taking in account all of the different mechanisms I find that maternal
mental health matters for children’s cognitive development. This is one of the
key findings in this paper. I find that on average a 30% decrease in mothers’
psychological distress result in a 5.09% increase in children’s cognitive skills at
age 16. This effect is large and similar to, for example, the effect of a $350 per
week increase in family income.32 This effect is reported in the first row of Table
1.5. This effect can be seen graphically in Figure 1.5. The solid line plots the
simulated change in cognitive scores at age 16 for the median child for different
levels of maternal distress.
Two mechanisms are key in explaining the effect of maternal distress on
children’s development. The most important mechanism is the effect of maternal
mental health on the productivity of maternal time and goods investments. I
call these ‘complementarity effects’. As can be seen in Table 1.5, this mechanism
alone explains about 70% of the overall effect. That is, this mechanism alone
implies that a 30% decrease in mothers’ psychological distress would result in
32These results on family income are comparable to other research. For example, using the
same data Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014) finds that a $250 weekly increase in child
goods lead to 4.6% increase in child quality at age 16.
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a 3.72% increase in children’s cognitive skill at age 16.33 34 The importance of
this mechanism can also be seen graphically in Figure 1.5. Once I control for
these complementarities changes in maternal distress have a significant smaller
effect on the child’s cognition.
The importance of this mechanism is explained by two parameter estimates.
First, it is explained by the large negative complementarity between maternal
time investments and maternal distress in the technology of cognitive skill for-
mation (α10 in Table 1.8). It is also explained by the finding that maternal
distress does not influence the quantity of maternal time investments (see Ta-
ble 1.11). These results together, imply that mothers in poor mental health
spend the same amount of time engaged with their children, when compared
to mothers in good mental health, even though their time investment is signifi-
cantly less productive (and sometimes harmful) for their children. The fact that
some mothers spend time with their children even when it is not productive (or
harmful) to do so highlights the benefits of policy interventions.
The second important mechanism is the direct effect of maternal mental
health on children’s cognitive development (α4 in Table 1.8). This mechanism
captures all the ways mental health affects children that are not captured by
the other mechanisms in my model. For example, it captures mental health
33Here is a brief description on how I compute the separate effect of each mechanism. First,
I simulate children’s cognition scores at age 16 without any changes into the model. Then,
I create a new measure for the mother’s distress that is 30% smaller. Next, I substitute this
new measure for the old one in the maternal labor force participation equation, and compare
the new simulated children’s cognition scores at age 16 with the old score. This allows me
to compute the percentage change in children’s scores due to the effect of maternal distress
on the mother’s labor force participation alone. Then, I allow the new measure of maternal
distress to enter the model through the other mechanisms one at a time. This allows me to
compute the change in children’s scores due to each of the other mechanisms.
34The order of the mechanisms can change the estimated contribution of each mechanism.
However, the results are very similar independent of the order used.
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contagion, the idea that the child develops mental health problems of their
own by being exposed to the mother’s mental health problems. The direct
effect explains about 30% of the overall effect, as I describe in Table 1.5. This
mechanism alone implies that a 30% decrease in mothers’ psychological distress
would result in a 1.38% increase in children’s cognitive skill at age 16. I also
depicted this mechanism graphically in Figure 1.5. The relative importance of
the direct effect is represented by the second dotted line. It is also important to
notice that, differently than family income (α2) and time investments (α3), the
effect of maternal distress (α4) is high in both developmental stages. This is also
true for the complementarity effect (α10). This means that policies that focus
on improving maternal mental health are especially important when targeting
older children.
I do not find strong evidence that the other mechanisms play an important
role for children’s cognitive development. These other mechanisms correspond
to the proposed effect of the mother’s mental health on her labor force partici-
pation, on the time spent with her child, and on her labor market productivity.
This is perhaps surprisingly given that I do find evidence of these mechanisms
when looking at static effects, as I demonstrated in Section 1.2.4. However,
evidence of these effects disappear once I allow for dynamics in the mothers’
labor force participation decision, and, more importantly, when I control for the
endogeneity of mental health, as I described in the beginning of this section.
These results highlight the importance of constructing a model that allows for
dynamic interactions and endogeneity.
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1.6 Policy Analysis
The results discussed in the previous section suggest two avenues for policy
intervention. Two mechanisms explain the effect of maternal psychological dis-
tress on children’s development: the direct effect of maternal distress and the
negative complementarity between maternal distress and maternal time invest-
ments. Policies that aim to improve the cognitive development of children of
at-risk mothers should target these two mechanisms. One would be to treat
at-risk mothers for their mental illness. Another policy would be to improve
maternal parenting, as in home visitation programs.
1.6.1 Mental Health Treatment
The most obvious policy intervention would be to screen mothers for psycho-
logical problems and treat all mothers at risk of developing a mental illness.
This approach is currently recommended by the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics regarding maternal postpartum depression. The Academy recommends
that pediatricians screen mothers for postpartum depression at the infant’s 1,
2, and 4 month visits (Earls et al., 2010). Similarly, we could screen and treat
mothers for mental health problems at later stages in the child’s life.
There are many different approaches to treat mental health problems such
as distress, depression and anxiety. Two are the most common: anti-depression
medication and psychological interventions, such as cognitive behavioral ther-
apy. Both methods have been shown to be important avenues to treat depression
and anxiety disorders in adults. For instance, cognitive behavioral therapy has
been shown to increase the probability of remission from depression in adults
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when compared to usual care, and to decrease the levels of depression by up to
1 standard deviation (Churchill et al., 2013). Psychological therapies have also
been shown to effectively reduced generalised anxiety disorder in adults (Hunot
et al., 2007). Moreover, both antidepressants and psychological interventions
have been shown to reduce symptoms and levels of postnatal depression. For
instance, mothers treated with antidepressants were between 43% to 79% more
likely than those treated with a placebo to show signs of remission from depres-
sion (Molyneaux et al., 2014).35
Given the similarities between psychological distress and both depression
and anxiety disorders, these results suggest that medication and therapy can
significantly reduce maternal distress. Moreover, given these results it does not
seem unreasonable to assume that mental health treatment could lead to a 30%
decrease in the level of psychological distress. I should mention that coming up
with a value for the treatment is inevitably arbitrary given that the efficacy of
treatment vary with the type of treatment and also across individuals in the
population.
Table 1.6 shows the effect of different policies on children’s cognitive scores
at age 16. On average, mental health treatment, represented by a 30% decrease
in mothers’ psychological distress, results in a 5.09% increase in children’s cog-
nitive skills at age 16. This effect was computed by re-simulating the model
and calculating children’s cognitive skills under the 30% reduction in maternal
levels of psychological distress. By comparison, an increase in family income by
the median TANF benefit, which was $379 per month in 2,000, only increases
35Most of these studies focus on Sertraline, which is an antidepressant of the selective
serotonin re-uptake inhibitor class.
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children’s scores by 1.2%.36 Unsurprisingly, the returns to mental health treat-
ment are larger for children of mothers in poor mental health. This can be
seen in Figure 1.6 that plots average percentage change in children’s cognitive
scores at age 16 as a result of mental health treatment for different percentiles
of maternal psychological distress.37
We can use a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to compare the value of
mental health treatments to equivalent income transfers. Russell et al. (1999)
estimated the average cost of mental health treatment for adults, including
outpatient visits and hospitalizations, to be around $1,200 per year. Assuming
the 30% decrease in maternal psychological distress, maternal mental health
treatment improves children’s cognitive scores by 5.09 percentage points, on
average. In comparison, a $1,200 permanent annual increase in family income
improves children’s cognitive socres by mere 0.32 percentage points. These
results suggest that, on average, investments in mother’s mental health are 16
times more valuable for improving children’s cognitive skills than comparable
income transfers.
36One important caveat from computing the effect of income transfers is that the model
does not allow increases in family income to affect the mother’s mental health. Higher family
income should lead to better mental health as it alleviates financial strain and increases the
resources to be invested in the mother’s mental health.
37In Figure 1.6, the effect of cash transfers are larger for children of mothers in poor mental
health. This is surprisingly, since dynamic complementarity implies that the return of family
income would be larger for mothers in good mental health. However, I estimated a positive
complementarity between family income and maternal distress in the second developmental
period (α9 in Table 1.8), which explains why I find the opposite result. As a matter of fact,
if I look at younger children, where the complementarity parameter α9 is negative, the effect
of cash transfer are much larger for children of mothers in good health.
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1.6.2 Improving Maternal Parenting
Another avenue for policy intervention would be to invest in programs that
improve mother-child relationships for mothers with high levels of psychologi-
cal distress, as in for example home visitation programs. In traditional home
visitation programs, a nurse or social worker provides educational training to
mothers during frequent visits to the family’s home. The training focuses on
many areas, including parenting skills, maternal health, and infant nutrition.
These programs have become increasingly popular and include well know pro-
grams, such as the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP), Healthy Families America,
and the Infant Health and Development Program (Howard and Brooks-Gunn,
2009; Ammerman et al., 2010). These programs have been evaluated by control
trials, and shown to improve children’s achievement in school, decrease chil-
dren’s behavioral problems and reduce criminality during adolescence (Howard
and Brooks-Gunn, 2009).
One of the many ways through which these programs improve child out-
comes is by improving maternal parenting skills. As a result, one way to model






for mothers in poor mental health. One big
issue is deciding on how much these programs improve the productivity of ma-
ternal time investments. Since we don’t have actual estimates any number will
be arbitrary. I argue that a reasonable assumption is to assume these programs
lead to a 20% reduction in the gap in productivity of maternal time investments
across mothers.38
38As mentioned, this number comes with many caveats. First, the actual improvement in
the productivity of maternal time investments can be very different across programs. Second,
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Another issue with estimating the value of improving the productivity of
maternal time investments is that in doing so I am changing structural param-
eters in the model. Since I did not estimate the mother’s preference parameters
(Equation 1.6), I cannot estimate how changes in the productivity of maternal
time investments affect the mother’s time allocation decisions. As a result, the
results in this section rely on the assumption that the reduced form time allo-
cation policy functions remain the same after the introduction of the program.
With that in mind, I find that, on average, a 20% reduction in the gap in
productivity of maternal time investments results in a 6.31% increase in chil-
dren’s cognitive skills. This can be seen in Table 1.6. This effect was computed
by re-simulating the model and calculating children’s cognitive skills under the
20% reduction in the gap in the value maternal time investments. Again, these
can be compared to an increase in family income by the median TANF benefit,
which only increases children’s scores by 1.2%. Moreover, I find large hetero-
geneity in the returns of this program across mothers, as can be seen in Figure
1.6. As expected, the benefit of this policy is negligible for children of mothers
with low levels of psychological distress. However, this policy improves skills by
as much as 11 percentage points for children of mothers with serious psycholog-
ical distress.39
We can use a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to compare the value
the improvement is most likely heterogeneous across mothers. Lastly, as far as I am aware
nobody has measure the improvements in the productivity of maternal time investments from
home visitation programs.
39There is a technical explanation for the difference in heterogeneous effects across the two
programs. Mental health treatment decreases the level of maternal distress, which enters the
child’s technology of skill production in ‘log-form’. This is not true for the improvement in
parenting policy, which directly alters the α parameters in that function. As a result, a 30%
in effect of maternal distress will have a much larger effect for children than a 30% decrease
in the level of maternal distress.
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of home visitation programs, insofar as they improve maternal parenting, to
equivalent income transfers. Burwick et al. (2014) estimated the average cost
of home visitation programs to be $6,583 per family for a 44 week enrollment
period. One important questions is whether these programs improve maternal
parenting skills in the short or long run. That is, do we need to re-enroll families
every year or enrolling them once is enough to improve maternal parenting until
the child reaches the end of the developmental period. In the former case we
should compare these programs to a $6,583 permanent annual income increase,
which improves children’s cognitive scores by 1.74 percentage points. In the
latter case we should compare these programs to a one-time $6,583 increase
in annual income, which at age 5 improves children’s cognitive scores at age
16 by mere 0.09 percentage points, on average. With all the caveats already
mentioned and assuming home visitation programs lead to a 20% reduction in
the gap in productivity of maternal time investments, these results suggest that
investments in home visitation programs are between 3-70 times more valuable
for improving children’s cognitive skills than comparable income transfers.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper builds on many strands of the child development literature in or-
der to evaluate the different mechanisms that relate maternal mental health
to children’s cognitive development. In the analysis, I allow maternal mental
health to determine the quantity as well as the quality of maternal investments.
My model estimates, which were derived using data from the Panel of Study of
Income Dynamics, shed light on the importance of mother’s mental health for
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children’s development.
Using the parameter estimates from the model, I first show that on average
a 1% decrease in maternal psychological distress increases children’s cognitive
scores by 0.17 percentage points. Moreover, I show that the effect of maternal
distress on the productivity (quality) of maternal time investments explains
70% of the effect on children. Next, I investigate policy interventions that can
mitigate these effects. I argue that treating mothers for psychological distress
could improve children’s cognitive scores by 5.09 percentage points, similar to a
$350 weekly increase in family income. Similarly, I argue that home visitation
programs, which improve maternal parenting behavior, also have large benefits
for children and are a viable option when treatment does not work. Moreover,
back-of-the envelope calculations show that both policies are much more cost
effective at improving child outcomes than income transfers.
These results open up many avenues for future research. In particular, future
research should explore the different ways that government programs interact
with maternal mental health in producing child outcomes. For example, we
now know that increases in the earned income tax credit (EITC) are related
to improvements in mothers’ mental health (Evans and Garthwaite, 2014). We
also know that increases in the EITC are related to improvements in children’s
outcomes (Dahl and Lochner, 2012). As a result, we can ask whether maternal
mental health mediates the effect of EITC on children. Moreover, we now
know that maternal mental health changes the productivity of maternal time
investments, and as a result, we can ask whether differences in maternal mental
health can partially explain the puzzling heterogeneity in the returns to childcare
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Figure 1.1: Psychological Distress Scale
Figure 1.1(a) plots the average distress scale by family income percentiles mea-
sured between the ages 0 to 5. Individuals in the lower end of the income
distribution are at a much higher risk of developing mental health problems
than individuals at the higher end of the distribution. There a sharp drop until
the median family income, which is equivalent to $46,000 (measured in 2000
dollars). Figure 1.1(b) plots the density of the distress scale constructed using
Item Response Theory. The responses are concentrated in the left part of the
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(b) LW Score by Family Income and Age
Groups
Figure 1.2: Chidren’s Letter-Word Score
Figure 1.2(a) plots average age-standardized Letter-Word scores by family in-
come percentile. LW score was measured from ages 3 to 16 and family income
was measured between the ages 0 to 5. Socioeconomic disparities in children’s
cognition are large, the cognition gap can be as large as one standard devi-
ation. Figure 1.2(b) does a similar analysis for different age groups. These
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(d) Hourly Wage by the Child’s Age
Figure 1.3: Investments by the Child’s Age
These figures plot changes in maternal investments as the child ages. Figure
1.3(a) plots changes in maternal distress, figure 1.3(b) plots changes in mater-
nal time investments, figure 1.3(c) plots changes in the mother’s labor force
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(d) Hourly Wage
Figure 1.4: Outcomes by Maternal Distress
Figures 1.4(a)-1.4(d) plot the raw relationship between the maternal distress
and children’s cognitive skills, maternal time investments, maternal labor force
participation, and hourly wage received if employed. 95% confidence intervals
are also plotted.
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 + Control for Time and Wage Effects
 + Control for Complementarity Effects
 + Control for the Direct Effect
Figure 1.5: Decomposition of the Effect of Maternal Psychologi-
cal Distress
This figure plots the simulated change in child cognitive score at age 16 for
the median child for different levels of maternal distress. I re-simulate child
cognitive skills under different specifications. That is, I control for different
channels through which maternal mental health can affect child outcomes. First,
I control for the effect of maternal distress on her labor force participation, time
investments and wages. These are very small, so the second curve overlaps
with the first. Then, I control for the effect of maternal mental health on
the productivity of maternal time investments. Controlling for this mechanism
significantly reduces the effect of maternal distress, highlighting its importance.
Lastly, I control for the remaining effects. Once I do so, the line becomes flat,
as expected.
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P1: Change in Distress
P2: Change in Time Productivity
P3: Median TANF Benefit
Figure 1.6: Policies
This figure plots the effect of different policies on children’s cognitive develop-
ment at age 16. These effects are calculated for the median child for different
levels of maternal distress. In the first policy, I decrease psychological distress
by 30% in the whole population. The second policy, decreases the gap in the
returns of maternal time investments across individuals by 20%. Then, I com-
pare these policies to an increase in family income by the median TANF benefit,
which was was $379 per month in 2,000.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max # obs
Child is Female 0.495 0.500 0 1 41803
Child is Black 0.401 0.490 0 1 41803
Mother’s Years of Edu. 12.98 1.978 10 17 41803
Mother’s Age at Birth 25.68 5.727 13 41 41803
Number of Children 2.791 1.189 1 11 41803
Mother is Single 0.317 0.2165 0 1 41803
Letter-Word Score 1.417 1.093 0.001 12.79 4582
Maternal Distress 1.533 2.066 0.271 36.64 4534
Maternal Time Investments 19.36 14.13 0 77.33 5006
Annual Hours Worked 1209 913.6 0 3640 25795
Hourly Wage 12.76 84.08 1.970 65.80 19864
Mother’s Depression B.17 0.043 0.202 0 1 41803
Child-Age Observations 41803
Notes: Summary statistics for the analytic sample of 2,459 children. Children
and their mothers were observed over 17 years for a total of 41803 child-age
observations. Entries for the child’s race and gender and the mother’s cohabiting
status and depression before age 17 are in the form of percentages divided by
100. Maternal time investments is measured in weekly hours, hours worked in
annual hours and hourly wages are in 2000 dollars. The child’s letter-word score
has been log-age-standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation equal to
1 at all ages.  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes
the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient is
significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1.2: Preliminary: Log Letter-Word Score
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4]
Log Maternal Distress -.129 -.069 -.068 -.063
Log Maternal Time . . .035 .038
Log Family Income . . . .093
Controls (N) (Y) (Y) (Y)
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used link
maternal investments to child cognitive scores. I regress log age-standardized
letter word scores at time t  5 on maternal investments at time t. Controls in-
clude the mother’s years of education, age at the child’s birth, cohabiting status,
number of children and the child’s race and gender.  denotes the coefficient is
significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5%
level and  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
Table 1.3: Preliminary: Maternal Investments
Maternal Time Annual Hours Worked Hourly Wages
[1] [2] [3] [4] [4] [6]
Log M.Dis. -.825 -.547 -57.662 -41.810 -.085 -.048
Controls (N) (Y) (N) (Y) (N) (Y)
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used link
log maternal psychological distress to other maternal investments. I regress
weekly maternal time with the child, annual hours worked and hourly wages if
employed on log maternal distress. Controls for the time decisions include the
mother’s years of education, age at the child’s birth, cohabiting status, number
of children and the child’s race and gender. Controls for the wage offer include
the mother’s age and age squared, her education and state level labor market
conditions indicators.
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Table 1.4: State Level Variables: Description and Sources
Instruments Description Source
Labor Market Conditions
servwagest Median hourly wage rate for workers in the Service Sector in State s MORG
empservicest Share of the employed population working in the Service sector in State s MORG
State Variation in TANF Rules
DiversionProgramst Dummy for whether State s has a Diversion Program in place at Period t UI-WRD
JobSearchRequiredst Dummy for whether State s requires applicants to search for a job before application UI-WRD
TPElegiblest Dummy for whether Two-Parent Families are eligible for benefits in State s UI-WRD
TPLimitonHoursst Dummy for whether State s has a limit on the number of hours a month the principal wage earner can work UI-WRD
TPWorkHistoryst Dummy for whether State s performs a work history test in order to determine eligibility of TP Families UI-WRD
TPWaitingPeriodst Dummy for whether State s implements waiting periods for TP Families UI-WRD
NetIncomeTestst Dummy for whether State s performs a Net Income Test before determining eligibility UI-WRD
EIDpercentst Percent amount of Income disregarded in determining net income for the income eligibility tests n State s UI-WRD
EIDflatst Flat amount of Income disregarded in determining net income for the income eligibility tests in State s UI-WRD
MaxIncEligF3st Maximum monthly income for initial eligibility for a family of three in State s UI-WRD
MaxBenF3st Maximum monthly benefit awarded for a family of three with no income in State s UI-WRD
WRHowLongst Number of assistance months after which work is required in place in State s ” UI-WRD
WRY oungCExemptionst Dummy for whether Stats s exempts the work requirement for a parent caring for a young child UI-WRD
WRChildExemptst How old (in months) a child can be for the caregiver to be exempt from the work requirement in State s UI-WRD
WRNumWExemptionsst Number of different work exceptions allowed by State s UI-WRD
LifetimeT imeLimitst Dummy for whether State s has Time Limits in place UI-WRD
TLLengthst Maximum number of assistance months before benefits are terminated in place in State s UI-WRD
Other Policy Variables
unempst Unemployment Rate in State s LAUS
SEITCst State earned income tax credit as a percentage from the federal EITC TAXSIM
SEITCrefundablest Dummy for whether the state EITC is refundable TAXSIM
MHparityst Dummy for whether the state has passed by time t a comprehensive or mandate offering law. NAMI & NCLS
Note: LAUS refers to the Local Area Unemployment Statistics data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, MORG refers to the
CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups data provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research using data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS), UI-WRD refers to the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database, TAXSIM refers to the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s TAXSIM program data on State Earned Income Tax Credits, NAMI refers to the National Alliance on Mental
Illness parity laws table, and NCLS the National Conference of State Legislatures mental health benefits state mandates table.
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Table 1.5: Mechanisms
Mechanism: %∆ in Cognition % Contribution
Total Effect 5.09 100.00
∆ in L.F. Participation -0.06 -1.18
∆ in Time Investments 0.03 0.59
∆ in L.M. Productivity 0.02 0.39
Complementarity of Mental Health 3.72 73.08
Direct Effect 1.38 27.12
Notes: This table describes and decomposes the average effect of a 30% de-
crease in psychological distress in the overall population on children’s cognitive
scores at age 16. Column [1] depicts the average percentage change in children’s
cognitive scores due to each mechanism. Column [2] depicts the percentage con-
tribution of each mechanism for the overall effect. The first mechanism captures
the effect of maternal mental health on maternal annual hours worked, the sec-
ond captures its effect on maternal time investments and the third its effect
on maternal wages. The forth mechanism captures the effect of maternal men-
tal health on the return of maternal time investments. The fifth mechanism
captures the remaining effect of maternal mental health for children’s cognitive
development.
Table 1.6: Policy Simulations
Policy: %∆ in Cognition
30% Ó in Distress 5.09
20% Ó in Time Prod. Gap 6.31
Ò in Income by the Median TANF Benef. 1.20
Notes: This table describes the average effect of three different policies on
children’s cognitive scores at age 16. That is, I compute the average percentage
change in children’s cognitive scores as a result of each policy. In the first policy,
I decrease psychological distress by 30% in the whole population. The second
policy, decreases the gap in the returns of maternal time investments across
individuals by 20%. Then, I compare these policies to an increase in family
income by the median TANF benefit, which was was $379 per month in 2,000.
On average, this program increases children’s cognitive scores by 1.2 percentage
points.
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Table 1.7: Psychological Distress
Constant 2.012 ( 0.401 )
Years of Education -0.069 ( 0.017 )
Age -0.077 ( 0.003 )
Age sqrd. 0.001 ( 0.000 )
Single 0.283 ( 0.078 )
# of Children 0.057 ( 0.025 )
Depressed at 17 0.561 ( 0.709 )
White Dummy -0.070 ( 0.049 )
Mental Health Parity -0.031 ( 0.013 )
Unobserved Type 2 -0.002 ( 0.000 )
Unobserved Type 3 -0.119 ( 0.017 )
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates for the mental health func-
tion (Equation 1.14). It relates log maternal psychological distress to maternal
observable variables, the state level mental health parity law, and the time-
invariant unobservable types. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in paren-
theses.
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Table 1.8: Cognition Production Function
Parameter First Dev. Stage Second Dev. Stage
Total Factor Productivity K 0.595 ( 0.017 ) 0.938 ( 0.035 )
Self Productivity α1 0.140 ( 0.158 ) 0.484 ( 0.128 )
Log-Family Income α2 0.092 ( 0.001 ) 0.012 ( 0.006 )
Log Maternal Time Investment α3 0.085 ( 0.005 ) 0.009 ( 0.010 )
Log Psychological Distress α4 -0.037 ( 0.013 ) -0.025 ( 0.020 )
Log-At1  Log-F.Income α5 0.001 ( 0.001 ) 0.000 ( 0.001 )
Log-At1  Log-M.Time α6 0.002 ( 0.003 ) 0.004 ( 0.006 )
Log-At1  Log-Distress α7 -0.005 ( 0.008 ) -0.002 ( 0.013 )
Log-F.Income  Log-M.Time α8 -0.001 ( 0.000 ) 0.000 ( 0.000 )
Log-F.Income  Log-Distress α9 -0.012 ( 0.010 ) 0.015 ( 0.031 )
Log-M.Time  Log-Distress α10 -0.052 ( 0.007 ) -0.033 ( 0.014 )
Unobserved Type 2 κ2 0.003 ( 0.000 ) 0.003 ( 0.000 )
Unobserved Type 3 κ3 -0.093 ( 0.002 ) -0.093 ( 0.002 )
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates for the child human capital pro-
duction function (Equation 1.4). The translog function relates child cognitive
scores to parental investments in the form of maternal time investments,family
goods investments measured by family income and the mother’s mental health
measured by a psychological distress scale. Time-invariant unobservable types
control for unobserved investments. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
Table 1.9: Initial Child Ability
Constant -1.279 ( 0.113 )
Mother‘s Years of Education 0.044 ( 0.005 )
Mother‘s Age at Child‘s Birth 0.012 ( 0.002 )
Single -0.001 ( 0.000 )
# of Siblings -0.037 ( 0.031 )
White Dummy 0.059 ( 0.042 )
Female 0.146 ( 0.094 )
Unobserved Type 2 0.014 ( 0.000 )
Unobserved Type 3 -0.116 ( 0.008 )
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates for the initial child human
capital function (Equation 1.5). Children’s initial human capital is assumed to
depend on child and mother’s observable characteristics as well as time-invariant
unobservable types. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.10: Labor Market Participation
Constant 337.679 ( 59.698 )
Years of Education 66.325 ( 4.465 )
Age at Child‘s Birth -0.041 ( 0.025 )
Single -18.249 ( 10.617 )
# of Children -156.983 ( 25.552 )
White Dummy 335.792 ( 45.755 )
Child is Female -33.106 ( 16.214 )
Child‘s Age 53.541 ( 7.212 )
Child‘s Age sqrd. -2.033 ( 0.513 )
Log Non-Labor Income -0.023 ( 0.015 )
Median State Service Wage Rate -35.855 ( 6.664 )
State % Employed in Serv. Sector 243.108 ( 72.271 )
State Variation in Welfare Rules 1 114.095 ( 26.980 )
State Variation in Welfare Rules 2 -12.459 ( 8.469 )
Child Younger Than 4 -12.587 ( 7.853 )
Psychological Distress 16.951 ( 9.948 )
Not Working Last Period -1.020 ( 1.219 )
Experience 2.338 ( 1.850 )
Hours Working Last Period 0.469 ( 0.040 )
Hours With the Child Last Period -4.394 ( 1.935 )
Unobserved Type 2 216.167 ( 42.910 )
Unobserved Type 3 347.630 ( 35.791 )
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates for the approximated decision
rule for labor market participation (Equation 1.12). It relates annual hours of
work to all the state variables in the Conceptual model as well as the time-
invariant unobservable types. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in paren-
theses.
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Table 1.11: Weekly Time Investments
Constant 26.799 ( 6.219 )
Years of Education 0.512 ( 0.385 )
Age at Child‘s Birth -0.016 ( 0.009 )
Single -3.780 ( 1.478 )
# of Children 0.011 ( 0.006 )
White Dummy -6.026 ( 1.317 )
Child is Female 2.194 ( 1.231 )
Child‘s Age -0.556 ( 0.255 )
Child‘s Age sqrd. 0.091 ( 0.014 )
Log Non-Labor Income -0.589 ( 0.506 )
Median State Service Wage Rate -2.080 ( 1.100 )
State % Employed in Serv. Sector 18.437 ( 5.629 )
State Variation in Welfare Rules 1 0.019 ( 0.007 )
State Variation in Welfare Rules 2 69.014 ( 11.989 )
Child Younger Than 4 8.887 ( 2.276 )
Psychological Distress -0.067 ( 0.031 )
Not Working Last Period 0.145 ( 0.144 )
Experience -0.062 ( 0.087 )
Hours Working Last Period 0.001 ( 0.000 )
Hours With the Child Last Period -0.061 ( 0.024 )
Unobserved Type 2 2.715 ( 2.168 )
Unobserved Type 3 -3.279 ( 2.400 )
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates for the approximated decision
rule for mothers’ time investments in their children (Equation 1.12). It re-
lates weekly maternal active time with children to all the state variables in the
Conceptual model as well as the time-invariant unobservable types. Bootstrap
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.12: Hourly Wages
Constant -1.847 ( 0.285 )
Years of Education 0.194 ( 0.011 )
Age 0.018 ( 0.002 )
Age sqrd. -0.000 ( 0.000 )
Median State Service Wage Rate 0.010 ( 0.004 )
State % Employed in Serv. Sector 1.522 ( 0.318 )
Log Psychological Distress -0.002 ( 0.001 )
Not Working Last Period -0.151 ( 0.188 )
Experience 0.001 ( 0.000 )
Unobserved Type 2 0.082 ( 0.012 )
Unobserved Type 3 -0.119 ( 0.016 )
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates for the wage process (Equation
1.9). It relates log hourly wages to maternal observable variables, state level
labor market conditions, and the time-invariant unobservable types. Bootstrap
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.13: Type Probabilities
Unobserved Type 1 Unobserved Type 2
Constant -0.004 ( 0.000 ) -0.012 ( 0.000 )
Years of Education -0.021 ( 0.000 ) -0.002 ( 0.000 )
Depression before 17 -0.010 ( 0.000 ) -0.022 ( 0.000 )
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates for the time probability equa-
tion described in Equation 1.16.
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Chapter 2
The Economic Value of Breaking
Bad : Misbehavior, Schooling
and the Labor Market
This chapter is joint work with Nicholas W. Papageorge and Yu Zheng.1
2.1 Introduction
Economists generally recognize that human capital consists of multiple skills
that drive educational and labor market outcomes. An early contribution is
Willis and Rosen (1979), who distinguish between academic and manual skill.
More recently, a burgeoning literature in economics has extended the concept of
human capital to incorporate non-cognitive skills such as perseverance and grit
1We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from: Robert Barbera, Pedro Carneiro,
Sarah Cattan, Flavio Cunha, Seth Gershenson, Donna Gilleskie, Barton Hamilton, Hans
von Kippersluis, Patrick McAlvanah, Robert Moffitt, Albert Park, Richard Spady and Ser-
gio Urzua along with seminar participants at the City University of Hong Kong, Tinbergen
Institute, the Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, Universtiy of Western Ontario,
European University Institute, the Econometric Society World Congress and SOLE 2016. The
usual caveats apply.
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(Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001).2 It is not controversial that returns to skills
can differ across sectors and that some skills are more productive in schooling
than in work or in one occupation than in another. For example, to explain
career choices, Willis and Rosen (1979) emphasize variation in the returns across
occupations to manual versus academic skill.3
Despite potential differences in returns, however, the skills that constitute
human capital are typically seen as all enhancing productivity—both in school
and on the labor market. This is likely true for cognition and for many non-
cognitive skills such as grit, which captures goal setting (Duckworth et al.,
2007). However, this view overlooks how some components of human capital
could be productive in some economic contexts but could actually be counter-
productive in others. If so, then policies designed to promote human capital
accumulation could have mixed effects or even negative economic consequences.
This is especially the case for policies that target non-cognitive skill formation
aimed at children or adolescents, for whom non-cognitive skills have been shown
to be relatively malleable (Heckman and Kautz, 2013).
In this paper, we demonstrate that some components of childhood misbehav-
ior predict higher earnings even though they are associated with lower schooling
attainment. In particular, we examine a widely-studied pair of non-cognitive
2Excellent summaries of this research are found in Borghans et al. (2008) and Almlund
et al. (2011).
3This point has its origins in Roy’s model of selection into occupations (Roy, 1951).
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skills known as externalizing behavior and internalizing behavior.4 Externaliz-
ing behavior is linked to aggression and hyperactivity while internalizing be-
havior captures anxiety, depression, shyness, unassertiveness and fearfulness
(Ghodsian, 1977; Duncan and Magnuson, 2011; Duncan and Dunifon, 2012).
Using a longitudinal data set from Britain, the National Child Development
Survey (NCDS), we estimate an econometric model relating childhood misbe-
havior to educational attainment and labor market outcomes. The two types of
non-cognitive skills are identified from teachers’ reports of misbehavior or mal-
adjustment among schoolchildren. We approximate schooling, hours of work
and wages using linear-in-parameters equations and we model correlation across
equations as unobserved heterogeneity in the form of three latent factors: ex-
ternalizing and internalizing behavior, capturing non-cognitive skills, and cog-
nition. We also estimate the model separately for males and females. The key
empirical fact we establish is that, for both genders, one of the factors underly-
ing observed classroom misbehavior, externalizing behavior, lowers educational
attainment, but is also associated with higher earnings.5 In other words, we
demonstrate that a penchant for breaking bad can be good.6
Our results have implications for our understanding of the skills compris-
ing human capital. Whereas previous work has recognized variation in skill
4Regarding the nomenclature: “externalizing behavior” and “internalizing behavior” de-
scribe the latent factors interpreted as two “non-cognitive skills” identified using childhood
misbehavior.
5Levine and Rubinstein (2013) demonstrate that some teenagers who engage in risky or
illicit behaviors go on to do well in entrepreneurship.
6According to www.urbandictionary.com the definition of the term breaking bad is to “chal-
lenge conventions” or to “defy authority”. Breaking Bad is also the title of an American
television show in which the protagonist is an unsuccessful chemist who reveals a striking
talent for producing illicit drugs. The show offers an extreme example of how certain skills
or behaviors may lead to low productivity in one sector and high productivity in another.
81
prices across economic sectors, our findings on externalizing behavior go fur-
ther, demonstrating that a single skill can be productive in some economic
contexts and counter-productive in others. Identifying a skill that raises wages,
but lowers educational attainment is a particularly striking illustration since it
runs counter to the typical view of ability bias in estimates of the returns to ed-
ucation (Becker, 1967). Generally, the presumption is that the unobserved skills
leading to success in education would also promote earnings.7 In line with this
assumption, among individuals in our sample, we demonstrate that schooling
predicts higher earnings; that internalizing behavior predicts lower education
attainment and lower earnings; and that cognition predicts higher degrees and
higher earnings. In contrast, externalizing behavior has mixed effects. Despite
its negative impact on schooling, it is also associated with higher wages for
males and females and with more hours in the labor market for females.8
An important question is whether externalizing behavior is a direct determi-
nant of earnings or whether it merely influences some third variable or variables
which then affect earnings. One obvious example is selection into employment.
Suppose unproductive high-externalizing individuals select out of the labor mar-
ket. Then estimates of positive labor market returns to externalizing behavior
could be an artifact of differential sorting, which would undermine the idea that
a valuable component of human capital is counterproductive in some economic
7There are a number of exceptions. For example Card (2012) shows that IV estimates
could lead to larger coefficients on education in wage equations. The argument is based on
heterogeneity in treatment effects coupled with the particular group for whom the IV affects
attendance.
8Several studies have examined the relationship between these two behaviors to better
known measures like the “Big 5” personality traits. Evidence suggests that externalizing
behavior is related to conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to new experience, while
internalizing behavior is mostly related to neuroticism (Ehrler, Evans, and McGhee, 1999;
Almlund et al., 2011).
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contexts. In a series of sensitivity analyses, we therefore assess how externaliz-
ing behavior predicts labor supply, occupation choice, work experience, fertility
and partnership. While we show evidence that externalizing behavior is strongly
related to many of these economic outcomes, we also demonstrate that these
relationships do not drive our main finding that externalizing behavior, despite
being unproductive at school, is productive in the labor market.
Another important question is whether the returns to non-cognitive skills
vary across socioeconomic groups. This question is partly motivated by find-
ings in Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013), who show that an early childhood
intervention (the Perry Preschool Program) raised earnings and that about 20%
of this rise is attributable to a reduction in externalizing behavior. In contrast,
we find that, for a 1958 British cohort, externalizing behavior raises earnings.
To explore this difference, we consider a sub-sample of the NCDS British cohort
that is selected to mimic the financially disadvantaged group studied in Heck-
man, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013).9 We show that, among individuals who grew
up in poverty, externalizing behavior carries no significant earnings premium.
This finding is in line with Lundberg (2013), who demonstrates that the pay-
off to non-cognitive skills is context-dependent and may vary by socioeconomic
status. One possible reason is selection into criminality (Aizer, 2009; Heckman,
Pinto, and Savelyev, 2013). However, for our sample, we find that differential
sorting into police involvement does not appear to drive differences in returns to
externalizing behavior across socioeconomic groups. Therefore, we cannot rule
out the possibility that some skills are simply priced differently in the labor
9To study black-white differentials in labor market outcomes in the U.S., Urzua (2008)
allows the distribution and impact of underlying skills to vary by race.
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market depending on an individual’s background. This possibility is troubling
if it means that individuals who are already disadvantaged are excluded from
realizing the full returns to their skills.
Turning to policy, mixed effects of externalizing behavior suggest that a
productive labor market skill may be easily overlooked or difficult to detect or
foster since it is not productive in school. Relatedly, our findings also point to
a mismatch between the types of skills promoted in school and the skills that
are valuable on the labor market. This point echoes findings in Heckman and
Rubinstein (2001), who show that the GED is a “mixed” signal of productiv-
ity since it is taken by high school dropouts with low non-cognitive skill. As
a result, educational attainment or certification is a potentially flawed signal
of a future worker’s productivity. An informative signal should be designed to
accurately reflect all skills that are productive in the labor market. Similarly, in
our context, if externalizing behavior carries an earnings premium, then at the
very least it should not carry an education penalty. More generally, our find-
ings illustrate that broadening our understanding of what constitutes human
capital, which the literature on non-cognitive skills has done, also opens up the
possibility that some human capital investments can have negative economic
returns in some sectors. Despite the positive returns to educational attainment,
investments designed to curb or eliminate childhood misbehavior may be ill-
conceived or short-sighted since a subset of children who misbehave may be
expressing non-cognitive skills that are valuable in the labor market. This is
not a hypothetical concern since school districts are increasingly poised to begin
using high-stakes tests to evaluate students, teachers and schools based on char-
acter or non-cognitive skills (West et al., 2015). Finally, our findings on group
84
differences imply further difficulties in evaluating human capital investments
involving children’s non-cognitive skills since the returns to skills can differ not
only by the economic context in question, but also by socioeconomic status.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce the data
set, discuss measurements of misbehavior that identify externalizing and inter-
nalizing behavior and conduct a preliminary data analysis. In Section 2.3, we
describe the econometric framework and estimation. In Section 2.4, we present
results. In Section 2.5, we discuss what our findings mean for policy. Section
2.6 explores policy implications and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Data and Preliminary Analysis
First, we provide details on the NCDS and on how we construct the analytic
sample. Second, we discuss how classroom behavior is used to identify two
latent factors: externalizing and internalizing behavior. Third, we report sum-
mary statistics on education, labor market outcomes and childhood misbehavior
in the classroom. Fourth, we provide estimates from a preliminary econometric
model relating childhood misbehavior with schooling and earnings. In particu-
lar, we demonstrate that once we treat externalizing and internalizing behaviors
separately, externalizing behavior is associated with higher earnings even though
it also predicts lower schooling attainment.
2.2.1 The National Child Development Study
The NCDS is an ongoing longitudinal survey that follows the universe of indi-
viduals born in the same week in 1958 in Great Britain. The data set contains
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information on physical and educational development, wages, employment, fam-
ily life, well-being, social participation and attitudes. The NCDS is particularly
well-suited for our study since it documents teachers’ reports of classroom mis-
behavior for a large sample of children and then follows these children through
adulthood. Therefore, the data set allows us to relate misbehavior in elemen-
tary school to educational attainment along with labor market outcomes. To
date, there have been eight surveys to trace all the members of the cohort still
living in Great Britain. Surveys occurred when subjects were born and when
they were aged 7 (1965), 11, 16, 23, 33, 42 and 50 (2008).
We focus on information gathered at birth and in the first five sweeps, cov-
ering ages 7 to 33. The NCDS initially contained 18,555 births. At the second
wave, 15,356 of the original sample remained as respondents and by the fifth
survey, at age 33, 11,407 individuals remained. In constructing our analytic
sample, we keep respondents with valid information on test scores and class-
room misbehavior at age 11 and educational attainment at age 33, which leaves
us with 9,511 individuals. We drop individuals with missing information on
relationship status, fertility and employment status at age 33. We also drop
individuals with missing information on their employment history or who are
reported as employed but have missing information on earnings at age 33.10
The resulting analytic sample has complete information on 7,324 individuals, of
whom 3,612 are males and 3,712 are females.11
10We drop individuals when there is missing information on one of the key outcome variables
used in our analysis. However, we impute data for missing control variables, including parents’
education and occupation.
11To assess whether sample attrition drives our main results, we compare our final sample
to the sample of individuals observed at age 11, to which we refer as the “full sample”. We
report the summary statistics of the full sample in Tables B.1 and B.2 in B.1. Compared to
the full sample, our analytic sample is slightly less educated, more likely to be self-employed
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2.2.2 Classroom Misbehavior and Non-Cognitive Skills
While cognitive skills are identified, as usual, by math and reading test scores,
non-cognitive skills and classroom misbehavior are identified with inventories
completed by teachers describing student behavior in the classroom. When a
child in the sample was 11 years old, the child’s teacher was asked to com-
plete an inventory listing the child’s behaviors in the classroom. The teacher
was given a list of roughly 250 descriptions of specific behaviors and asked to
underline the items which best fit the child. These descriptions include state-
ments such as: “too timid to be naughty”; “brags to other children”; “normally
honest with school work”; “adopts extreme youth fashions”; and “has stolen
money”. Completed inventories were then used to compute scores on a set of
ten maladjustment syndromes, known as the Bristol Social Adjustment Guide
or BSAG maladjustment syndromes. The syndromes were first defined in Stott,
Sykes, and Marston (1974). They are: hostility towards adults, hostility towards
children, anxiety for acceptance by adults, anxiety for acceptance by children,
restlessness, inconsequential behavior, writing off adults and adults standards,
depression, withdrawal and unforthcomingness. The syndromes have been used
since their introduction in Stott, Sykes, and Marston (1974) to assess the psycho-
logical development of children.12 They have also been externally validated in
the sense that the inventories used to measure the ten syndromes are positively
correlated with a range of other measurements of social maladjustment from
teachers, professional observers, parents and peers (Achenbach, McConaughy,
and more likely to have a partner at age 33. However, none of these differences are statistically
significant.
12Unfortunately, the NCDS does not provide access to the original completed inventories.
We only have access to the computed maladjustment syndrome scores.
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and Howell, 1987).
Using principle components factor analysis, Ghodsian (1977) showed that
the BSAG maladjustment syndrome variables could be described by two dis-
tinct latent factors.13 Ghodsian (1977) also proposed a mapping between the
measurements and the two factors, which gives a meaningful interpretation to
each one. The mapping assigns each observed maladjustment syndrome to one
of the two factors. According to the mapping, the first factor corresponds to
anxious, aggressive, outwardly-expressed or externalizing behavior and includes
maladjustment syndromes such as “hostility towards adults” and “restlessness”.
The second factor corresponds to withdrawn, inhibited or internalizing behavior
and includes maladjustment syndromes such as “depression”.14 In Table 2.1, we
list each factor along with the maladjustment syndromes used to identify it.15
The two factors have been studied extensively by psychologists researching child
development and, of late, by some economists (Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan,
2007; Aizer, 2009; Agan, 2011; Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev, 2013).16
Though there is some debate on the key assumptions underlying the struc-
ture of the mapping between maladjustment syndromes and underlying factors,
13In B.1, we use our sample to confirm that two independent factors adequately describe
data on the ten BSAG maladjustment syndromes.
14In B.1, we confirm that a standard rotation method reveals that variables such as
“hostility towards adults and children” and “inconsequential behavior” represent outwardly-
expressed behaviors and are strongly related to the first factor in the factor analysis. This
factor represents externalizing behavior. Observed maladjustment syndromes such as “depres-
sion,” “unforthcomingness” and “withdrawal” represent inwardly expressed behaviors and are
strongly related to the second factor in the factor analysis.
15Syndromes we do not use are “miscellaneous nervous symptoms, “miscellaneous symp-
toms”, “appearance”, “attendance” and “health factors”. In results available upon request,
we repeat our analysis using “miscellaneous nervous symptoms” and “miscellaneous symp-
toms” and find no significant differences in results.
16Both Aizer (2009) and Agan (2011) study how externalizing behavior is linked to anti-
social and criminal activity. For general surveys on the use of externalizing and internalizing
behaviors, see Duncan and Magnuson (2011) and Duncan and Dunifon (2012).
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in our analysis, we generally follow Ghodsian (1977).17 We use 10 BSAG mal-
adjustment syndrome variables to identify two latent factors, externalizing and
internalizing behavior. We also assume dedicated measurements, which means
that each measurement is related to only one unobserved factor, even though
this assumption is not required (Rao and Sinharay, 2006).18 Following Ghod-
sian (1977) has the advantage of making our results comparable to other work
studying childhood misbehavior and economic outcomes. This includes work
using the NCDS data set studying externalizing and internalizing behaviors
(Farmer, 1993, 1995; Jackson, 2006). It also includes research using different
samples since the division of misbehavior into these two factors now extends
to other data sets, including the CNLSY and the PSID (Yeung, Linver, and
Brooks-Gunn, 2002; Agan, 2011).
2.2.3 Summary Statistics
Our three key variables are those for educational attainment, labor market out-
comes and childhood misbehavior. For the first of these, we note that, in the
UK, schooling is compulsory until age 16. Thereafter, students can leave school
without any qualifications (no certificate), study for an exam to obtain a Cer-
tificate of Secondary Education (CSE) or study towards obtaining the Ordinary
17For example, while traditional factor analytic methods determine the number of unob-
served factors in one step and the mapping in a second step, newer Bayesian methods estimate
the number of factors and their mapping to the measurement system simultaneously (Conti
et al., 2014). In B.1, we discuss issues surrounding factor analytic methods for childhood
misbehavior in greater detail.
18The exception is “writing off adults and adult standards”, which could represent an
outwardly or inwardly expressed behavior and is statistically related to both factors. In this
case, we again follow previous work and allow the variable to be related to both factors
(Ghodsian, 1977; Shepherd, 2013). We also perform robustness checks where we assign the
ambiguous variables to either factor. Results remain largely unchanged.
89
Levels (O-Levels), where the latter are more academically demanding.19 If stu-
dents decide to stay in school at age 16, another set of examinations is available,
the Advanced Levels (A-Levels). Students who are successful in their A-Levels
are able to continue to higher education and obtain either a higher-education
diploma (after two years of study) or a bachelor’s degree (after three years of
study). At the postgraduate level, students can obtain a higher degree: Master
of Philosophy (MPhil) or Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). In summary, individuals
in our sample can sort into six mutually exclusive schooling levels: no certificate,
CSE, O-Levels, A-Levels, higher education (including diploma and bachelors)
or higher degree (including MPhil and PhD).
Summary statistics on education, labor market and other adult outcomes are
found in Table 2.2. Perhaps most striking are large gender differences, which
reflects the fact that the analytic sample is a 1958 cohort. According to the
table, females in our sample are less educated than the males. Roughly half
of the males obtain O-Level qualifications or less, whereas roughly two-thirds
of the females do. We also find large gender differences in employment and,
conditional on employment, hourly wages and hours worked. Conditional on
working, hourly wages average about 7.64 pounds for males and 5.46 pounds
for females and weekly earnings average 329 pounds for males and 162 pounds
for females, all measured in 1991 pounds. Differences in educational attainment
only offer a partial explanation for labor market disparities. In Figure 2.1, we
show that, at each education level, males have higher wages, work longer hours
and earn more. Despite these differences, the relative returns to schooling are
19CSEs and O-Levels were replaced by the General Certificates of Secondary Education
(GCSE) in 1986 after individuals in our sample had finished their schooling.
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higher for females than for males (Panel 2.1(d) in the same figure). Females with
a higher degree earn 3 times as much as females with no formal education, while
for males this ratio is 1.75. This may reflect gender differences in how individuals
sort into schooling based on their cognitive and non-cognitive skills or differences
in skill prices across genders, both of which our econometric analysis will account
for.
Another factor explaining differences in labor market outcomes is fertility.
According to Table 2.2, females and males in our sample are equally likely to
have a partner, though females are roughly 20% more likely to have children. A
stark gender difference emerges if we compare the earnings of males and females
with and without children. Females with children work many fewer hours than
those without children. For males, having children in the household predicts no
drop in labor supply. These patterns can be observed in Figure 2.2. Accord-
ingly, our econometric analysis will consider the role of partnership and fertility
in mitigating the gender-specific relationship between non-cognitive skills and
earnings. In general, large gender differences in schooling and labor market out-
comes suggest that we should allow the parameters of our econometric model
to vary for males and females.
In Table 2.3, we present averages for each BSAG variable separately by gen-
der. Values of the BSAG variables ranges from 0 to 15, with a higher value
indicating a higher prevalence of a particular maladjustment syndrome. These
scores were constructed using the teacher responses to particular statements
about the student’s behavior. The means are usually low due to a clustering
around zero and fairly low values in general. Nonetheless, there are signifi-
cant differences across gender. In general, females appear to misbehave less
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frequently than males. Specifically, males score higher for each of the BSAG
variables except for “anxiety for acceptance by adults”. For example, for “in-
consequential behavior” and “anxiety for acceptance by children”, the average
for males is roughly double that of females. Gender differences in misbehavior
are consistent with earlier findings documented in Great Britain (Duncan and
Magnuson, 2011; Duncan and Dunifon, 2012) and in the U.S. (Bertrand and
Pan, 2013).
2.2.4 Misbehavior, Schooling and Earnings
In our main econometric analysis, we jointly estimate the mapping from unob-
served factors to observed BSAG maladjustment syndrome variables with the
impact of these factors on outcomes. However, for our preliminary analysis con-
ducted here, we construct measures for externalizing and internalizing behaviors
by simply summing the BSAG variables associated with each factor according to
Table 2.1 and then including the sums as additional regressors in models where
outcomes are schooling categories and earnings. We refer to these as “crude”
models since summing up scores likely inflates measurement error and ignores
correlation across factors. We provide estimates from the crude model to com-
pare our findings with previous work and to demonstrate that main results, in
particular mixed effects of externalizing, are not driven by the factor analytic
methods used to estimate the measurement system in our main econometric
analysis.
We start by estimating an ordered probit model to explain educational at-
tainment. The outcome variable is one of the six possible schooling levels.20
20Our results are robust to the specification of the educational model. The main message
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Formally, defining si as a latent variable determining schooling, we estimate
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H are the par-
ticular bounds for schooling level s. Ei and Ii are the measures of externalizing
and internalizing behaviors based on a simple summation of the BSAG scores.
Similarly, Ci is based on the sum of the reading and math test scores listed in
Table 2.1. Here, and elsewhere, we normalize our measures of cognitive and
non-cognitive skills with mean equal to 0 and variance equal to 1. Finally, Xi
is a vector of covariates and eSi is a normally distributed disturbance.
Estimates of equation (2.1) are presented in Table 2.4 for varying sets of
covariates Xi. Column [1] contains an indicator for being female and a single
measure of misbehavior, obtained by summing Ei and Ii for each individual.
Aggregating misbehavior into a single variable allows us to compare our results
to earlier research that relates childhood misbehavior to economic outcomes,
but which ignores how childhood misbehavior is driven by two separate factors,
reflecting two distinct non-cognitive skills. We find that misbehavior predicts
lower educational attainment. In Column [2], we add cognition Ci, which is
associated with higher education. Including cognition decreases the magni-
tude of the negative coefficient on misbehavior from 0.37 to 0.14, which
suggests strong correlation in measurements of cognition and childhood behav-
ior. In Columns [3] and [4], we again address misbehavior and schooling with
and without cognition, though here we separate misbehavior into externalizing
remains when we use multinomial probit model instead.
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and internalizing behavior. Both non-cognitive skills predict lower educational
attainment and the inclusion of cognition decreases the magnitude of the coeffi-
cients by over half. In Column [5], we assess the robustness of estimated coeffi-
cients on non-cognitive skills to the inclusion of a number of controls including
parents’ education, father’s social class and whether the mother is working. As
expected, higher parental education and occupation are positively related to
a higher educational attainment. Coefficients on the three skills, however, re-
main largely unchanged. Finally, we estimate the schooling model separately
for males (Column [6]) and females (Column [7]). We show that the negative
effects of externalizing are larger for males (0.12 versus 0.06). For females,
internalizing has a larger effect (0.09 versus 0.04). Cognition has a slightly
larger coefficient for females. Importantly, both non-cognitive skills predict less
education, while cognition predicts higher educational attainment even when
we estimate the crude model separately by gender.
We perform a similar analysis for earnings, regressing log weekly earnings at
age 33, conditional on being employed, onto measures of non-cognitive skills.21
Defining yi as log earnings at age 33 for individual i, we estimate OLS regressions
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where cognitive and non-cognitive skills are defined as in equation (2.1) and
eYi is an iid disturbance.
22 The results from OLS regressions for varying sets of
21Conditioning on employment raises the possibility that the preliminary results are driven
by compositional effects, which we address in Section 2.5.1. In particular, we assess whether
the positive association between externalizing behavior and earnings can be explained by
high-externalizing and low productive individuals selecting into unemployment.
22We include a London indicator to account for possible earnings differences arising from
cost-of-living. Omitting it does not affect results.
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regressors are found in Table 2.5. Column [1] contains estimates using the single
aggregated measure of misbehavior obtained by summing Ei and Ii. We find
that aggregate misbehavior is associated with lower earnings, which is in line
with previous research (Segal, 2013). Column [1] suggests that a one-standard-
deviation rise in aggregated misbehavior is associated with a 10.5% decline in
earnings at age 33. In Column [2], we add cognition to the regression. A
one-standard-deviation rise in cognition predicts a 20.5% increase in earnings.
Further, adding cognition lowers the coefficient on aggregated misbehavior to
2.8%. This sharp decline in the magnitude of the coefficient means that our
measures of misbehavior are related to our measures of cognition. Our main
econometric analysis explicitly treats observables as correlated measurements
of underlying factors and also permits correlation among the latent factors cap-
turing cognition and non-cognitive skills.
Results on misbehavior change dramatically, however, when we view child-
hood misbehavior as reflecting two distinct factors. In Columns [3]-[6] of Table
2.5, we regress log earnings onto Ei and Ii separately. Beginning with Col-
umn [4], where we also condition on cognition, gender and a London indicator,
we find that externalizing behavior predicts higher earnings. In other words,
externalizing behavior, as a non-cognitive skill, appears to carry an earnings
premium. Adding schooling, we find that higher degrees predict higher earn-
ings (Column [5]). Moreover, the positive coefficient on externalizing rises once
we control for educational attainment, which makes sense since adding schooling
helps to control for how externalizing could lower earnings through its negative
impact on schooling. Next, we add fertility, partnership, experience and occu-
pation (Column [6]). All controls are positively related to earnings with the
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exception of number of children for females. After adding these controls, the
coefficient on externalizing rises once again, which suggests that the association
between externalizing and earnings might work through its relationship with
other lifecycle outcomes, such as fertility. We explore this possibility explicitly
when assessing mechanisms and selection in Section 2.5.1. Finally, in all mod-
els from Columns [4]-[8], cognition continues to predict higher earnings while
internalizing behavior is associated with lower earnings.
It is also worth highlighting that, according to Table 2.5, the coefficient on
externalizing is positive whether or not we control for schooling. An alternative
possibility would be that externalizing behavior predicts higher earnings only
after we have controlled for its negative impact on schooling. Such a finding
would still support the idea that externalizing is potentially valuable in the labor
market. However, it would also suggest that lowering externalizing behavior
could have a positive net effect on labor market outcomes since the negative
effect of externalizing through schooling on earnings would overwhelm the direct
positive effect on earnings. In contrast, our estimates suggest that policies
lowering externalizing would have a negative effect on individual earnings even
if we account for how externalizing affects schooling.
We also estimate the earnings regression separately for males and females.
We find the externalizing earnings premium is more pronounced for females than
for males (see Columns [7] and [8] for males and females, respectively). In terms
of the magnitude, once we control for educational attainment, partnership and
fertility, the coefficient on externalizing behavior for females is comparable to
the coefficient on cognition. Gender differences in coefficients may reflect true
heterogeneity in returns, but could also reflect instability of the measurement
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of the two factors. In our main empirical analysis, we account for the second
possibility by estimating the measurement system mapping latent factors to
measurements of misbehavior separately by gender.
The crude model results presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide preliminary
evidence of our main result. A non-cognitive skill that is productive on the labor
market is not productive in school. The positive association between external-
izing behavior during childhood and adult earnings has not been recognized in
previous literature on the economic consequences of childhood misbehavior.23
There are several reasons for this lack of recognition. First, most of the liter-
ature on the long run effects of childhood misbehavior takes for granted that
externalizing is broadly unproductive, focusing instead on school-related out-
comes (Bertrand and Pan, 2013). This may be a result of data limitations since
linking childhood misbehavior to labor market outcomes requires a long panel
beginning with a sample of children. However, even studies using the NCDS
data have not linked externalizing behavior to earnings. For example, Farmer
(1993, 1995) shows that males who display high levels of externalizing behavior
leave school earlier, obtain fewer qualifications, and begin their careers in lower
social class positions. However, neither study considers actual performance in
the labor market.24 Second, many studies use a single, aggregated measure of
misbehavior. Segal (2013) shows that misbehavior during the eighth grade can
23One exception is Levine and Rubinstein (2013), who recognize an empirical pattern that
is similar in spirit. They show that individuals who engage in illicit behaviors as teenagers
report high earnings in self employment. One possible extension to our research would be to
assess whether the successful entrepreneurs they identify were high-externalizing children.
24Nor do these studies control for internalizing behavior, which means they may suffer from
omitted variables bias if the two are correlated. Other work from psychology and sociology
uses the NCDS data to examine selection into occupations. Jackson (2006) shows that having
low levels of internalizing behavior is an important predictor of managerial occupations.
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have a negative impact on future earnings even after controlling for schooling at-
tainment and Sciulli (2016) demonstrates that adult employment outcomes are
negatively related to childhood maladjustment. Also using the NCDS data set,
Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins (2005) show that a single measure of misbe-
havior predicts lower earnings in adulthood. As we demonstrate in Columns [1]
and [2] of Table 2.5, using the NCDS data set, we can replicate the basic result
that aggregated misbehavior predicts lower earnings. However, estimates from
our crude model also demonstrate how key implications change dramatically
once we recognize that misbehavior reflects two distinct factors with potentially
different returns in the labor market. Building on our preliminary analysis, we
now turn to the specification of our main econometric framework, which treats
observed classroom behavior as mis-measurements of underlying factors.
2.3 Measurement Error Model and Inference
The preliminary analysis just presented has several shortcomings. Simply sum-
ming the BSAG maladjustment syndrome variables assigned to each underlying
skill does not account for differences in explanatory power of each measurement
or correlation across measurements. This can inflate measurement error, in-
creasing attenuation bias. In what follows, we instead factor analyze the data
on childhood classroom behavior, which means that we treat each BSAG vari-
able as a mismeasurement of one of the underlying factors. Factor analysis
reduces measurement error and maps underlying factors to observed variables
according to the explanatory power of each variable. In addition, in the prelim-
inary analysis we estimated equations for schooling and earnings separately. In
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what follows, the equations describing the relationship between skills, schooling
and labor market outcomes are instead estimated jointly with equations describ-
ing how underlying skills map into BSAG variables. Joint estimation reduces
estimation error.
2.3.1 Description of the Model
There are three latent skills affecting education and labor market outcomes:
externalizing behavior, internalizing behavior and cognition. Each skill is mea-
sured from a set of variables with measurement error (Table 2.1). We denote
the k-th measurement of skill j P t1, 2, 3u for individual i with gender n P t0, 1u
as mijkn, where n  1 denotes male and n  0 denotes female. mijkn is specified
as:
mijkn  mjk   αjknfij   εijkn (2.3)
where mjk is the mean for that measurement for the whole sample, which does
not vary by gender.25 fij is the value of latent skill j for individual i, αjkn is the
factor loading of latent skill j on the k-th measurement of that skill, which can
vary by gender, and εijkn is an error term capturing mis-measurement and it is
assumed to be normally distribution for the measurements of cognition. In order
to account for the high number of zero responses we assume the measurements
of the two behaviors follow a Poisson distribution. The latent factors fij are
drawn from a joint normal distribution with a probability density function fM ,
the parameters of which can vary by gender:26
25This setup allows us to compare the latent skill mean across genders.
26The results are robust to allowing for more flexible distributional assumptions on the
measurement errors. In particular, we have permitted mixed normal distributions with two
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Further, the model assumes that the latent skills are independent of mea-
surement errors, or covpfij, εijknq  0, @k. The latent skill j
1 affects the mea-
surement of the latent skill j only through its correlation with the skill j, or
covpmijkn, fij1 |fijq  0, for j  j
1 and all k.27
We approximate the schooling problem with a linear-in-parameters ordered
probit model, so that the probability that agent i chooses education level s P
















where µs is the cutoff for each schooling choice and where µ0   inf and
µ6  inf. Xi,S is the vector of observable characteristics that affect the school-
ing decision and βS is the vector of returns associated with Xi,S. Xi,S contains
a number of variables that are excluded from other equations: whether the
mother studied beyond the minimum schooling age, whether the father studied
beyond the minimum schooling age, father’s occupation and mother’s employ-
ment status, all observed when the child is age 11. We also include an indicator
for financial difficulties during childhood. The variable takes the value one if
(i) the interviewer reported that the household appeared to be experiencing
poverty in 1965 or (ii) a member of the household self-reported having financial
difficulties in the 12 months prior to being observed in either 1969 or 1974, and
27The only exception is “writing off adults and adult standards”, which depends on both
externalizing and internalizing behaviors.
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zero otherwise.28
We model the hourly wage and weekly hours worked for individuals that are
employed at age 33 as follows: log hourly wage for individual i, denoted yi, is
modeled with a linear specification and a normally distributed disturbance:






αj,Y fij   εi,Y . (2.6)
Here, Xi,Y is a vector of observables that include partnership, fertility, months
of experience, occupation and an indicator for financial difficulties during child-
hood. The log weekly working hours are modeled in a similar fashion as:






αj,Hfij   εi,H . (2.7)
where βH captures how partnership, fertility, experience and occupation (in-
cluded in the vector of observables Xi,H) affect the number of hours worked
in a usual week. In addition, both of the above equations include dummies of
schooling levels, 1irss, and the latent skills, fij.
We summarize the parameters to be estimated by a vector denoted Φ:
Φ  pβ, γ, α,Ξq (2.8)
where β denotes the set of coefficients of the vectors of observables absent the
schooling level in equations (2.5)-(2.7), γ is the set of coefficients governing the
returns to schooling, α is the set of coefficients governing the returns to latent
skills and Ξ are coefficients of the measurement system described in equations
(2.3) and (2.4).
28Including this variable does not affect main results. However, it is included as an ad-
ditional control in our main analysis since we use it to explore differences in the returns to
externalizing behavior by childhood socioeconomic status in Section 2.5.2.
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2.3.2 Estimation Procedure
We estimate the model by simulated maximum likelihood. There are three
main steps in the estimation procedure. First, at each suggestion for parameter
values, indexed by g and denoted Φpgq, and for each individual i, we simulate a
vector of unobserved skills K times and compute, for each draw of the skills, the
probability of observing each schooling level, log weekly hours worked and log
hourly wage. More specifically, given a parameter suggestion, we draw a block
matrix of size K  I  J from a standard normal distribution, where J is the
number of latent skills, i.e. 3, and I is the number of individuals. Then, for each







compute the density functions corresponding to each outcome: the probability of
individual i reaching a schooling level s pP
pgq
ik psqq, the probability of observing
wage yi pf
Y,pgq
ik pyiqq and hours worked hi (f
H,pgq
ik phiqq, for individual i, draw k
and parameter suggestion pgq. We also compute f
M,pgq
ik pmiq, the probability of
observing the classroom misbehavior measurements, for individual i, draw k
and parameter suggestion pgq.
Second, we compute each individual’s average likelihood contribution, where























where si represents the observed schooling choice and ei the observed employ-
ment status (with employed taking the value 1) in the data.
Third, we take the log of the individual likelihood contribution and sum over
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Using both simplex and gradient methods, we evaluate lpgq at different values
in the parameter space, indexing these suggestions by pgq, and continue until a
maximum is found. We implement this model for males and females separately.
2.4 Empirical Results
We present our key empirical findings of the econometric model just presented in
three sections. We first discuss estimates of the measurement system mapping
unobserved factors to observed BSAGmaladjustment syndromes (Section 2.4.1).
Next, we discuss key findings, including the externalizing schooling penalty
(Section 2.4.2) and the externalizing earnings premium (Section 2.4.3).
2.4.1 Mapping Unobserved Factors to Observed Misbe-
haviors
Starting with the joint distribution of latent factors, we find a negative corre-
lation between externalizing behavior and cognition and a positive correlation
between externalizing and internalizing behavior for both males and females
(Table 2.6). The negative relationship between the two non-cognitive skills and
cognition could reflect the distribution of skill endowments at birth. It could also
reflect early childhood investments if the same environments that promote exter-
nalizing and internalizing behaviors also slow cognitive development (Heckman
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and Cunha, 2007). An example would be childhood poverty. The positive rela-
tionship between externalizing and internalizing behavior is well-documented in
the child development literature. Children under stress as a result of poverty or
a family disruption, for example, tend to develop both aggressive and depres-
sive symptoms (Wolfson, Fields, and Rose, 1987). Accounting for correlation
across factors means that we avoid mis-attributing returns to skills. For ex-
ample, failing to account for the positive association between externalizing and
internalizing behavior could lead us to over-estimate the degree to which each
non-cognitive skill negatively affects schooling.
In Table 2.7, we report the estimates of factor loadings mapping latent skills
to BSAG maladjustment syndrome scores. Larger loadings signal a stronger
relationship between the latent factor and the observed measure. Recall, we
estimate the measurement system for males and for females separately. The
goal is to address the possibility that estimated gender differences in returns
to non-cognitive skills in school or on the labor market reflect instability of the
measurement system across genders. According to Table 2.7, instability is not
a very important concern since the estimated factor loadings are very similar
for males and females. However, we find considerable variation across measure-
ments. For both genders, the main variable identifying externalizing behavior
is “hostility towards children” and the main variable identifying internalizing
behavior is “unforthcomingness”. In contrast, “writing off of adults and adult
standards”, for example, is relatively unimportant for both non-cognitive skills.
Using estimates of the distributions of underlying factors, we next plot the
gender-specific distributions of each latent skill in Figure 2.3. We find little
evidence of gender differences in the distribution of internalizing behavior or
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cognition. For externalizing behavior the mean and variance are higher for
males. Our findings are consistent with earlier literature studying gender dif-
ferences in misbehavior. However, since earlier literature has taken for granted
that externalizing is broadly unproductive, the rightward-shifted externalizing
distribution for boys has been viewed as a cause for concern (Bertrand and Pan,
2013).29
2.4.2 The Externalizing Penalty in School
Estimates of the ordered probit model for educational attainment are reported
in Table 2.8. We find a negative association between externalizing behavior
and schooling for both males and females and the point estimates are of a
similar magnitude compared to findings in our crude model. The effect of family
characteristics is also consistent with our initial expectations. Having parents
with more education and who work in more lucrative occupational categories
is related to higher educational attainment of the child. Moreover, individuals
living in poverty during their childhood, a measure of family resources, are less
likely to reach higher levels of education.
A difference from the crude model estimates is that the negative relation-
ship between externalizing and schooling for females is smaller and no longer
significant at conventional levels. In other words, high-externalizing females are
better able to finish school in comparison to high-externalizing males. This find-
ing may reflect how teachers are more likely to punish or refer a male versus a
29The difference in the distribution of externalizing behavior between males and females
coupled with positive returns to externalizing in the labor market raises the possibility that
differences in externalizing behavior could explain the gender earnings gap. In results available
upon request, we show that this is not the case. The gender earnings gap closes only slightly
if we assign females the same distribution of externalizing behavior as males.
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female child for special help for the same level of aggressive behavior (Gregory,
1977). On the other hand, we find that internalizing behavior is negatively as-
sociated with educational attainment for females, but not for males, for whom
the coefficient is both small and insignificant. This is also on par with research
that finds stronger effects of conduct disorders and weaker effects of anxiety
and depressive symptoms for the educational attainment of males in compari-
son to females (Kessler et al., 1995). Finally, it is worth mentioning that even
the largest coefficients on non-cognitive skills in the schooling equations are
between one-fifth and one-tenth the size of coefficients mapping cognition to
educational attainment, which predicts schooling at similar magnitudes across
genders.
In general, estimates for the schooling model are broadly consistent with lit-
erature that studies the impact of emotional problems in school. For example,
McLeod and Kaiser (2004) argue that children with internalizing and externaliz-
ing problems withdraw from social relationships in school, including those with
teachers, in order to minimize their exposure to negative interactions. More-
over, one of the key pathways relating behavioral problems to low educational
attainment is through early educational failures such as repeating a grade or
falling behind in class. If externalizing or internalizing behavior make learn-
ing more difficult, this would explain the strong negative correlation between
the two non-cognitive skills and cognition (which is identified from test scores)
reported in Table 2.6.
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2.4.3 The Externalizing Premium on the Labor Market
Literature studying the consequences of externalizing behavior has generally
limited attention to educational attainment. In contrast, we assess the relation-
ship between childhood misbehavior and labor market outcomes. Estimates
of hours and wage equations conditional on employment are in Tables 2.9 and
2.10.30 For males, a one-standard-deviation rise in externalizing behavior pre-
dicts a 2.5% rise in hourly wages, but it is not significantly related to weekly
hours worked. For females, a one-standard-deviation rise in externalizing pre-
dicts a 2.5% rise in hourly wage. In addition, it is associated with a 6.9%
increase in hours worked per week. The positive wage returns demonstrate
that externalizing behavior is productive in the labor market even though it is
counter-productive in school, which is a novel finding in the literature on the
economic consequences of childhood misbehavior.
In contrast, internalizing behavior is negatively related to both productivity
in the labor market and hours worked. For males, a one-standard-deviation
rise in internalizing predicts a 4% decrease in hourly wage. We also find that
cognition increases hourly wages, but does not influence the hours decision.
The remaining parameters follow conventional wisdom. For example, higher
educational attainment increases worker productivity, but has little effect on
the number of hours worked for those already employed. Also, individuals living
in or around London and who work in more skilled occupations receive higher
hourly wages. Finally, males in higher-skilled occupations do not necessarily
work more hours but females do.
30Selection into employment is discussed in the following section.
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One possible explanation of the externalizing premium is that externaliz-
ing behavior is highly negatively correlated with agreeableness (Ehrler, Evans,
and McGhee, 1999). Agreeableness is one of the “Big-5” personality traits and
it predicts lower earnings (Judge, Livingston, and Hurst, 2012). To explain
why, Barry and Friedman (1998) show that individuals with higher levels of
agreeableness are worse negotiators as they are susceptible to being anchored
by early offers in the negotiation process. Relatedly, Spurk and Abele (2011)
show that less agreeable individuals are more competitive in the workplace and
place a higher emphasis on career advancement. They also find that agreeable-
ness is negatively related to work hours, which is consistent with the positive
relationship between externalizing behavior and hours worked for the females
in our sample. In summary, high-externalizing individuals may earn more for
some of the same reasons that agreeable people earn less. Our findings on ex-
ternalizing differ from those on agreeableness, however, since agreeableness is
generally measured during adulthood and, in contrast, we measure externalizing
behavior among schoolchildren. We can therefore demonstrate that externaliz-
ing behavior, though productive on the labor market, is also counterproductive
in school.
Our findings demonstrate a more nuanced relationship between childhood
misbehavior and labor market outcomes than has been recognized in previ-
ous literature. Separating aggregate misbehavior into two separate components
leads to a new understanding of how childhood misbehavior affects earnings dur-
ing adulthood. In the following section, we conduct sensitivity and subgroup
analyses to gain further insights into the relationship between externalizing be-
havior and adult outcomes. Thereafter, we discuss some policy implications of
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our findings.
2.5 Sensitivity Tests and Subgroup Analyses
Here, we assess whether our findings on the mixed effects of externalizing behav-
ior are the result of selection into employment, occupation or fertility (Section
2.5.1). Although we do find that externalizing behavior affects these outcomes,
accounting for these relationships does not undermine our main findings that
externalizing has positive returns in the labor market. Next, we present results
showing that the benefits to externalizing do not extend to children who expe-
rienced poverty during childhood, even when we control for additional variables
such as police involvement (Section 2.5.2).
2.5.1 Externalizing and Selection
In this section, we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses to explore whether
wage returns to externalizing are explained by selection. We begin with selection
into employment. Next, we study how the relationship between externalizing
and earnings changes when we control for various lifecycle outcomes, including
education, fertility, partnership, experience by age 33 and occupation decisions.
In general, we find evidence that externalizing behavior is strongly related to a
host of lifecycle outcomes. However, accounting for these relationships does not
undermine the idea that externalizing is rewarded in the labor market.
Externalizing and Employment
Recall that wage and hours regressions are estimated on individuals who are
employed. One possible concern is that the estimated relationship between
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externalizing and earnings is driven solely by selection into employment. In
order to consider this relationship we first estimate a multinomial logit model
of selection into self and paid employment while keeping the factor analysis
structure constant.31 The results can be found in Table 2.11 where unemployed
individuals are the base group. We find important gender differences in our
results. Females with higher levels of externalizing behavior are less likely to
be unemployed and are more likely to be self-employed at age 33.32 For males,
externalizing behavior is weakly negatively related to the employment decision.
Moreover, women with high levels of internalizing behavior are significantly
more likely to be unemployed, but for men it is not important. Cognition
predicts higher employment for males, though the coefficient is only significant
at the 10% level. For females, it is not significantly related to employment. The
main impact of cognition on employment likely works through schooling, which
we do control for and does predict employment for both genders.
The results for externalizing behavior among females are especially concern-
ing since they raise the possibility that high-externalizing women who are rela-
tively productive (or who work more hours when employed) tend to self-select
into employment. This could be the case if high-externalizing individuals face a
lower disutility of working and are therefore observed in unemployment only if
they are particularly unproductive due to other (omitted) factors. To address
this concern, we exploit earnings data for individuals who were not employed at
31In other words, we keep the measurement system mapping latent skills to observed mea-
surements of misbehavior constant so that changes in the parameters are solely attributable
to changes in the control variables and not in the measurement system.
32This finding is similar to the one in Levine and Rubinstein (2013) They show that
teenagers who engage in risky or illicit behaviors are more likely to self-select into en-
trepreneurship.
110
age 33, but reported earnings in a previous employment spell. The idea is that
labor market outcomes at other periods would provide some insight into how
much unemployed individuals would have earned if they had worked at age 33
(Neal and Johnson, 1996). Using this approach, the proportion of individuals
in our sample for whom we obtain a measure of earnings rises from 62% to 92%
(90% for males and 93.5% for females).33 If results are driven by highly pro-
ductive, high-externalizing individuals entering employment, we would expect
the estimated relationship between externalizing and earnings to fall once we
include earnings information on unemployed individuals.
We re-estimate the model outlined in Section 2.3 using the larger sample that
includes individuals with earnings information from other years. Estimates are
presented in Table 2.12. In Column [1] we present the estimated parameters
using the original measure of labor market earnings. In Column [2] we use the
new measure of earnings that include individuals not working at age 33. We do
not find a decrease in the estimated relationship between externalizing behavior
and weekly earnings once we include earnings for unemployed males. These
results provide evidence against the possibility that selection into employment
explains the estimated results for the males in our sample. However, as can
be seen in Column [4], we do see a decrease of about 20% in the estimated
relationship for females. Therefore, our estimates reflect, in part, how high-
externalizing females who are high earners for unobserved reasons select into
employment. However, the bottom line is that, even after we account for this
decrease, the resulting relationship between externalizing behavior and earnings
33This percentage is somewhat lower for males because a higher percentage of males are
always classified as self-employed.
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remains large and significant.34
Externalizing and other Lifecycle Outcomes
Next, we assess how estimated coefficients change when we vary the set of con-
trols used to explain weekly hours and wages.35 We consider four sets of controls
(measured at age 33), which are added to the earnings equations successively.
They are (i) dummies for educational attainment; (ii) number of children and a
partnership indicator; (iii) months of experience; and (iv) occupation dummies.
Estimation occurs for males and females separately and results are presented
in Table 2.13 for males and in Table 2.14 for females. In Figure 2.4, we illus-
trate the changes in the estimated coefficients on externalizing as the additional
controls are added. In particular, for each set of controls in the wage and hour
equations, we simulate weekly earnings as we vary the externalizing factor from
the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 95th percentile, keeping other latent
skills and covariates at the population median.
To begin, we consider the relationship between externalizing behavior and
earnings before we control for any additional outcomes. Estimates can be found
in column [1] of Tables 2.13 and 2.14. Even before we control for any additional
outcomes the relationship is positive for both males and females (though it is
insignificant for females). This reflects results from the crude model showing
34As an additional robustness check, we also experimented with a formal Heckman selection
model for hourly wages using partnership and number of children as exclusion restrictions.
We do not present these results since they suggest a similar story to the one presented in
Table 2.12 and because the exclusion restrictions are difficult to defend.
35For this exercise, we keep the measurement system mapping latent skills to observed mea-
surements of misbehavior constant so that changes in the parameters are solely attributable to
changes in the control variables and not in the measurement system. We also re-estimated the
model allowing the factor structure to change at each different version of the model. Results
do not change in any apparent way.
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that the externalizing behavior leads to a net benefit in terms of earnings, i.e.,
that the premium does not emerge only after we have controlled for the nega-
tive impact on schooling. In Column [2], we add schooling dummy variables and
re-estimate the model. The estimated relationship between externalizing and
earnings increases by around 15%. This is not surprising given the externalizing
penalty in school. In other words, the relationship between externalizing behav-
ior and earnings is stronger once we control for schooling, which is negatively
associated with externalizing.
Next, we control for number of children and whether the individual has a
partner (Columns [3] and [4] of Tables 2.13 and 2.14, for males and females,
respectively). For males, including these additional controls does not change
the estimated coefficient on externalizing. In contrast, for females, controlling
for fertility doubles the magnitude of the coefficient. This gender difference is
also clear in Figure 2.4. In Panel (b) for females, the slope of the curve, which
represents how externalizing is associated with earnings, increases noticeably
once we add the number of children by age 33 as a control. To understand the
gender difference in how fertility affects the externalizing earnings premium,
we estimate a linear regression of the number of children by age 33 on the
three factors using the previously estimated measurement system. Estimates
are found in Table 2.15. Externalizing males and females are both likely to
have a larger number of children by age 33, but based on the earnings equations
(Tables 2.13-2.14), having more children is somewhat irrelevant to earnings
for males, but is associated with a large drop in earnings for females. Recall
from Figure 2.2 that female earnings are much lower for women with children
in comparison to women without children. For males, there is no discernible
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relationship.36
Finally, we add months of experience and occupational choice as controls
(Columns [5] and [6]). However, adding these to the model does not appreciably
alter the estimated relationship between externalizing and earnings. In fact,
there is little evidence that externalizing behavior drives individuals into any
specific occupation once we have controlled for education. These results are
found in Table 2.16 where we estimate a multinomial logit model of occupational
sorting with unskilled occupations as the basis group. As can be seen in Table
2.16, externalizing is not strongly related to the occupation decision. High-
externalizing males are more likely to self-select into skilled manual occupations
but the parameter is only marginally significant.37
In summary, though externalizing behavior is related to a host of economic
outcomes that also predict earnings, we have demonstrated here that the exter-
nalizing premium on the labor market is not driven by differential sorting by
externalizing behavior into these outcomes. Return to Figure 2.4, which plots
wages for different levels of externalizing using coefficients estimated assuming
varying sets of controls. Though the slope does change, especially for females,
depending on which controls are included, the externalizing wage premium is
robust across specifications.
36For individuals from later cohorts, among whom women are more likely to purchase
childcare in the market or men are more likely to take time out of the labor market to care
for children, our findings on externalizing, fertility and earnings could be different.
37In additional analyses that are available upon request, we also show that the returns to
externalizing do not differ significantly across occupations.
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2.5.2 Childhood Poverty, Misbehavior and Earnings
Studying a sample of disadvantaged black children in the U.S., Heckman, Pinto,
and Savelyev (2013) find that an early childhood education program increased
earnings in part by reducing externalizing behavior. In contrast, we show that
externalizing can be valuable in the labor market. In this section, we explore
whether differences in findings are explained by differences in the socioeconomic
status of the group being analyzed. One possibility is that children born into
poorer families face a higher likelihood of criminality or police involvement for
the same level of externalizing behavior.
We estimate a version of our econometric model with two changes. First,
we include a measure of police involvement at age 16 as an additional outcome
equation and as an additional explanatory variable in the schooling, wage and
hours equations. Second, we estimate the model on a sub-sample of our analytic
sample, which is selected to resemble the family characteristics of the sample
studied in Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013). In particular, we construct
a subsample of our analytic sample consisting of subjects who faced financial
difficulties during childhood. Recall, this occurs if the interviewer reported that
the household appeared to be experiencing poverty in 1965 or if a member of
the household self-reported having financial difficulties in the 12 months prior
to being observed in either 1969 or 1974.38 We estimate the econometric model
separately for the low-SES subsample and for all other subjects in our analytic
38An alternative would be to use family income. However, perhaps surprisingly, the NCDS
does not collect information on family income or parental pay in the first three surveys. In
the fourth survey, when children were 16 years old, categorical information was collected on
each parent’s work pay. However, this information on parental pay is missing for over 20% of
our sample. Therefore, we decided to use the available information about financial difficulties
instead.
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sample, which we call the high-SES subsample.39
Summary statistics for the low-SES sub-sample are found in Table 2.17.
Looking at the table, the low-SES sample completes less education and earns
lower wages, though hours are similar across groups. They are somewhat less
likely to be employed or report having a partner, but have more children, on
average. To account for potential instability of the measurement system (the
mapping from underlying factors to observed variables), we estimate the mea-
surement system for each group separately. Estimates by SES group for school-
ing, hours, wages and police involvement are found in Tables 2.18-2.21.
Estimating separate models by childhood SES, we find that many patterns
are similar to the main model. However, we also find some important differences
by childhood SES. First, we estimate a larger penalty for externalizing behavior
for educational attainment among individuals that grew up in low-SES house-
holds (-0.108 versus -0.061). This finding is broadly consistent with results in
Ramey (2014), who shows that externalizing blacks in the U.S. face a higher
likelihood of punishment by suspension in comparison to similarly externalizing
whites. This could be because schools that serve low-SES children in the UK
(or black children in the U.S.) have fewer resources to address externalizing
behavior and therefore react to it through suspensions or expulsions.40
Perhaps most importantly, we find that the labor market returns to exter-
nalizing behavior fail to extend to the low-SES subsample. For this group, the
39In a separate analysis, not presented here, we separated our sample into four groups
by gender and socioeconomic status. Main patterns remain largely similar. However, the
standard errors for the low-SES groups, when divided by gender, were too large for any useful
inference to be made.
40There are also some differences in the returns to family characteristics, such as the father’s
occupation.
116
point estimate of the coefficient on externalizing behavior is zero in the wage
equation. In the hours equation, the coefficient is 0.23 and insignificant for
the low-SES group (versus 0.43 and significant at the 1-percent level for the
high-SES group). Wage returns to the other skills are similar across the two
groups, as are the returns to education, experience and occupation. On the
other hand, there are some differences in the influence of internalizing behavior
and cognition for the hours worked decision. Internalizing behavior decreases
hours worked for the high-SES group but not for the low-SES group and cogni-
tion increases hours worked for the low-SES group only. Other coefficients are
mostly similar. However, one important caveat to the results presented in this
section is that we cannot statistically differentiate the returns to externalizing
behavior for the two socioeconomic groups because the standard errors in the
estimates for the financially difficulties group are too large.41
Following the results in Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013), one explana-
tion for possible differences in results by childhood SES status is that low-SES
individuals are at a higher risk of criminal behavior for a given level of external-
izing behavior. In line with this possibility, we find a strong relationship between
externalizing behavior and police involvement (see Table 2.21). In general, our
estimates suggest that low-SES individuals are more likely to have some police
involvement (the estimated constant in the police involvement equation is 1.00
for the high-SES group and -0.41 for the low-SES group). However, the rela-
tionship between externalizing behavior and police involvement is stronger for
41One possibility is that differences in returns are due to instability of the measurement
system across groups. However, we estimated the measurement system separately for each
group and find that the factor loadings are remarkably similar for the high-SES and low-SES
group (Table B.4).
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the high-SES group.42 Interestingly, we do not find much evidence that police
involvement is related to worse labor market outcomes for either SES subgroup.
Therefore, even though externalizing behavior predicts higher police involve-
ment, police involvement does not appear to derail labor market prospects in
the British sample we study. It is possible that the returns to externalizing
behavior might be negative in a context where police involvement is highly pe-
nalized in the labor market. This is the sort of context studied in Heckman,
Pinto, and Savelyev (2013), who examine a sample composed mostly of at-risk
black youths in the U.S. However, for our sample, police involvement cannot
explain why low-SES individuals in the British sample we study receive little
payoff to externalizing behavior.
Therefore, despite our initial results showing that externalizing behavior is
associated with better labor market outcomes, this positive association does not
extend to individuals who faced poverty during childhood. In other words, the
payoffs to non-cognitive skills are context-dependent, as argued in Lundberg
(2013). To explain differences in returns to skills across socioeconomic groups,
we are therefore left with several distinct, but related possibilities. The first
is that there are true differences in the productivity of externalizing behavior
across groups. This is possible if, for example, children born into wealthier fam-
ilies are better able to channel aggressive tendencies into productive activities.43
A second possibility is that high-externalizing individuals from lower classes face
different selection rules than their higher-SES counterparts, but which are not
observed by the econometrician. For example, managers or co-workers may view
42Interestingly, internalizing behavior and cognition are associated with less police involve-
ment, though the coefficients are much larger in magnitude for high-SES individuals.
43See, for example, Doyle et al. (2009) on the timing of investments to decrease inequality.
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high-externalizing individuals from high-SES families as ambitious leaders and
be willing to hire them in high-wage positions or to promote them. In contrast,
high-externalizing individuals from lower SES families may find their advance-
ment thwarted if they are viewed as disruptive, aggressive or impolite. If so,
high-externalizing individuals from low-SES families are not unproductive per
se, but instead sort into jobs where they earn less. In both cases, childhood SES
and externalizing exhibit complementarities and children from poorer families
are unable to unleash the potential of an otherwise lucrative skill.
2.6 Externalizing and Education Policy
In this section, we discuss the economic implications of our findings on ex-
ternalizing behavior. Connecting childhood misbehavior to earnings connects
our findings to a well-developed literature linking childhood characteristics and
behaviors to long-term economic outcomes. An implication of this literature
is that human capital investments during childhood can have large payoffs in
adulthood (Heckman and Masterov, 2007; Doyle et al., 2009; Cunha, Heckman,
and Schennach, 2010; Carneiro, Løken, and Salvanes, 2011). For example, Cur-
rie (2001, 2009) shows that early childhood health disparities can affect future
labor market outcomes through a variety of mechanisms, including performance
at school. This suggests that interventions that address health disparities can
improve the labor market performance of children born into poverty.
Researchers have also linked childhood misbehavior to labor market out-
comes, typically seeing misbehavior as uni-dimensional and unproductive. Our
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departure from the typical view suggests the need for caution in implement-
ing policies that affect childhood non-cognitive skills. The concern is not a
hypothetical one as many school systems are poised to enact policies that eval-
uate schools on character skills development (West et al., 2015). In response
to such proposals, Duckworth and Yeager (2015) emphasize concerns related
to measurement, arguing that assessments of non-cognitive skills could be mis-
leading and are subject to strategic manipulation or outright cheating.44 These
concerns are certainly valid, but our findings on mixed effects of externalizing
behavior raise additional serious doubts about the utility of uniformly penaliz-
ing or rewarding schools for the development of students’ non-cognitive skills.
The reason is that such policies could stifle skills that are productive in other
sectors.
Even if a character skill is shown to be valuable in the labor market, however,
this does not imply that it should be promoted in school. In our case, we do
not think that the externalizing premium we identify should be used to justify
policies encouraging externalizing behavior. Here, we discuss two reasons why.
The first reason is tied to our results on differences in returns by socioeconomic
group. Leaving aside important questions about the source of such differences
in returns (e.g., a higher propensity for police involvement due to biases in crim-
inal justice systems), policies that promote skills could harm some groups. This
is especially concerning for skills that are negatively priced among individuals
from poor backgrounds as such policies could exacerbate existing inequality.
Another reason not to support policies promoting externalizing behavior is the
possibility of negative spillover effects in the classroom if externalizing children
44See also Ivcevic and Brackett (2014) on issues with the measurement of grit.
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are disruptive and limit other students’ learning (Henneberger, Coffman, and
Gest, 2016). Recall, our results show that externalizing behavior loads heavily
onto the maladjustment syndrome “hostility towards children”. Given docu-
mented negative impacts of bullying on education, policies increasing hostility
among schoolchildren are likely to be unproductive (Brown and Taylor, 2008;
Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010).
However, our results do suggest that it could be useful to explore policies
and interventions that accommodate externalizing behavior rather than penal-
izing or simply attempting to eliminate it. Such alternatives might increase
schooling without stifling valuable labor market skills. In making this distinc-
tion between potential policies, we draw on pedagogical research that discusses
“control-oriented” teaching methods, which are designed to reduce external-
izing behavior versus “relationship-oriented” methods, which are designed to
strengthen the learning environment for externalizing children.45 A simple ex-
ample illustrates the difference in the two approaches. Young students who
often initiate conversations with teachers at inopportune times could be pun-
ished for interrupting a lesson. Instead, they could be given a “raincheck” and
invited to initiate a discussion at an appropriate time. The effectiveness of such
practices is demonstrated by a randomized controlled trial of the My Teach-
ing Partner-Secondary program (MTP-S), in which a web-mediated program
on improving teacher-student in-class interaction has produced reliable gains in
student achievement (Allen et al. (2011)).
45For an overview of pedagogical techniques that foster a caring and positive student-teacher
relationship, in particular, in dealing with student misbehavior, see Hamre and Pianta (2006).
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2.7 Conclusion
Few would argue against the idea that stronger cognition or better health would
improve outcomes on almost any conceivable economic dimension. Some non-
cognitive skills, such as grit, also appear to have positive returns in many sectors.
In this paper, we illustrate that it is generally not meaningful to think of non-
cognitive skill as either good or bad per se. We have demonstrated that the
same non-cognitive skill can be productive in one context and counterproduc-
tive in another. Our findings suggest that investments in human capital should
be evaluated in light of this possibility. In particular, mixed effects of exter-
nalizing behavior suggest caution in devising policies that target children with
apparently undesirable behaviors or so-called negative non cognitive skills. Such
policies may pay off in the short-run by improving educational outcomes, but
may also be costly in the long-run by stifling a productive labor market skill.
We also show important differences across socioeconomic groups in the returns
to skills. This further complicates policies centering around non-cognitive skill
formation, suggesting that individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds may
suffer from an inability to profit from productive skills. Our results are partic-
ularly salient given recent efforts to include measures of non-cognitive skills as
part of schools’ and teachers’ performance ratings.
One direction for future research would aim to better understand hetero-
geneity in the effects of non-cognitive skills across groups. For example, Ramey
(2014) studies a cohort of individuals born in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s.
He shows that high-externalizing blacks are more likely to be suspended from
school than equally externalizing whites. This could lead to differences in the
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returns to externalizing behavior across racial groups since suspensions are as-
sociated with low schooling attainment and lower earnings. Extending the find-
ings in Ramey (2014) to consider labor market outcomes could help to clarify
whether differences in returns to the same non-cognitive skill help to explain
stubbornly persistent inequality across racial groups. Finally, studying exter-
nalizing behavior among a relatively young cohort in the U.S. could lead to
a better understanding of mixed returns to the skills that constitute human
capital.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Latent Factors and their Measurements
Latent Skill Measures
Externalizing Behavior
 Hostility Towards Adults
 Hostility Towards Children
 Anxiety for Acceptance by Adults
 Anxiety for Acceptance by Children
 Restlessness
 Inconsequential Behavior





 Writing Off of Adults and Adult Standards
Cognition
 Reading Comprehension Test Score
 Mathematics Test Score
 Non Verbal Score on General Ability Test
 Verbal Score on General Ability Test
Notes : This table lists the three latent factors used in the empirical analysis
(externalizing behavior, internalizing behavior and cognition) and the observed
variables used to identify them. Measures for externalizing and internalizing
behaviors are drawn from the BSAG maladjustment variables, derived from
teachers’ reports of misbehavior. For cognition, a series of aptitude test scores
are used as measures. See B.1 for further details.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Both Males Females Diff
No Formal Education 0.112 0.102 0.121 
(0.315) (0.303) (0.326)
CSE 0.128 0.112 0.142 
(0.334) (0.316) (0.349)
O Level 0.347 0.307 0.386 
(0.476) (0.461) (0.487)
A Level 0.146 0.190 0.103 
(0.353) (0.393) (0.305)
Higher Education 0.146 0.150 0.142
(0.353) (0.357) (0.349)
Higher Degree 0.121 0.138 0.105 
(0.326) (0.345) (0.307)
Hourly Wage 6.637 7.643 5.457 
(3.053) (2.967) (2.712)
Weekly Hours Worked 36.35 43.54 27.93 
(12.65) (7.757) (12.07)
Weekly Earnings 252.5 329.2 162.4 
(152.5) (134.5) (119.5)
Experience 145.9 164.0 128.2 
(50.92) (45.65) (49.56)
In Paid Work 0.804 0.919 0.692 
(0.397) (0.273) (0.462)
Self Employed 0.162 0.197 0.115 
(0.368) (0.398) (0.319)
Has a Partner 0.873 0.877 0.869
(0.333) (0.328) (0.338)
Number of Children 1.475 1.349 1.597 
(1.125) (1.152) (1.085)
London 0.300 0.293 0.306
(0.458) (0.455) (0.461)
Observations 7324 3612 3712 7324
Notes : Summary statistics for the analytic sample of 7,324 individuals (Column
[1]) and then separately for males (Column [2]) and for females (Column [3]).
For education categories, employment and partnership, entries are in the form
of percentages divided by 100. Experience is measured in months and wages
and weekly earnings are in 1992 British pounds. Self Employed means the
percentage of individuals in paid work who are also self-employed. In Column
[4], ,  and  mean that differences between males and females are significant
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics - BSAG Variables
Both Males Females Diff
Hostility Towards Adults 0.766 0.896 0.639 
(1.754) (1.866) (1.628)
Hostility Towards Children 0.240 0.266 0.215 
(0.719) (0.777) (0.656)
Anxiety for Acceptance by Adults 0.515 0.481 0.548 
(1.154) (1.094) (1.210)
Anxiety for Acceptance by Children 0.298 0.403 0.197 
(0.761) (0.899) (0.579)
Restlessness 0.195 0.242 0.149 
(0.522) (0.575) (0.459)
Inconsequential Behavior 1.263 1.676 0.862 
(1.868) (2.153) (1.432)
Depression 0.933 1.086 0.784 
(1.452) (1.534) (1.350)
Withdrawal 0.307 0.374 0.242 
(0.770) (0.876) (0.645)
Unforthcomingness 1.479 1.538 1.421 
(2.036) (2.009) (2.060)
Writing Off of Adults and Adult Standards 0.910 1.128 0.698 
(1.588) (1.788) (1.333)
Observations 7324 3612 3712 7324
Notes : Summary statistics for maladjustment syndrome scores for our sample of
7324 individuals. Measures constructed using teachers’ reports of misbehavior
or misconduct in school. Statistics are reported separately for all individuals
(Column [1]), for males (Column [2]) and for females (Column [3]). For each
maladjustment syndrome, a child receives a score, which is an integer between
0 and 15, with 15 indicating a persistent display of behavior described by the
maladjustment syndrome. In the table, entries are averages for each syndrome
for the analytic sample. In Column [4], ,  and  mean that differences
between males and females are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 2.4: Crude Model: Educational Attainment
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Misbehavior -.364 -.138 . . . . .
Externalizing . . -.231 -.092 -.097 -.121 -.062
Internalizing . . -.183 -.066 -.060 -.036 -.090
Cognition . .806 . .807 .718 .695 .753
Father Edu . . . . .254 .189 .316
Mother Edu. . . . . .268 .224 .311
No Info on Father Figure . . . . .173 .130 .220
Father in Skilled Occupation . . . . .167 .203 .133
Father in Managerial Occupation . . . . .414 .462 .369
Working Mother . . . . .019 .001 .037
Female -.303 -.333 -.304 -.334 -.335 . .
Obs. 7324 7324 7324 7324 7324 3612 3712
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from ordered probit used to link non-cognitive
skills to educational attainment. We estimate the ordered probability of choosing 1 of 6
schooling levels on a set of observable variables along with proxies for unobserved skills. To
construct proxies for unobserved skills, we sum up all variables used to measure that skill
in subsequent analysis and then normalize each unobserved skill. Models [1]-[5] include all
individuals and a gender dummy, Model [6] includes only males and Model [7] only females.
 denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant
at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.5: Crude Model: Log Weekly Earnings
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Misbehavior -.105 -.028 . . . . . .
Externalizing . . -.019 .025 .034 .046 .018 .090
Internalizing . . -.101 -.059 -.050 -.045 -.045 -.041
Cognition . .205 . .204 .084 .053 .052 .057
CSE . . . . .078 -.015 .013 -.021
O Level . . . . .207 .033 .070 .0003
A Level . . . . .343 .116 .096 .132
Higher Education . . . . .515 .178 .156 .154
Higher Degree . . . . .644 .386 .291 .368
Has a Partner . . . . . .085 .121 .031
Number of Children . . . . . -.106 .015 -.258
Experience . . . . . .003 .001 .002
Skilled Manual Occu. . . . . . .259 .091 .310
Skilled Non-manual Occu. . . . . . .241 .172 .301
Managerial Occupation . . . . . .514 .266 .695
Female -.933 -.916 -.932 -.915 -.867 -.739 . .
London .249 .219 .248 .219 .205 .161 .193 .124
Const. 5.639 5.615 5.639 5.616 5.319 4.808 5.026 4.403
Obs. 4936 4936 4936 4936 4936 4936 2664 2272
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to earnings. We regress log earnings of workers on a set of observable variables
along with proxies for unobserved skills. To construct proxies for unobserved skills, we sum
up all variables used to measure that skill in subsequent analysis and then normalize each un-
observed skill. Models [1]-[6] include all individuals and a gender dummy, Model [7] includes
only males and Model [8] only females.  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10%
level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient
is significant at the 1% level.
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Externalizing 1.000 0.575 -0.380
Internalizing 0.575 1.000 -0.358
Cognition -0.380 -0.358 1.000
Females
Externalizing Internalizing Cognition
Externalizing 1.000 0.593 -0.400
Internalizing 0.593 1.000 -0.398
Cognition -0.400 -0.398 1.000
Notes : This table lists the correlation matrix of the three latent skills by gender.
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Table 2.7: Measurement Error Model: Factor Loadings
Latent Skill Measures Males Females
Externalizing Behavior
Inconsequential Behavior 1.000 1.000
Hostility Towards Adults 1.680 1.312
Hostility Towards Children 2.387 1.632
Anxiety for Acceptance by Adults 1.204 0.763
Anxiety for Acceptance by Children 1.699 1.522
Restlessness 1.784 1.572





Writing Off of Adults and Adult Standards 0.605 0.847
Cognition
Verbal Score on General Ability Test 1.000 1.000
Reading Comprehension Test Score 0.596 0.579
Mathematics Test Score 1.086 1.065
Non Verbal Score on General Ability Test 0.733 0.766
Notes : This table lists the factor loadings that express the relationship between
each observed measure and the underlying factor it identifies.
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Table 2.8: Measurement Error Model: Ordered Probit for Educa-
tional Attainment
[M] [F]
Externalizing Factor -0.119 -0.046
Internalizing Factor -0.019 -0.064
Cognition 0.702 0.725
Mother Education 0.189 0.327
Father Education 0.250 0.329
No Father Info. 0.200 0.271
Father in Skilled Occupation 0.174 0.113
Father in Managerial Occupation 0.442 0.331
Working Mother 0.019 0.039
In Financial Difficulties -0.311 -0.303
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from an Ordered Probit model used to link
non-cognitive skills to educational attainment. We estimate educational attainment on a set
of observable variables along with the unobserved factors. The coefficients on the three factors
have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect.  denotes the coefficient
is significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and 
denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.9: Measurement Error Model: Log Hourly Wages
[M] [F]
Externalizing Factor 0.025 0.025





Higher Education 0.184 0.257
Higher Degree 0.333 0.409
Partner Dummy 0.109 0.064
Number of Children 0.011 -0.067
Experience 0.001 0.001
Skilled Manual Occu. 0.070 0.070
Skilled Non-manual Occu. 0.199 0.173
Managerial Occu. 0.255 0.374
London Dummy 0.180 0.123
In Financial Difficulties -0.026 -0.014
Constant 1.334 1.179
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to hourly wages. We regress log hourly wages on a set of observable variables
along with the unobserved factors. The coefficients on the three factors have been standard-
ized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect.  denotes the coefficient is significant at
the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the
coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.10: Measurement Error Model: Log Weekly Hours Worked
[M] [F]
Externalizing Factor 0.009 0.069





Higher Education -0.031 -0.110
Higher Degree -0.051 -0.047
Partner Dummy 0.012 -0.033
Number of Children 0.005 -0.190
Experience 0.000 0.001
Skilled Manual Occu. 0.023 0.235
Skilled Non-manual Occu. -0.027 0.127
Managerial Occu. 0.011 0.317
London Dummy 0.013 -0.000
In Financial Difficulties -0.008 0.043
Constant 3.748 3.426
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to hours worked. We regress log weekly hours worked on a set of observable
variables along with the unobserved factors. The coefficients on the three factors have been
standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect.  denotes the coefficient is significant
at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the
coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.11: Measurement Error Model: Employment Decision
Males Females
Self-Employed Employee Self-Employed Employee
Externalizing Factor -0.055 -0.211 0.377 0.144
Internalizing Factor -0.198 -0.074 -0.307 -0.208
Cognition 0.154 0.246 0.063 -0.006
CSE 0.726 0.740 0.422 0.182
O-Level 0.672 0.434 0.355 0.240
A-Level 1.093 1.064 0.431 0.022
Higher Education 0.448 0.891 0.356 0.499
Higher Degree 0.210 0.639 0.271 0.281
Partner Dummy 1.545 1.566 0.280 0.274
Number of Children -0.168 -0.255 -0.279 -0.549
Father in Skilled Occupation -0.316 -0.107 -0.195 0.277
Father in Managerial Occupation -0.362 0.035 -0.414 0.201
Working Mother -0.091 0.145 -0.108 0.238
In Financial Difficulties -0.366 -0.329 0.005 0.303
Constant -0.639 0.463 -1.012 0.713
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from a multinomial logit model used to link
non-cognitive skills to the employment decision. We model the the employment decision
as a linear function of a set of observable variables along with the unobserved skills. The
coefficients on the three factors have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation
effect. The base category is not-employed at age 33.  denotes the coefficient is significant
at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the
coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.12: Measurement Error Model: Log Weekly Earnings, Im-
puting Missing Earnings
[Males] [Females]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Externalizing Factor 0.039 0.045 0.084 0.066
Internalizing Factor -0.061 -0.054 -0.049 -0.041
Cognition 0.052 0.088 0.062 0.029
CSE 0.017 -0.019 -0.020 -0.065
O-Level 0.073 0.002 0.002 0.012
A-Level 0.094 0.062 0.135 0.178
Higher Education 0.158 0.103 0.158 0.180
Higher Degree 0.295 0.277 0.376 0.453
Partner Dummy 0.124 0.151 0.032 0.045
Number of Children 0.015 0.001 -0.257 -0.229
Experience 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Skilled Manual Occu. 0.089 0.080 0.306 0.358
Skilled Non-manual Occu. 0.174 0.195 0.301 0.405
Managerial Occu. 0.266 0.339 0.693 0.774
London Dummy 0.192 0.201 0.123 0.166
In Financial Difficulties -0.033 -0.029 0.029 -0.011
Constant 5.064 5.019 4.613 4.453
Obs 2264 3257 2272 3470
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from a linear regression used to link non-
cognitive skills to weekly earnings under alternative specifications. We regress log weekly
earnings of workers on a set of observable variables along with the three factors. In Model
[1], the dependent variable is reported gross weekly earnings for males that were working at
age 33. In Model [2], we impute weekly earnings for males that were not working at age
33 using self-reported weekly earnings from previous jobs and include those observations in
the regression. In Model [3], the dependent variable is reported gross weekly earnings for
females that were working at age 33. In Model [4], we impute weekly earnings for females
that were not working at age 33 using self-reported weekly earnings from previous jobs and
include those observations in the regression. With the imputation, we manage to compute
the earnings for 92% of the individuals in our sample.  denotes the coefficient is significant
at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the
coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.13: Measurement Error Model: Log Weekly Earnings
(Males), Varying Controls
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Externalizing Factor 0.036 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.039
Internalizing Factor -0.079 -0.077 -0.073 -0.069 -0.068 -0.061
Cognition 0.138 0.072 0.072 0.070 0.073 0.052
CSE . 0.051 0.050 0.053 0.037 0.017
O-Level . 0.137 0.139 0.129 0.111 0.073
A-Level . 0.172 0.176 0.169 0.157 0.094
Higher Education . 0.286 0.289 0.278 0.267 0.158
Higher Degree . 0.374 0.383 0.368 0.415 0.295
Number of Children . . 0.029 0.012 0.011 0.015
Partner Dummy . . 0.158 0.147 0.124
Experience . . . 0.001 0.001
Skilled Manual Occu. . . . . . 0.089
Skilled Non-manual Occu. . . . . . 0.174
Managerial Occu. . . . . . 0.266
London Dummy 0.215 .0.212 0.214 0.215 0.216 0.192
In Financial Difficulties -0.070 -0.043 -0.044 -0.043 -0.040 -0.033
Constant 5.666 5.487 5.447 5.336 5.148 5.064
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to weekly earnings with different sets of controls. We regress log weekly
earnings of male workers on a set of observable variables along with the three factors. The
goal is to undertand how the relationship between non-cognitive skills to earnings change as
we change the set of additional regressors.  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10%
level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient
is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.14: Measurement Error Model: Log Weekly Earnings (Fe-
males), Varying Controls
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Externalizing Factor 0.036 0.043 0.079 0.080 0.086 0.084
Internalizing Factor -0.046 -0.029 -0.062 -0.060 -0.065 -0.049
Cognition 0.279 0.109 0.089 0.087 0.080 0.062
CSE . 0.089 0.067 0.068 0.041 -0.020
O-Level . 0.251 0.154 0.154 0.119 0.002
A-Level . 0.509 0.339 0.339 0.329 0.135
Higher Education . 0.732 0.579 0.579 0.541 0.158
Higher Degree . 0.961 0.727 0.726 0.799 0.376
Number of Children . . -0.323 -0.327 -0.285 -0.257
Partner Dummy . . . 0.064 0.048 0.032
Experience . . . . 0.002 0.002
Skilled Manual Occu. . . . . . 0.306
Skilled Non-manual Occu. . . . . . 0.301
Managerial Occu. . . . . . 0.693
London Dummy 0.218 0.188 0.136 0.135 0.135 0.123
In Financial Difficulties -0.077 -0.026 0.024 0.026 0.035 0.029
Constant 4.996 4.634 5.153 5.106 4.744 4.613
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to weekly earnings with different sets of controls. We regress log weekly
earnings of female workers on a set of observable variables along with the three factors. The
goal is to undertand how the relationship between non-cognitive skills to earnings change as
we change the set of additional regressors.  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10%
level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient
is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.15: Measurement Error Model: Number of Children
[Males] [Females]
Externalizing Factor 0.070 0.051





Higher Education -0.076 -0.231
Higher Degree -0.229 -0.370
Children in HH at 11 0.037 0.031
In Financial Difficulties 0.039 0.008
Constant 0.222 0.542
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from a regression model used to link non-
cognitive skills to the number of children. We model the number of children as a linear
function of a set of observable variables along with the unobserved skills. The coefficients on
the three factors have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect.  denotes
the coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the
5% level and  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.16: Measurement Error Model: Occupation Decision
Males
Skilled Manual Skilled Non-Manual Managerial
Externalizing Factor 0.239 -0.021 0.032
Internalizing Factor -0.324 -0.191 -0.263
Cognition 0.029 0.279 0.208
CSE 0.077 0.689 0.805
O-Level 0.536 1.374 1.526
A-Level 1.070 1.537 2.470
Higher Education 1.137 0.840 3.679
Higher Degree -0.112 1.209 4.397
Partner Dummy 0.129 0.487 0.376
Number of Children -0.446 -0.382 -0.640
Father in Skilled Occupation -0.331 -0.220 -0.354
Father in Managerial Occupation -0.277 -0.413 -0.556
Working Mother 0.110 -0.105 0.045
In Financial Difficulties 0.243 -0.185 0.122
Constant -0.839 -0.169 -1.087
Females
Skilled Manual Skilled Non-Manual Managerial
Externalizing Factor 0.127 -0.099 -0.034
Internalizing Factor -0.116 -0.163 -0.245
Cognition 0.041 0.689 0.594
CSE 0.564 0.992 0.534
O-Level 1.089 1.630 1.209
A-Level 1.691 2.350 2.089
Higher Education 1.228 2.484 2.990
Higher Degree 0.746 2.914 4.077
Partner Dummy 0.459 0.412 0.821
Number of Children -0.013 -0.155 -0.142
Father in Skilled Occupation 0.221 -0.205 -0.583
Father in Managerial Occupation 0.089 -0.537 -0.979
Working Mother 0.126 0.155 -0.058
In Financial Difficulties -0.390 -0.482 -0.323
Constant -0.533 -2.000 -0.850
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from a multinomial logit model used to link
non-cognitive skills to the occupation decision. We model the occupation decision as a function
of a set of observable variables along with the unobserved skills. The coefficients on the three
factors have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect. The base category
are unskilled occupations.  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes
the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient is significant at
the 1% level.
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Table 2.17: Summary Statistics, Subsamples by SES
Both High-SES low-SES Diff
No Formal Education 0.112 0.0839 0.257 
(0.315) (0.277) (0.437)
CSE 0.128 0.116 0.191 
(0.334) (0.320) (0.393)
O Level 0.346 0.351 0.324
(0.476) (0.477) (0.468)
A Level 0.146 0.158 0.0871 
(0.354) (0.365) (0.282)
Higher Education 0.146 0.156 0.0982 
(0.354) (0.362) (0.298)
Higher Degree 0.122 0.137 0.0427 
(0.327) (0.344) (0.202)
Hourly Wage 6.635 6.832 5.595 
(3.052) (3.073) (2.718)
Weekly Hours Worked 36.35 36.57 35.18 
(12.65) (12.51) (13.32)
Weekly Earnings 252.3 260.6 208.8 
(152.4) (153.6) (137.8)
Experience 145.8 146.8 140.5 
(50.96) (49.82) (56.28)
In Paid Work 0.804 0.808 0.783 
(0.397) (0.394) (0.412)
Self Employed 0.161 0.164 0.146
(0.367) (0.370) (0.353)
Has a Partner 0.873 0.879 0.839 
(0.333) (0.326) (0.367)
Number of Children 1.474 1.444 1.635 
(1.125) (1.121) (1.130)
London 0.299 0.309 0.247 
(0.458) (0.462) (0.431)
Observations 7296 6125 1171 7296
Notes: Summary statistics for the analytic sample of 7,296 individuals. Statistics are reported
separately for all individuals (Column [1]), for individual that did not experience financial
difficulties growing up (Column [2]) and for those that did (Column [3]). For education
categories, employment and partnership, entries are in the form of percentages divided by
100. Experience is measured in months and wages and weekly earnings are in 1992 British
pounds. The Self Employed row reports the percentage of individuals in paid work that are
self-employed. In Column [4], ,  and  mean that differences between males and females
are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.18: Measurement Error Model: Ordered Probit for Edu-
cational Attainment, by SES
[High SES] [Low SES]
Externalizing Factor -0.061 -0.108
Internalizing Factor -0.053 -0.032
Cognition 0.698 0.629
Mother Education 0.246 0.357
Father Education 0.297 0.185
No Father Info. 0.259 0.201
Father in Skilled Occupation 0.162 0.076
Father in Managerial Occupation 0.390 0.282
Working Mother -0.002 0.069
Police Involvement -0.416 -0.559
No Police Inv. Info -0.378 -0.406
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from the Ordered Probit model used to link
non-cognitive skills to educational attainment with the additional control “police involvement
at age 16”. We estimate educational attainment on a set of observable variables along with
the unobserved factors. The estimation is done separately for individuals having low-SES
family backgrounds and those having high-SES family backgrounds. The coefficients on the
three factors have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect.  denotes the
coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5%
level and  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.19: Measurement Error Model: Log Hourly Wages, by SES
[High SES] [Low SES]
Externalizing Factor 0.034 0.009





Higher Education 0.235 0.258
Higher Degree 0.397 0.428
Partner Dummy 0.086 0.101
Number of Children -0.022 -0.025
Experience 0.002 0.001
Skilled Manual Occu. 0.108 0.086
Skilled Non-manual Occu. 0.182 0.115
Managerial Occu. 0.345 0.215
London Dummy 0.147 0.189
Police Involvement 0.019 0.005
No Police Inv. Info -0.017 0.010
Constant 1.276 1.340
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to hourly wages with the additional control “police involvement at age 16”. We
regress log hourly wages on a set of observable variables along with the unobserved factors.
The estimation is done separately for individuals having low-SES family backgrounds and
those having high-SES family backgrounds. The coefficients on the three factors have been
standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect.  denotes the coefficient is significant
at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the
coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.20: Measurement Error Model: Log Weekly Hours
Worked, by SES
[High SES] [Low SES]
Externalizing Factor 0.043 0.023





Higher Education -0.069 0.047
Higher Degree -0.018 0.089
Partner Dummy -0.003 -0.008
Number of Children -0.081 -0.087
Experience 0.001 0.001
Skilled Manual Occu. 0.168 0.109
Skilled Non-manual Occu. 0.097 -0.034
Managerial Occu. 0.216 0.090
London Dummy 0.004 0.032
Police Involvement 0.068 0.031
No Police Inv. Info -0.057 -0.008
Constant 3.603 3.686
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to hours worked with the additional control “police involvement at age 16”.
We regress log weekly hours worked on a set of observable variables along with the unobserved
factors. The estimation is done separately for individuals having low-SES family backgrounds
and those having high-SES family backgrounds. The coefficients on the three factors have
been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect.  denotes the coefficient is
significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and 
denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.21: Measurement Error Model: Linear Probability Model
- Police Involvement at 16
[High SES] [Low SES]
Externalizing Factor 0.351 0.244
Internalizing Factor -0.174 -0.059
Cognition -0.242 -0.123
Mother Education 0.011 -0.521
Father Education -0.042 -0.199
No Father Info. 0.431 0.349
Father in Skilled Occupation -0.210 -0.222
Father in Managerial Occupation -0.358 -1.059
Working Mother 0.041 0.045
Constant -0.994 -0.414
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from a linear probability model used to link
non-cognitive skills to “police involvement at age 16”. We regress police involvement on a set
of observable variables along with the unobserved factors. The coefficients on the three factors
have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect.  denotes the coefficient
is significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and 
denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
144


































(a) Wages by schooling

































(b) Hours by schooling

































(c) Earnings by schooling
































(d) Normalized earnings by schooling
Figure 2.1: Gender Differences in Labor Market Outcomes by
Schooling
Figure 2.1(a) compares hourly wages by schooling level and gender, Figure
2.1(b) compares weekly hours worked by schooling level and gender, and Figures
2.1(c) and 2.1(d) compare weekly earnings and normalized weekly earnings by
schooling level and gender.
145































(a) Normalized wages by fertility



































(b) Normalized hours by fertility
































(c) Normalized earnings by fertility
Figure 2.2: Gender Differences in Labor Market Outcomes by Fer-
tility
Figure 2.2(a) compares hourly wages by number of children and gender, Figure
2.2(b) compares weekly hours worked by number of children and gender, and
Figure 2.2(c) compares normalized weekly earnings by number of children and
gender.
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(a) Estimated Distribution Externalizing














(b) Estimated Distribution for Internalizing
















(c) Estimated Distribution Cognition
Figure 2.3: Gender Differences in Latent Factors
Figure 2.3(a) shows the estimated distribution of externalizing behavior by gen-
der. Figure 2.3(b) shows the estimated distribution of internalizing behavior by
gender. Figure 2.3(c) shows the estimated distribution of cognition by gender.
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Figure 2.4: Decomposition of Effects of Externalizing on Weekly
Earnings
Figure 2.4 visualizes the results from regressing weekly earnings on a varying set
of controls presented in Tables 2.13 and 2.14. It illustrates how the predicted
weekly earnings in regression models with different sets of controls vary, when
we increase the externalizing from the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 95th
percentile, keeping other latent skills and covariates at the population median.
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Chapter 3
When Mothers and Teachers
Disagree: Observer Reports and
Children’s Noncognitive Skills
3.1 Introduction
A large literature in Economics has recognized the importance of noncognitive
skills developed in childhood in explaining economic outcomes. Studies have
shown that noncognitive skills, which are defined by Borghans et al. (2008)
as personality traits or the “patterns of thought, feelings, and behavior”, pre-
dict a variety of adult outcomes, from educational attainment to labor force
productivity and health outcomes (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006; Cur-
rie and Almond, 2011; Durlak et al., 2011; Moffitt et al., 2011). Measuring
noncognitive skills in children, however, present unique methodological chal-
lenges. Since these skills are not directly observed, researchers have to rely on
observer reports, usually the mother but sometimes the child’s teacher, on the
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child’s behaviors.1 2
Observer reports, however, provide an imperfect picture of the child’s emo-
tional development. Mothers and teachers only observe children in specific
settings – at home or at the school. As a result, these reports do not paint a
complete picture of the child’s behavior (Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell,
1987; De Los Reyes and Kazdin, 2005; Youngstrom, Loeber, and Stouthamer-
Loeber, 2000). More problematic is that observer reports can be influenced by
socioeconomic contexts. For example, we now know that parental beliefs re-
garding children’s abilities are influenced by the school composition and that
teacher beliefs are influenced by children’s and teachers’ race (Kinsler, Pavan
et al., 2016; Gershenson, Holt, and Papageorge, 2016; Papageorge, Gershenson,
and Kang, 2016). Likewise, random mean-zero measurement error is likely a
problem since we now know that mothers are often misinformed about different
aspects of child development (Cunha, 2013; Boneva and Rauh, 2016).
In this paper, I exploit information from both maternal and teacher reports
on the same behaviors to better understand how these reports are formed and
the implications for our understanding of child development. First, I document
the fact that teachers and mothers rarely agree on children’s behavioral prob-
lems when asked the same questions about children’s behaviors - the correlation
between maternal and teacher reports is 0.37.3 In order to better understand
1This is the case, for example, of the behavior problem index (BPI) collected as part of
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth - Children and Young Adults. The BPI scale
is constructed from a series of maternal report about different child behaviors (Parcel and
Menaghan, 1988). This scale is widely used in the literature, including, for example, the
seminar paper by Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010).
2Self-reports can also be used for older children. However, these also come with many dif-
ferent limitations. For example, Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) shows that most individuals
tend to overrate their skills.
3This is consistent with the literature in psychiatry and psychology. In a seminal paper
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this disagreement, I develop a measurement error model, where I model noncog-
nitive skills and the disagreement between teachers and mothers as latent fac-
tors and estimate these jointly with adult outcomes influenced by the latent
factors. The model allows me to separate the information in the maternal and
teacher reports into three components, a common factor that is measured by
both maternal and teacher reports, a factor that is uniquely reported by moth-
ers, referred to as maternal disagreement factor, and a third that is uniquely
reported by teachers, referred to as teacher disagreement factor. I find that
maternal and teacher reports are measuring very different aspects of child de-
velopment. I find that both observer reports measure the common factor, which
captures general child misbehavior and is related to educational attainment, la-
bor market involvement and adult risky behaviors. I also find that the teacher
disagreement factor explains a small proportion of teacher reports and seems to
capture random mean-zero measurement error. On the other hand, the mater-
nal disagreement factor explains a large proportion of the variation in maternal
reports and is a strong predictor of adult mental health.
These results suggest that differences between maternal and teacher reports
are not solely explained by random measurement error, but seem to be driven
by teachers and mothers reporting on different aspect of child development. An
important open question, however, is why are mothers and teachers are respond-
ing differently when asked the same questions. One explanation is systematic
bias in reporting by mothers and teachers. There is some evidence in the litera-
ture that mothers and teachers can be influenced by the socioeconomic context
Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell (1987) found that the mean correlation between re-
ports of similar respondents (e.g., pairs of parents) is 0.6, while between different types of
respondents (e.g., a parent and a teacher) is 0.28.
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when describing children’s academic abilities. For example, parental beliefs have
been shown to be influenced by the school composition and teacher beliefs by
the child’s race (Kinsler, Pavan et al., 2016; Gershenson, Holt, and Papageorge,
2016). In this paper, I find suggestive evidence that reporting bias might also be
at play when describing children’s noncognitive skills. For example, I find that
maternal mental health is the main predictor of maternal disagreement but is
not related to the common factor. This finding has been argued in the literature
as evidence of bias in maternal reports (Boyle and Pickles, 1997; Najman et al.,
2000).
A second possible explanation is that mothers and teachers observe children
in different settings - at home and at the school - and as a result are reporting
on different dimensions of noncognitive skills (Achenbach, McConaughy, and
Howell, 1987; De Los Reyes and Kazdin, 2005). I also find suggestive evidence
of this explanation as different factors are related to different adult outcomes.
For example, the maternal disagreement is a strong predictor of adult mental
health, while the common factor is a strong predictor of adult risky behaviors.
Further work is needed to disentangle these two effects.4
My results highlight the empirical challenges in measuring noncognitive
skills, as even when using the same scale different observers report different
aspects of children’s noncognitive development. As a result, research using
the same scale but measured from different observers could lead to very differ-
ent conclusions on the returns of investing in children and the importance of
4One important caveat is that I don’t have exogenous variation for investments in children
and for children noncognitive skills. As a result, further works is needed to establish whether
the results shown here are causal. The reader should take this into consideration when
interpreting my results.
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noncognitive skills for adult outcomes. This accentuates the need for a better
understanding of what aspects of children’s noncognitive development are mea-
sured by different scales and observers, and how to better elicit noncognitive
skills from observer reports.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I describe
the conceptual framework that explains mother-teacher disagreement. In Sec-
tion 3.3, I introduce the dataset, describe my measure of noncognitive skills, and
conduct a preliminary data analysis. In Section 3.4, I describe the econometric
framework and estimation. In Section 3.5, I present my findings and discuss
the implications for our understanding of children’s noncognitive development.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I describe the main conceptual problems with observer reports.
I start by describing conceptually how observer reports are formed and why
maternal and teacher reports might be different. I argue that there are three
main conceptual reasons for maternal-teacher disagreement: random and mean-
zero measurement error, systematic biases in maternal and teacher reports, and
behaviors that are only expressed in a specific setting and, as a result, only
observed by the mother or by the teacher. Then, I discuss the conceptual impli-
cations of these three sources of disagreement for our understanding of noncog-
nitive skill formation and for our understanding of the returns of noncognitive
skills for adult outcomes.
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3.2.1 Sources of Disagreement
Conceptually observer reports of children’s behavioral problems measure a com-
bination of three different objects. First, they measure noncognitive skills, here
described as θ. If this were not so, the reports would be of little interest to
us. Importantly, noncognitive skills are multidimensional, so θ is a vector of
different skills (Currie and Almond, 2011). Second, since noncognitive skills are
imperfectly observed by the observers, the reports of child behaviors are always
measured with some error. Here, I describe this random and mean-zero mea-
surement error as ε. Third, observers can be influenced by the socioeconomic
context. For example, we know that parental beliefs about children’s cognitive
ability can be influenced by the composition of children in the child’s school
(Kinsler, Pavan et al., 2016). Similarly, we know that teacher beliefs about
children’s future educational attainment can be influenced by children’s and
teachers’ race (Gershenson, Holt, and Papageorge, 2016; Papageorge, Gershen-
son, and Kang, 2016). As a result, reports can be systematically biased and
influenced by observable socioeconomic variables, here described by the vector
X.
Formally, we can write the production of maternal (MRi) and teacher (TRi)
reports as:










where fm and ft are functions that describe how the mother and the teacher
incorporate the three sources of information into the reports of different child
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behaviors.
Similarly, mother-teacher disagreement (Disi) can be formally described as
the difference between the maternal and teacher reports:









This simple framework suggests three main conceptual reasons for why ma-
ternal and teacher reports can differ. First, mothers and teachers imperfectly
observe children’s noncognitive development. As a result, both maternal and
teacher reports suffer from random measurement error – εmi and ε
t
i in Equation
3.3. When taking the difference between the two reports, the random measure-
ment error problem is amplified and can explain differences in the two reports.
Random, mean-zero measurement error is not a significant problem, and can be
corrected with multiple sources of information on noncognitive skills, as it has
been suggested in the econometric and psychometric literature (De Los Reyes
and Kazdin, 2005; Hu and Schennach, 2008).
A second reason for disagreement between different observers is systematic
bias in reporting, as captured by Xmi and X
t
i in Equation 3.3. This is a pos-
sibility if observers with different characteristics or in different social contexts
disagree about the underlying noncognitive skill when they observe the same
child behaviors (Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell, 1987; De Los Reyes and
Kazdin, 2005).5 Systematically bias in reporting can be explained by both bi-
ases in beliefs, where observers mistakenly believe the child’s behavior to be
higher (lower) than it actually is, and differences in how individuals report the
same belief about the child behavior. For example, observers in different social
5One such example is Gupta, Lausten, and Pozzoli (2016) that shows that mothers in
distress over report child behavioral problems in comparison to fathers.
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contexts might agree on the underlying child behavior but disagree on what
‘often’ means when asked whether “the child often has changes in mood or
feelings”.
Thirdly, disagreement might arise because noncognitive skills are multidi-
mensional and different observes interact with children in different settings and,
as a result, observe and report on a different subset of the noncognitive skills.
In Equation 3.3, this is captured by fm and ft, which describe how different di-
mensions of noncognitive skills (θi) are transformed into maternal and teacher
reports. One explanation is that mothers mainly interact and observe children
at home, while teachers mainly observe children in the school, and children ex-
press different behaviors in these different settings (Achenbach, McConaughy,
and Howell, 1987; Smith, 2007).6
3.2.2 Conceptual Implications
Understanding the sources of disagreement is important because they can clar-
ify conceptual problems in using observer reports to study the determinants and
returns of noncognitive skills. The sources of disagreements can explain why
the returns of child behavioral problems for adult outcomes differ when using
maternal and teacher reports, which I demonstrate Section 3.3.3. Similarly, it
provides conceptual explanations for why estimates for the formation of noncog-
nitive skills in children can differ when using maternal and teacher reports. I
discuss these issues in more detail in the next two sections.
6Similarly, children might express a different set of behaviors as they interact with different
individuals. De Los Reyes et al. (2009) showed this phenomenon in a laboratory setting. The
researchers showed that maternal reports of child disruptive behavior are more predictive of
laboratory observations of child disruptive behavior in the presence of the mother, whereas
teacher reports are more predictive of child behavior in the presence of an unfamiliar observer.
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Returns for Adult Outcomes
Suppose we are interested in estimating the returns of noncognitive skills on
some relevant adult outcome (Yi), say years of education or earnings. A typical
exercise would be to linearly regress the adult outcome on the noncognitive skill
and on relevant controls (Xyi ), as described in Equation 3.4 below. However,
the true noncognitive skill is not observed and instead we would use maternal
report and teacher report as measures of the noncognitive skill, as described in
Equations 3.5 and 3.6.
Yi  X
y








pβy  xαyTRi   pεy (3.6)
The three sources of disagreement discussed in the previous section sug-
gest that conceptually the estimated returns of noncognitive skills can be miss-
estimated in Equations 3.5 and 3.6 (αy αy xαy). First, it is likely that both
maternal and teacher reports to be measured with error. This would lead to
attenuation bias, or an underestimate of the returns of noncognitive skills. Sec-
ond, reports might suffer from reporting bias, which can lead to bias estimates
on the returns to noncognitive skills if the source of the bias also affects the adult
outcome. Thirdly, it possible for mothers and teachers report on a different set
of child behaviors. In this case, the problem is more nuanced since estimates
for the returns of noncognitive skills in Equations 3.5 and 3.6 are measuring re-
turns to different sets of skills and, as a result, should not be expected to be the
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same. Moreover, it would imply that estimates of noncognitive skills measured
with teacher reports and maternal reports are not necessarily comparable and
highlight the need to treat noncognitive skills as multidimensional objects.7 As
a result, understanding the sources of disagreement between mothers and teach-
ers can highlight important problems in estimating the returns of noncognitive
skills.
Noncognitive Skill Formation
Similarly, suppose we are interested in estimating the returns of different in-
vestments in children (Xθi ). A typical exercise would be to linearly regress the
noncognitive skill on the relevant investments as described in Equation 3.7 be-
low. Since the underlying skill is unobserved we would use maternal report and












pβθ   pεθ (3.9)
The sources of disagreement suggest that the estimated returns of different
investments could be different in the three equations (i.e. βθ  rβθ  pβθ). In
7The literature on noncognitive skills has started to realize the importance of treating
noncognitive skills as multidimensional objects. One example is Papageorge, Ronda, and
Zheng (2017). They show that misbehavior in school has two dimensions, one that is valued
in the labor market (externalizing behaviors) and one that is not (internalizing behaviors).
This difference in effects, however, would not be uncovered if misbehavior was treated as an
uni-dimensional object, as it is commonly done in the literature.
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this case, random measurement error is less of a problem since the variable mea-
sured with error is the outcome of interest. However, as before, bias in reporting
would lead to miss-estimation of the returns of different investment on children’s
noncognitive skills if the source of the bias in reporting is correlated with the
investments. That is, we would attribute a higher effect to an investment if it
also influences the observer reports. A second problem arises if different sets of
behaviors are measured by mothers and teachers. In this case, as before, the
estimated returns of investments in children are expected to be different when
using maternal and teacher reports, since different skills are affected differently
by the investments. As before, understanding the sources of disagreement be-
tween mothers and teachers can highlight important problems when estimating
the returns of investments on children’s noncognitive development.
3.3 Data and Preliminary Results
In this section, I introduce the data set used in this paper and discuss the
different ways we can measure noncognitive skills in children. Then, I show
that mothers and teachers display a high level of disagreement about children’s
noncognitive skills when asked the same questions about different child be-
haviors. Moreover, I provide preliminary evidence that mother-teacher dis-
agreement is not random and is correlated with family characteristics such as
maternal age, maternal mental health and family income. Finally, I provide
preliminary evidence that maternal and teacher reports are correlated with dif-
ferent adult outcomes, which suggests that they might be capturing different
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dimensions of children’s noncognitive skills. These results motivate the empiri-
cal model developed in Section 3.4.
3.3.1 The Child Development Supplement to the PSID
In this paper, I use information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and its Child Development Supplement (CDS). The PSID is an ongoing
dynastic longitudinal survey. It started as a nationally representative sample
of 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families in 1968 in the United States. The
CDS collected information on 3,563 children living in 2,394 of the PSID families.
Information was collected in three waves: 1997, 2002 and 2007. Eligible children
were between the ages of 0 and 12 in 1997, at the time of the first survey. The
CDS includes a broad array of developmental measures as well as information
on the home and schooling environment of the child.
In this paper, I focus on children attending elementary and middle school
in 1997, during the first wave. For these children, the survey collected infor-
mation on their schooling environment and interviewed their elementary and
middle school teachers. This allows me to compare maternal and teacher re-
ports about child behavioral problems. Information on teacher characteristics
and experience was also collected as part of the schooling supplement. School-
ing information was collected for 1,024 children out of the 3,563 children in the
original CDS sample. My final sample includes 834 of the 1,024 children in
elementary school in 1997. I exclude children missing information on key fam-
ily characteristics, such as maternal years of education, children with missing
information on key teacher characteristics and missing information on either
maternal or teacher reports on their behavior.
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Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the 834 children included in the
study. In 1997, these children were between 4 and 13 years old, with an average
age of 9.26. Half of my sample is female and about 37% of my sample is
reported by the mother as black. The high percentage of black children is a
direct result of the over-sample of low income families in the main PSID. For
the same reason, about 28% of mothers were single in 1997. In addition to
the common family characteristics, such as family income, maternal years of
education and age at birth, the PSID also provides information about mothers’
mental health, measured by the Kessler 6 (K6) distress scale. The K6 is a widely
used measure of general mental health developed by Kessler et al. (2002). It
measures psychological distress and captures a symptoms of depression and
anxiety (Drapeau, Marchand, and Beaulieu-Prévost, 2011).
Moreover, it also provides information on maternal investment measured
by the emotional support scale and the cognitive stimulation scale from the
Home Observation Measurement of the Environment-Short Form (HOME-SF).
The HOME-SF scales use both maternal reports and interviewer observations
to measure the quality of the cognitive stimulation and emotional support pro-
vided by the child’s family. The emotional support scale includes interviewer
observations, such as whether the“mother answered child’s questions or requests
verbally?”, and maternal reported measures, such as “about how many times,
if any, have you had to spank child in the past week?”. Similarly, the cognitive
stimulation scale includes interviewer observations, such as the “building has no
potentially dangerous structural or health hazards within a school-aged child’s
range.”, and maternal reported measures, such as “How many books does the
child have?”.
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Furthermore, the PSID continued to survey these children throughout their
lives. Starting in 2005, individuals 18 and older were interviewed as part of the
‘transition into adulthood’ (TA) supplement. As part of this study, informa-
tion was collected on many adult outcomes. As a result, the TA supplement
allows me to link the maternal and teacher measures of children’s behavioral
problems to adult outcomes. I included a varied range of adult outcomes in
this study in order to better understand what the maternal and teacher reports
are measuring. Information on the adult outcomes can be seen in Table 3.1.
First, I include information on individuals’ years of completed education. On
average the individuals in my sample completed 13.26 years of education at age
23. Second, I include information on their employment, on average 82% of my
sample was working or in school at age 23. Third, I include a measure of young
adult risky behavior. This measure captures how often the individual engages
in five different behaviors. Individuals were asked ‘about how often in those 6
months did you’ ‘do something dangerous’, ‘damage public or private property’,
‘get into a physical fight’, ‘drive when drunk or high’ and ‘ride with a driver
who had too much to drink’. Each behavior was coded as follows: never as (1),
once as (2), 2-3 times as (3), 4-6 times as (4), and more than 6 times as (5). The
risky behavior scale is an average of the self-reported score on each of these five
questions, ranging from 1 to 5. On average individuals score 1.41 in the risky
behavior scale. Finally, I also include a measure of adult mental health. This
measure is the same scale available for their mothers in 1997, which measures
symptoms of anxiety and depression. These individuals report slightly higher
distress than the mothers , 4.88 versus 3.60 on average.
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3.3.2 Measuring Noncognitive Skills - The BPI
As mentioned throughout the paper, one issue with studying children’s noncog-
nitive development is that noncognitive skills are not directly observed. As a
result, researchers are dependent on information about different child behav-
iors that are related to the child’s noncognitive skills. Information on these
different behaviors is usually elicited from an adult that is close to the child,
usually the child’s mother but sometimes the child’s teacher (Borghans et al.,
2008).8 9 Alternatively, some researchers have relied on child outcomes that
are highly correlated with noncognitive skills as measures of these skills. For
example, Jackson (2012) and Gershenson (2016) rely on student absences and
suspensions as measures of students’ noncognitive skills.
In this paper, I use both maternal and teacher reports of child behaviors from
the Behavior Problem Index (BPI). The BPI was developed to measure the in-
cidence and severity of child behavior problems in a survey setting (Peterson
and Zill, 1986). The BPI in the PSID-CDS includes 26 questions10 administered
to children ages 3 and older. These questions ask respondents about specific
behaviors that children may have exhibited in the previous three months. For
8For adults and older children, self-reports about these behaviors can also be used to elicit
individual’s noncognitive skills.
9For example, Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) uses maternal responses about
different child behaviors in the Behavior Problem Index to measure children’s noncognitive
skills. This information is collected as part of the widely used National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth - Children and Young Adults. In comparison,Papageorge, Ronda, and Zheng (2017)
uses teacher reports about different child behaviors in the Bristol Social Adjustment Guides
to measure similar children’s noncognitive skills. These are part of the British National Child
Development Study.
10I use 26 of the original set of 30 questions administered in the PSID. I exclude questions
that were administered differently for teachers and primary caregivers and questions that do
not belong to the six sub-scales described in Table 3.2.
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example, respondents were asked whether the child “is stubborn, sullen or ir-
ritable” and whether the child “has trouble getting along with other children”
(see Table 3.2 for the full list of questions). Respondents describe the child’s
behavior using three categories: (1) “often true”, (2) “sometimes true”, and
(3) “not true”. In the PSID-CDS the BPI was administered to various re-
spondents, including the primary caregiver, usually the mother, a secondary
caregiver, usually the father, and the child’s teacher in preschool, elementary
and middle school. These questions vary slightly by child age and respondent
but the underlying construct remains the same.
The 26 questions can be separated into six different subscales measuring dif-
ferent dimensions of child behaviors. Table 3.2 lists the 26 questions and the cor-
responding sub-scale classification. For example, mothers were asked whether
their children “has sudden changes in mood or feeling”, capturing anxiety and
depression, and also whether their children “cheats of tells lies”, capturing an-
tisocial behavior. The sub-scales are constructed by summing the scores on the
individual questions. I rely on the six sub-scales when estimating the model
described in Section 3.4.
In addition to the BPI, the PSID-CDS also includes information about dif-
ferent child outcomes that are related to children’s noncognitive development.
For example, it includes information about whether the child has ever been sus-
pended or expelled from school, ever saw a behavioral specialist, and how often
she has been late or absent from school. The specific questions are described in
Table 3.3. These observable outcomes can also be used to measure children’s




In the main econometric analysis, I formally model noncognitive skills and the
disagreement between teachers and mothers as latent variables and estimate
these jointly with investments in children and adult outcomes. However, for the
preliminary analysis conducted here, I construct measures of noncognitive skills
by simply summing the scores in the 26 BPI questions from maternal and teacher
reports. Similarly, mother-teacher disagreement is constructed by taking the
difference between the maternal noncognitive score and the teacher noncognitive
score. This ‘crude’ model allows me to demonstrate the key patterns in the data
and to demonstrate that the main results are not driven by the factor analytic
methods in the main econometric analysis.
Table 3.4 summarizes the BPI total score and subscales from teachers and
mothers separately. These are crude measures, constructed simply by sum-
ming the score in the corresponding BPI questions. In general, mothers tend
to report higher behavioral problems than teachers, the difference however is
not statistically significant. Despite the non-significant difference in average re-
ports, mothers and teachers rarely agree on children’s behavioral development.
The correlation between maternal and teacher reports is only 0.36. This result
is in line with other results in the literature that found the average correla-
tion between maternal and teacher reports to be 0.27 across several studies
(see Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell (1987)). The low correlation is also
present in the sub-scales, with correlations ranging from 0.22 for the ‘Dependent’
sub-scale to 0.42 for the ‘Hyperactive’ sub-scale.
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In order to understand what explain this high level of disagreement, I esti-
mate the relationship between different family characteristics, maternal invest-
ments and teacher characteristics with the disagreement score (Disi) and the
child behavior measured from maternal and teacher reports (MRi and TRi).








tr   εtri (3.11)
Disi MRi  TRi  X
D
i β
D   εDi (3.12)
where XDi is a vector of different family socioeconomic characteristics and ma-
ternal investments and εs are normally distributed disturbances.
Estimates of Equations 3.10-3.12 are presented in Table 3.5. I find some
important differences in the association between the different observable char-
acteristics and the maternal and teacher reports. First, teacher reports are in-
fluenced by the child’s age and gender, while maternal reports are not. Second,
while I find that some family investments are associated with both maternal
and teacher reports, others are only associated with one of the observer reports.
For example, I find that maternal education, maternal mental health and fam-
ily income are associated with maternal reports but not with teacher reports.
Similarly, cognitive stimulation is strongly associated with teacher reports but
only weakly related to the maternal reports. Of these relationships the most
striking is the difference in the association between the reports and maternal
mental health. As a result, maternal mental health is the main predictor of
mother-teacher disagreement. This finding is well documented in the literature
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(Fergusson, Lynskey, and Horwood, 1993; Najman et al., 2000). Finally, teacher
and school characteristics do not seem to influence either maternal or teacher
reports.
Since mothers report higher behavioral problems on some sub-scales and
teachers report higher behavioral problems on others (see Table 3.2), it is pos-
sible that these differences are driven by differences in the weights given to
different sub-scales in the maternal and teacher reports. In order to under-
stand whether this is a problem, I re-estimate Equation 3.12 on each of the
six sub-scales separately. These results can be seen in Table 3.6. I don’t find
any discernible differences in the sub-scales that could be driving the results in
Table 3.5.
These results suggest that mother-teacher disagreement cannot be solely
explained by random measurement error. However, differences in association
between observable characteristics and maternal and teacher reports can be
explained by either bias in reporting by one of the observers or by the idea
that different observers report on different dimensions of child behaviors. The
results in Table 3.5 do not allow me to differentiate between the two sources of
disagreement.
In order to try to distinguish between these two sources of disagreement, I
explore the relationship between the maternal and teacher reports with different
dimensions of adult outcomes at age 23. These outcomes capture educational
attainment, involvement with the labor market, risky behaviors and mental
health. The idea being that different dimensions of noncognitive skills have dif-
ferent returns for different adult outcomes, and if maternal and teacher reports
are measuring different dimensions we should also see different returns across
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the outcomes. Formally, let Yi be adult outcome of interest for individual i, I
estimate linear regressions of the following form:
Yi  X
y
i βy   α1θi   α2Disi   εy (3.13)
where θi is a measure of child i’s noncognitive skills using either maternal or
teacher reports, Xyi are observable socioeconomic characteristics of the child
and εy is a normally distributed disturbance.
Estimates of Equation 3.13 are presented in Table 3.7. First, note that both
maternal and teacher measures of children’s behavioral problem are negatively
associated with educational attainment and involvement with the labor and
schooling sectors at age 23 (columns [1] and [2]). The maternal report, however,
is not significantly related to the risky behaviors scale at age 23, while the
teacher report is. In contrast, teacher report is not significantly related with
the mental health scale at age 23, while the maternal report is. Second, for
the first three outcomes, the disagreement factor is significant when I control
for the maternal report but not when I control for the teacher report (columns
[4] and [5]). This suggests that the unique information in the teacher report is
an important predictor of educational attainment, labor market and schooling
participation and adult risky behaviors. In contrast, for the mental health scale,
the disagreement is only significant when I control for the teacher report. This
suggests that the unique information in the maternal report is an important
predictor adult mental health.
The results from the crude model presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.7, provide
evidence that the mother-teacher disagreement cannot be solely explained by
random measurement error. Moreover, it provides suggestive evidence that the
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maternal and teacher reports are picking up different dimensions of child be-
havioral problems. These results suggest that the teacher report is capturing a
general aspect of child misbehavior that is associated with educational attain-
ment, involvement with the labor and schooling sectors, and with adult risky
behaviors. The maternal report, on the other hand, seems to be capturing infor-
mation about the child’s mental health since it is associated with the maternal
mental health scale and maternal investments in the form of emotional support,
and, importantly, with adult psychological distress.
3.4 Model
This section describes the main empirical framework used in the paper. I start
by describing the structural latent factor model and its advantages in compar-
ison to the crude model estimated in the previous section. In short, it allows
me to control for measurement error in the reports and to separately identify
the unique information in each observer report. Then, I quickly describe the
estimation procedure. Finally, I explain the main identification assumptions
and the variation that identify the key parameters in the model.
3.4.1 Description of the Model
In the model, noncognitive skills are measured by three sources of information:
maternal reports of child behaviors, teacher reports of child behaviors and child
outcomes, such as school suspension and absences. Importantly, I treat each
sub-scale of the BPI, for each observer, as an independent measure of the child’s
noncognitive skills. Treating each sub-scale as a mismeasurement allows me to
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control for measurement error in the observer reports. More importantly, I al-
low for three latent factors to explain the observer reports and child outcomes
in the model. The first factor, the ‘common factor’, is allowed to influence all
noncognitive skills measurements. As a result, it captures the common varia-
tion across the maternal and teacher reports and the child outcomes. On the
other hand, the second factor, the ‘maternal disagreement factor’, only influ-
ences maternal reports and captures the information that is unique to these
reports. Similarly, the third factor, the ‘teacher disagreement factor’, captures
the information that is unique to the teacher reports.
As explained in Section 3.2, the unique information in each observer report
can be explained by three different components. First, the disagreement factors
could be capturing a dimension of noncognitive skills that is only observed
or reported by one of the observers. Second, the disagreement factors could
be capturing observer bias in reporting. Third, it can capture measurement
error that is correlated across sub-scales, and as a result not corrected by the
model. Unfortunately, I cannot separately identify these three components with
the available data. Nonetheless, estimated results provide suggestive evidence
of which component seems to be the most relevant in explaining the unique
information in each observer report.
Formally, I denote the k-th measurement of child i’s noncognitive skills from
observer j P tm, tu as mjik, where m denotes maternal reports and t teacher















ik j P tm, tu (3.14)
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where θci is the ‘common factor’ that influences both maternal and teacher re-
ports, θmi is the ‘maternal disagreement factor’ that influences maternal reports
only, and θti is the ‘teacher disagreement factor’ that influences teacher reports
only. In addition, αj





are the factor loading of the two factors on the k-th measurement of observer
j and εjik is an error term capturing measurement error that is assumed to be
normally distributed and independent across measurements.
Moreover, I use child observed outcomes related to misbehavior, such as





order to separately identify the three factors, I need a source of information




i . I explain the identification
issue in more detail in Section 3.4.3. Formally, I denote the k-th measurement
of child i’s outcome as moik. m
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where, Xoi are observables that affect the child outcomes in addition to the
common factor and ζok are the estimated returns for these observables for the
k-th outcome. In addition, as before, αo
0k is the mean for outcome k, α
o
1k the
factor loading of the common factor on the k-th outcome and εoik is an error
term capturing measurement error that is assumed to be normally distributed
and independent across outcomes.
The measurement system is estimated jointly with the distribution for the
three latent factors, which is allowed to depend on family, teacher and child
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t   εti (3.18)
where the Xis are observable variables that determine the three latent factors
and the εis are exogenous shocks that are normally distributed and indepen-
dent across factors.11 12 The β coeficients estimate the association between
the observable family, teacher and child characteristics and the three sources of
information.
Finally, I jointly estimate this system with relevant adult outcomes that
are influenced by the noncognitive skills. I approximate these outcomes with















where γ1n, γ2n and γ3n estimate the association between the three sources of
information and the relevant adult outcomes, Xyi include control variables and
ε
y
in are exogenous shocks that are normally distributed and independent across
outcomes.
I summarize the parameters to be estimated by a vector denoted Φ:
Φ  pα, β, γ, ζ,Σq
11This is necessary condition for identification.
12Also necessary for identification is for Xc
i
to include variation not in Xo
i
. Otherwise, I




where α denotes the set of factor loadings in equations 3.14 and 3.15, β is the
set coefficients governing the relationship between observables and the three
latent factors in equations 3.16-3.18, γ is the set of coefficients relating the
three factors to adult outcomes in equation 3.19, ζ is the set of coefficients on
control variables in equations 3.15 and 3.19, and Σ are the estimated variance
of the exogenous shocks in equations 3.14-3.19.
3.4.2 Estimation Procedure
I estimate the model by simulated maximum likelihood. The estimation is done
in steps. First, at each parameter suggestion, indexed by g and denoted Φpgq,
and at for each individual i, I simulate a vector of unobserved latent factors
k3 times, using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature with k points for the exogenous
shocks described in equations 3.14 and 3.15. Then, for each draw, I compute the
probability of observing the maternal reports, teacher reports, child outcomes
and adult outcomes.
More formally, given a parameter suggestion g, I draw k3  I exogenous
shocks, where I is the number of individuals in my sample. Then, for each indi-







compute the density functions for each outcome in the model: the probability














i q, and the probability of observing the adult outcomes f
Y,pgq
il pyiq.
Then, I compute each weighted individual’s likelihood contribution, where the
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Finally, I take the log of the individual likelihood contribution and sum over











Using both simplex and gradient methods, I evaluate lpgq at different values
in the parameter space until a maximum is found.
3.4.3 Parameter Identification
Identification of latent factor models has been extensively discussed in the eco-
nomics literature. While different models require different identification assump-
tions, the general requirement is for there to exist sufficient correlation between
the measurements and instruments (variables that only enter the model through
the latent factors) to identify the latent factors. Carneiro, Hansen, and Heck-
man (2003) provides a good overview of the identification assumptions necessary
to identify a linear latent factor model where the latent factors are independent.
They argue that a sufficient condition for identification for the number of mea-
surements to be equal or larger than twice the number of latent factors plus
one. More generally, conditions for nonparametric identification are provided
in the measurement error literature (see Hu (2008); Hu and Schennach (2008);
Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010)).
In order to understand the variation in the data that identify the key pa-
rameters of the model, I provide an illustrative example of how the correlation
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between measurements and investments can be used to identify the parameters
in the model. The conditions for identification in the main model are similar
than those in the simple model below. That is, I need to assume that the ex-




i), that only the common factor
influences the observed child outcomes, as in Equation 3.15, and to fix the value
of at least one factor loading for each of the three factors.
Simple Example
In this section, I show identification for a simple model with 5 measurements
(M1-M5), two unobserved factors (θ1 and θ2) and three explanatory variables
that only influence the factors (X1,X1 and X3). Formally, we can describe the
system as:
M1 µ1   α11θ1   ε1
M2 µ2   α12θ1   ε2
M3 µ3   α13θ1   α23θ2   ε3
M4 µ4   α14θ1   α24θ2   ε4
M5 µ5   α15θ1   α25θ2   ε5
θ1 β11X1   β12X2   β13X3   εθ1
θ2 β21X1   β22X2   β23X3   εθ2
Identification requires at least to measurement to be uniquely determined
by one of the factors. M1 and M2 satisfy this condition in the simple model
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and the child outcomes satisfy this condition in the main model (see Equation
3.15). Moreover, in order to scale the factors I need to fix one of the factor
loadings (αs) for each of the factor. Here I will assume that α11  1 and
α23  1. Finally, I also need to assume the error terms are independent, so that
εθ1 K εθ2 K ε1 K ε2 K ε3 K ε4 K ε5.
We are interested in estimating three main set of parameters: the factor
loadings (αs), the determinants of the latent factors (βs) and the distribution
of the shocks for the latent factors (εθ1 and εθ2). Below I describe step by step
how each of these parameters can be identified in the simple model.
I start with the parameters describing the distribution of θ1. First, β11,
β12 and β13 are easily identified from regressing M1 on X1, X2 and X3. Since
α11  1, the β11, β12 and β13 are easily identified as can be seen in the equations
below:
M1 µ1   θ1   ε1
µ1   β11X1   β12X2   β13X3   pεθ1   ε1q
Once we know β11, β12 and β13, we can identify α12 also by regressing M2
on X1, X2 and X3, as can be seen in the equations below:
M2 µ2   α12θ1   ε2
µ2   α12β11X1   α12β12X2   α12β13X3   pα12εθ1   ε2q
Finally, εθ1 can be identified from the correlation between the residuals of the
two regression above. That is: varpεθ1q  corrpεθ1   ε1, α12εθ1   ε2q{α12 since
εθ1 K ε1 K ε2.
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Identifying the parameters for θ2 is slightly more complicated since we need
to solve a system of equations. We can identify the parameters in two steps.
First, we regress M3, M4 and M5 on X1, X2 and X3:
M3  pµ3   xγ31X1   xγ32X2   xγ33X3   pε3
M4  pµ4   xγ41X1   xγ42X2   xγ43X3   pε4
M5  pµ5   xγ51X1   xγ52X2   xγ53X3   pε5
Second, the estimated pγs are functions of the β and α parameters. The
relationship can be described by the following system of equations:
xγ31  α13β11   α23β21 , xγ32  α13β12   α23β22 , xγ33  α13β13   α23β23
xγ41  α14β11   α24β21 , xγ42  α14β12   α24β22 , xγ43  α14β13   α24β23
xγ51  α15β11   α25β21 , xγ52  α15β12   α25β22 , xγ53  α15β13   α25β23
The remaining parameters can be obtained from solving the system of equa-
tions above, where we have 9 observables (xγ31-xγ53) and 9 unobservables (α13,α14,α15,α23,α24,α25,β21
,β22, β23). Note that we already estimated β11 ,β12, β13 using M1 and M2. Fi-
nally, εθ2 can be identified from the correlation between the residuals of two of
the measurements that include θ2.
3.5 Results
In this section, I present the empirical findings from the econometric model
described in the previous section. I first discuss the relationship between the
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three latent factors and the observer reports and child outcomes (Section 3.5.1).
Next, I discuss the estimated relationship between observed child, family and
teacher characteristics and the three factors (Section 3.5.2). Then, I discuss
the estimated relationship between the three factors and the adult outcomes
(Section 3.5.3). Finally, I discuss how these different results fit together and
the implications for our understanding of children’s noncognitive development
(Section 3.5.4).
3.5.1 Mapping Factors to Measurements
Starting with the distribution of the three factors, I find a small positive corre-
lation between the common factor and the maternal disagreement factor (Table
3.8). However, I find a zero correlation between the maternal and teacher dis-
agreement factors. The small correlation between the factors is non-surprising
given the low estimated correlation between the maternal and teacher reports
described in Table 3.2. It is also explained by the relationship between these
factors and the observed characteristics and investments that determine the
factors, which I describe in Section 3.5.2.
In Table 3.9, I report the estimates of the factor loadings mapping the three
factors to the observer reports and child outcomes. The factor loadings describe
the relationship between each factor and its measurements, where a higher factor
loading implies a higher association between the factor and the corresponding
measurement. In order to identify the three factors, I restrict one of the factor
loadings for each factor. I restrict the maternal and teacher disagreement factors
to have a loading of 1 for the maternal and teacher reports of headstrong, and
the common factor to have a loading of 1 for the number of monthly days absent
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from school.
The factor loadings for the maternal disagreement factor are similar for the
six maternal reports sub-scales. The one exception is peer problems, with a fac-
tor loading of 0.32. This suggests that each of the first five sub-scales explain the
maternal disagreement factor by a similar rate. On the other hand, the teacher
disagreement factor disproportionately load higher on the anxious/depressed
scale, which suggests that this factor is mainly explained by this subscale. The
common factor loads more heavily in the teacher report scales than in the ma-
ternal report scales, suggesting that it is mainly driven by the information on
the teacher reports.
The factor loadings, however, paint an imcomplete picture of the relation-
ship between factors and measurements. The meaning of the loadings depends
on the variance of each factors. For example, while the loadings for the common
factor and teacher disagreement are similar for maternal report of headstrong,
the maternal disagreement factor explain a large variation of that sub-scale be-
cause it has a larger variance. This can be seen in Table 3.10, where I describe
the variation of each measurement explained by the three factors. The mater-
nal disagreement factor explain about 67% of the variation in headstrong, in
comparison to 6.7% by the common factor.
What is interesting from Table 3.10 is that while the common factor explains
a large percentage of the variation in the teacher reports (47.1%-93.5%), it only
explains a small percentage of the variation in the maternal reports (4.1%-
16.2%). That is, the maternal disagreement factor explains a larger proportion
of the maternal reports (31.6%-69.8%). In comparison, the teacher disagreement
factor explains a much smaller share of the teacher reports (2%-46.6%). It is
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also important to note that the remaining measurement error, the variance not
explained by both factors, in the maternal reports (28.2%-63.1%) is higher than
the measurement error in the teacher reports (3.7%-50.3%).
These results show that maternal and teacher reports are explained by dif-
ferent factors, which explain the low estimated correlation in Table 3.2. While
the teacher reports are mainly explained by the common factor the maternal
reports are mainly explained by the maternal disagreement factor. These results
will be important when interpreting the implications of my findings.
3.5.2 Explaining the Factors
Moving on, Table 3.11 describes the estimates for the relationship between the
estimated factors and child, family and teacher characteristics. It is important
to note that the estimated relationships can be explained by the effect of these
family and school characteristics on the underlying noncognitive skill, but also
by bias in reporting. As a result, differences in the relationship across the fac-
tors can be explained by both the idea that these factors are measuring different
dimensions of children’s noncognitive skills and the idea that these factors are
picking up differences in observer bias in reporting. It is also important to note
that I do not provide exogenous variation in family and school investments,
and as a result, the estimated relationships shown here provide suggestive evi-
dence of what is being captured by the three estimated factors but not causal
relationships.
The first column describes the relationship between the observable char-
acteristics and the common factor. I find that child behavioral problems, as
measured by the common factor, increase as children age, are higher for black
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children and lower for females. It is also significantly related to maternal in-
vestments in the form of cognitive stimulation and emotional support. Other
family characteristics, such as maternal mental health, maternal education and
family income, are not significant once I control for the measures of maternal
investment. Interestingly, teacher and school characteristics, such as teach ex-
perience or number of students in the classroom, are not significantly related to
the common factor.
The second column describes the relationship between the observable char-
acteristics and the maternal disagreement factor. Interestingly, the family char-
acteristics associated with this factor and very different than the variables as-
sociated with the common factor. While the common factor is higher for black
children, the maternal disagreement factor is smaller for black children. More-
over, maternal education and family income are associated with the maternal
factor but are not statistically related to the common factor. The most interest-
ing result, however, is the strong association between maternal mental health
and the maternal disagreement factor. It is not easily discernible from Table
3.11, but the maternal mental health measure is the main determinant of the
maternal disagreement factor. The strong relationship between maternal men-
tal health and maternal disagreement has been previously documented in the
literature (see Boyle and Pickles (1997); Briggs-Gowan, Carter, and Schwab-
Stone (1996); Fergusson, Lynskey, and Horwood (1993); Najman et al. (2000);
Webster-Stratton (1988)). Most of the literature interpret this finding as evi-
dence of bias in the maternal reporting of child behavioral problems (Boyle and
Pickles, 1997; Najman et al., 2000). Later in the paper I provide evidence that
this can also be explained by the idea that the maternal disagreement factor is
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measuring a factor related to the child’s mental health.
The third column describes the relationship between observable character-
istics and the teacher disagreement factor. Perhaps surprisingly, none of the
teacher and school characteristics are statistically related to the teacher dis-
agreement factor. The only two significant predictors are the child’s race and
gender. The teacher disagreement factor captures the information in teacher
reports not captured by the common factor. However, as described in Section
3.5.1, most of the variation in the teacher reports is explained by the com-
mon factor. The lack of explanatory power of the teacher disagreement factor
together with the fact that it is uncorrelated with most teacher and family
characteristics suggest that the teacher disagreement factor is mainly capturing
random measurement error in the teacher reports. This idea is reinforced when
looking at the correlation with adult outcomes in the next Section.
3.5.3 Factors and Adult Outcomes
Literature studying disagreement in teacher and maternal reports has generally
limited attention to the determinants of the disagreement. In contrast, I explore
the relationship between the different factors that explain teacher and mater-
nal reports and different dimensions of adult outcomes at age 23. The results
are shown in Table 3.12, where I access the relationship between the three fac-
tors and four distinct outcomes capturing educational attainment, labor market
involvement, risky behaviors and mental health. Importantly, I control for con-
founders, such as the child’s cognition, gender and race, maternal education,
maternal mental health and family income measured in 1997.
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The common factor is the sole main predictor of years of completed educa-
tion at age 23. Similarly, the common factor is strongly related to whether the
individual is working or studying at age 23 and strongly related to a measure
of risky behavior also measured at age 23. It is not, however, statistically or
economically related to mental health measured by the K6 distress scale. In con-
trast, the maternal disagreement factor is unrelated to measures of educational
attainment, employment or risky behaviors. It is however, strongly related with
the K6 distress scale, even after I control for maternal mental health. The
teacher disagreement factor is unrelated to all adult outcomes.
These results are supported by the results from the crude model described
in Section 3.3.3. There I showed that, once I control for the teacher report, the
disagreement factor was statistically associated with the K6 distress scale but
not with educational attainment, employment and risky behaviors. That is, in
both the latent factor model and the crude model the additional information
contained in the maternal reports is associated with the mental health scale but
not with the other adult outcomes.
3.5.4 Implications
As shown in Section 3.3.3, mothers and teachers systematically disagree when
reporting on children’s behavioral problems. As described in Section 3.2, there
are three main explanation for the maternal-teacher disagreement. First, it can
be explained by random measurement error in both reports. Second, mothers
and teachers observe children in different settings and, as a result, could be
observing and reporting on different dimensions of children’s noncognitive skills.
Third, disagreement can be explained by systematic bias in the observer reports
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if certain type of observer tend to over or under report children’s noncognitive
skills.
The latent factor model provides suggestive evidence on which of the three
sources are at play. First I find that teacher and maternal reports measure dif-
ferent factors. As described in Section 3.5.1 and shown in Table 3.10, maternal
reports are mainly explained by the maternal disagreement factor and teacher
reports are mainly explained by the common factor. The teacher disagreement
factor explain a smaller share of the teacher reports. Second, different socioeco-
nomic characteristics are associated with these factors. While child’s age, race
and gender and family investments are the main predictors of the common fac-
tor, maternal mental health, emotional support and family income are the main
predictors of the maternal disagreement factor. The teacher disagreement factor
is unrelated to most socioeconomic characteristics. Third, these different fac-
tors are associated with different adult outcomes. While the common factor is
strongly related to educational attainment, employment and risky behaviors at
age 23, the maternal disagreement factor is strongly related to measured mental
health at age 23. The teacher disagreement factor is unrelated to any of the four
adult outcomes and, as a result, seems to be capturing random measurement
error in the teacher reports.
These results suggest that maternal and teacher reports are measuring very
different aspects of child development. Teacher reports seem to be measuring
child misbehavior associated with risky behaviors in adulthood and negative
schooling and labor market outcomes. On the other hand, maternal reports
seem to be measuring both child misbehavior and a factor related to the child’s
mental health. This difference explains the preliminary results in Tables 3.5 and
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3.7. For example, it explains why maternal mental health and emotional support
are strong predictors of maternal reports and why both emotional support and
cognitive stimulation are important determinants of teacher reports (Table 3.7.
Similarly, it explains why teacher reports are stronger predictors of educational
attainment and employment at age 23 but weaker predictors of adult mental
health than maternal reports.
My results highlight the empirical challenges in measuring noncognitive
skills, as even when using the same scale different observers report on differ-
ent aspects of children’s noncognitive development. As a result, researchers
using the same scale but measured from different observers could end up with
very different conclusions about the returns of investing in children. For ex-
ample, using the maternal reports one would conclude that maternal mental
health is an important determinant of children’s misbehavior. However, using
teacher reports one would conclude that maternal mental health is not relevant
at predicting children’s misbehavior (Table 3.5). Similarly, researchers using
the same scale but measured from different observers could end up with very
different conclusions about the importance of noncognitive skills in determining
adult outcomes. For example, the estimated returns of noncognitive skills for
educational attainment using teacher reports is twice the size of the estimated
returns using maternal reports (Table 3.7). This highlights the need for a better
understanding of what aspects of children noncognitive development are mea-
sured by different scales and observers, and how to better elicit noncognitive
skills from observer reports.
185
3.6 Conclusion
Economists have recognized the importance of noncognitive skills developed in
childhood in explaining a variety of adult outcomes. Measuring noncognitive
skills in children, however, present unique methodological challenges. In this
paper, I show that the same scale when applied to different observers measure
very different aspects of children’s noncognitive development.
An important open question left for future research is why mothers and
teachers react to different pieces of information when asked the same questions
about the child’s behaviors. Conceptually, this can be explained by either sys-
tematic bias in maternal and teacher reports or by the fact that mothers and
teachers observe children in different settings – at home and at the school – and,
as a result, are reporting on different dimensions of noncognitive skills. Under-
standing these differences is important when thinking about policy interventions
that target children noncognitive development.
One direction for future research would be to explore whether disagreement
are present on different dimensions of children’s noncognitive skills. For ex-
ample, the questions in the BPI scale can be separated into questions eliciting
children externalizing behaviors, capturing anxious, aggressive and outwardly-
expressed behaviors, and internalizing behaviors, capturing withdrawn and in-
hibited behaviors. Moreover, previous research suggests that parents are better
informants of children’s internalizing problems than teachers, whereas teachers
are better informants of children’s externalizing problems than parents, which
can explain the findings in this paper (Smith, 2007). Another direction for
future research would be to explore whether parents and teachers beliefs on
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children’s noncognitive development can be influenced by the social context.
For example, Kinsler, Pavan et al. (2016) shows that parents beliefs on their
child’s ability are influenced by the school composition. It would be interesting
to see if their findings extend to beliefs on children’s noncognitive skills, and
whether teachers are also influenced by the school composition.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Mean s.d. Min Max
Child’s Age 9.26 2.36 4 13
Child is Female 0.51 0.50 0 1
Child’s is Black 0.37 0.48 0 1
Birth Order 2.03 1.09 1 9
Single Mother 0.26 0.44 0 1
Mother’s Years of Educ. 13.03 2.26 2 17
Mother’s K6 Distress Scale 3.60 3.53 0 22
Mother’s Age at Birth 27.46 5.29 14 42
Home Cognitive Stimulation 0.26 0.87 -3.34 1.99
Home Emotional Support 0.56 0.89 -2.92 2.11
Family Income 51561.41 50359.92 0 577000
Teacher Experience 14.67 9.18 0.5 30
Teacher has Masters 0.47 0.50 0 1
Teacher is Black 0.13 0.34 0 1
More Than 2 Teachers 0.43 0.49 0 1
Large Classroom (25+) 0.34 0.47 0 1
Years of Education at 23 13.26 1.83 6 17
Working or a Student at 23 0.82 0.39 0 1
Risky Behaviors Scale at 23 1.41 0.69 1 5
K6 Distress Scale at 23 4.88 3.75 0 24
Observations 834
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Table 3.2: Behavior Problems Index: Questions and Subscales
Subscale Question
Anxious/Depressed (He/She) has sudden changes in mood or feeling.
Anxious/Depressed (He/She) feels or complains that no one loves him/her.
Anxious/Depressed (He/She) is too fearful or anxious.
Anxious/Depressed (He/She) feels worthless or inferior.
Anxious/Depressed (He/She) is unhappy, sad or depressed.
Headstrong (He/She) is rather high strung and nervous.
Headstrong (He/She) argues too much.
Headstrong (He/She) is stubborn, sullen, or irritable.
Headstrong (He/She) has a very strong temper and loses it easily.
Antisocial (He/She) cheats or tells lies.
Antisocial (He/She) bullies or is cruel or mean to others.
Antisocial (He/She) is disobedient.
Antisocial (He/She) does not seem to feel sorry after (he/she) misbehaves.
Antisocial (He/She) breaks things on purpose or deliberately destroys things.
Hyperactive (He/She) has difficulty concentrating, cannot pay attention for long.
Hyperactive (He/She) is easily confused, seems to be in a fog.
Hyperactive (He/She) is impulsive, or acts without thinking.
Hyperactive (He/She) has difficulty getting (his/her) mind off certain thoughts.
Hyperactive (He/She) is restless or overly active, cannot sit still.
Peer Problems (He/She) has trouble getting along with other children.
Peer Problems (He/She) is not liked by other children.
Peer Problems (He/She) is withdrawn, does not get involved with others.
Dependent (He/She) clings to adults.
Dependent (He/She) cries too much.
Dependent (He/She) demands a lot of attention.
Dependent (He/She) is too dependant on others.
Notes: For each statement, mothers and teachers were asked whether “the
following statement is not true, sometimes true, or often true, of the child’s
behavior”.
Table 3.3: Behavioral Problems: Child Outcomes
Subscale Question
Suspended Has child ever been suspended or expelled from school?
Saw a Beh. Specialist
Has child ever seen a psychiatrist, psychologist, doctor, or counselor
about an emotional, mental, or behavioral problem?
Days Absent How many days in the past month has the target child been absent?
Notes: The mother was asked the questions about whether the child has ever
been suspended form school and whether the child has ever seen a psychiatrist.
On the other hand, the teacher answered the question about student absence
from school.
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Table 3.4: Behavior Problem Index
Maternal Report Teacher Report Disagreement Correlation
Total Score 9.316 7.366 1.950 0.362
(8.020) (9.063) (9.688)
Anxious/Depressed 1.962 1.182 0.741 0.288
(1.853) (1.799) (2.172)
Headstrong 2.087 1.265 0.823 0.227
(1.981) (1.909) (2.421)
Antisocial 1.445 1.202 0.224 0.300
(1.742) (2.071) (2.262)
Hyperactive 1.858 2.005 -0.163 0.421
(2.120) (2.481) (2.484)
Peer Problems 0.456 0.827 -0.379 0.262
(0.934) (1.273) (1.364)
Dependent 1.520 0.815 0.700 0.221
(1.745) (1.335) (1.942)
Observations 834 834 834
Notes: Results for the first three columns are for mean coefficients with stan-
dard deviations in parentheses. For the correlations,  denotes the coefficient is
significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5%
level and  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.5: Preliminary: Investments
Variable Maternal Report Teacher Report Disagreement
Child’s Age -.001 .394 -.371
Child’s Age Sqrd. .0008 -.020 .019
Child’s is Black -.056 .117 -.155
Child is female -.084 -.258 .173
Birth Order .009 .038 -.028
Single Mother -.099 .087 -.162
Mother’s Years of Educ. .035 -.005 .033
Mother’s Age at Birth -.024 -.019 -.001
Mother’s K6 Distress Scale .070 -.0006 .058
Log-Family Income -.103 -.029 -.056
Home Emotional Support -.181 -.135 -.020
Home Cognitive Stimulation -.089 -.142 .061
Teacher Experience -.003 -.002 -.0009
Teacher has Masters .023 -.057 .072
Teacher is Black -.00008 -.081 .076
More Than 2 Teachers .018 .082 -.062
Large Classroom (25+) .103 -.016 .099
Const. 1.146 -.767 1.655
Notes: For ease of comparison, the maternal and teacher reports and the dis-
agreement measure have been standardized to have mean 0 and variance 1. 
denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient
is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient is significant at the
1% level.
192
Table 3.6: Preliminary: Investments (2)
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Child’s Age -.347 -.225 -.315 -.187 -.359 -.345
Child’s Age Sqrd. .019 .012 .016 .010 .019 .017
Child’s is Black -.094 -.315 -.256 -.074 .013 .113
Child is female .208 .078 .149 .160 .081 .152
Birth Order -.059 .004 -.031 -.029 -.020 .025
Single Mother -.040 -.225 -.118 -.124 -.077 -.078
Mother’s Years of Educ. .0007 .014 .044 .034 .029 .036
Mother’s Age at Birth -.004 -.005 .006 .00007 .002 -.0006
Mother’s K6 Distress Scale .058 .050 .035 .041 .027 .038
Log-Family Income -.046 -.050 -.062 -.029 -.002 -.071
Home Emotional Support .057 -.074 -.040 .020 .022 -.055
Home Cognitive Stimulation .051 .052 .030 .088 .080 -.032
Teacher Experience -.003 -.002 -.002 -.003 .006 .0008
Teacher has Masters .068 .074 .107 .035 .032 .045
Teacher is Black -.080 .101 .140 .087 .106 .093
More Than 2 Teachers -.073 -.057 -.021 .007 -.165 -.011
Large Classroom (25+) .068 .113 .086 .057 -.035 .091
Const. 1.923 1.377 1.292 .496 1.013 1.606
Notes: Columns 1-6 are OLS regressions on mother-teacher disagreement among
the six BPI sub-scales. Each column represents a sub-scale in the following
order: (1) Anxious, (2) Headstrong, (3) Antisocial, (4) Hyperactive, (5) Peer-
Problems and (6) Dependent. For ease of comparison, the disagreement mea-
sures have been standardized to have mean 0 and variance 1. denotes the
coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes the coefficient is significant
at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.7: Preliminary: Outcomes
Columns: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Outcome: Years of Education
Maternal Report -.153 . . -.304 .
Teacher Report . -.298 . . -.349
Disagreement . . .133 .294 -.079
Outcome: Working or Studying
Maternal Report -.031 . . -.052 .
Teacher Report . -.043 . . -.059
Disagreement . . .014 .040 -.024
Outcome: Risky Behaviors Scale
Maternal Report .036 . . .082 .
Teacher Report . .086 . . .094
Disagreement . . -.047 -.088 .012
Outcome: K6 Distress Scale
Maternal Report .382 . . .374 .
Teacher Report . .111 . . .429
Disagreement . . .206 .017 .474
Notes: Control variables are included in all regressions. These include a measure
for the child’s cognition in 1997, the child’s age and age squared in 1997, child
gender and race dummies, and 1997 measures of maternal education, mental
health and log-family income. For ease of comparison, the maternal and teacher
reports and the disagreement measure have been standardized to have mean 0
and variance 1. denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes
the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient is
significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.8: Model: Latent Factor Correlation and Covariance Ma-
trix
Correlation Matrix
Common Factor Maternal Disa. Teacher Disa.
Common F. 1.00 0.07 -0.01
Mat. Dis. 0.07 1.00 0.11
Tea. Dis. -0.01 0.11 1.00
Covariance Matrix
Common Factor Maternal Disa. Teacher Disa.
Common F. 0.17 0.04 -0.00
Mat. Dis. 0.04 1.81 0.04
Tea. Dis. -0.00 0.04 0.09
Notes: This table lists the estimated correlation matrix of the three latent
factors.
Table 3.9: Model: Factor Loadings
Measurement Common Factor Maternal Disa. Teacher Disa.
Maternal Report
Headstrong 1.01 1.00 .
Antisocial 1.23 0.74 .
Anxious/Depressed 0.70 0.96 .
Dependent 0.80 0.70 .
Hyperactive 1.78 0.91 .
Peer Problems 0.52 0.32 .
Teacher Report
Headstrong 3.90 . 1.00
Antisocial 4.54 . 0.46
Anxious/Depressed 3.06 . 3.23
Dependent 1.84 . 1.36
Hyperactive 4.48 . 1.39
Peer Problems 2.14 . 1.55
Child Outcomes
Days Absent 1.00 . .
Saw a Beh. Specialist 0.16 . .
Suspended 0.21 . .
Estimated Standard Deviation: 0.41 1.34 0.30
Notes: This table lists the factor loadings that express the relationship between
each observed measure and the underlying factor it identifies. For the three
child outcomes, I control for the child’s age and age squared, for the child’s race
and gender, and for log-family income. For ease of comparison of the factor
loadings, I describe the estimated standard deviation of each factor in the last
row.
195
Table 3.10: Model: Percent Explained by Each Factor
Measurement Common F. Mat. Disa. Tea. Disa. All Fact. M. Error
Maternal Rep.
Headstrong 0.067 0.670 . 0.711 0.289
Antisocial 0.119 0.485 . 0.575 0.425
Anxious/Dep. 0.041 0.698 . 0.718 0.282
Dependent 0.051 0.412 . 0.445 0.555
Hyperactive 0.162 0.497 . 0.623 0.377
Peer Problems 0.073 0.316 . 0.369 0.631
Teacher Rep.
Headstrong 0.793 . 0.020 0.815 0.185
Antisocial 0.935 . 0.031 0.963 0.037
Anxious/Dep. 0.471 . 0.466 0.943 0.057
Dependent 0.350 . 0.144 0.497 0.503
Hyperactive 0.600 . 0.026 0.628 0.472
Peer Problems 0.510 . 0.205 0.726 0.274
Notes: This table describes the percentage of the variation in each measure-
ment explained by each factor and by random measurement error. The unique
variation of a measurement explained by a single factor is estimated by the
R2 obtained from an OLS regression of the measurement on the factor alone.
The variation explained by both factors is estimated by the R2 obtained from
an OLS regressiong of the measurement on both factors together. Since the
maternal (teacher) disagreement factor and the common factor are positively
(negatively) correlated, the explanatory power of the two factors jointly is less
(more) than the sum of the explanatory power of each individual factor.
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Table 3.11: Model: Investments
Variable Common Factor Maternal Disa. Teacher Disa.
Child’s Age 0.122 -0.150 0.111
Child’s Age Sqrd. -0.006 0.009 -0.006
Child’s is Black 0.128 -0.311 -0.183
Child is female -0.161 0.072 0.118
Birth Order 0.022 -0.024 -0.015
Single Mother 0.015 -0.181 0.052
Mother’s Years of Educ. -0.002 0.060 0.005
Mother’s Age at Birth -0.009 -0.027 0.004
Mother’s K6 Distress Scale -0.001 0.122 0.002
Home Cognitive Stimulation -0.056 -0.073 -0.019
Home Emotional Support -0.055 -0.231 -0.019
Log-Family Income -0.015 -0.154 0.001
Teacher Experience 0.000 -0.005 -0.002
Teacher has Masters -0.031 0.088 0.015
Teacher is Black -0.062 0.063 0.080
More Than 2 Teachers 0.003 0.024 0.070
Large Classroom (25+) -0.033 0.218 0.056
Notes:  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10% level,  denotes the co-
efficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient is significant
at the 1% level.
Table 3.12: Model: Young Adult Outcomes
Years of Edu. Work. or Study? Risky Beh. K6 Distress
Common Factor -0.905 -0.137 0.203 0.148
Maternal Disa. Factor -0.036 -0.014 0.010 0.308
Teacher Disa. Factor 0.356 0.093 0.069 0.410
Notes: Control variables are included in all regressions. These include a measure
for the child’s cognition in 1997, age and age squared in 1997, child gender and
race dummies, and 1997 measures of maternal education, mental health and
log-family income.  denotes the coefficient is significant at the 10% level, 
denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and  denotes the coefficient
is significant at the 1% level.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Results Assuming Exogeneity of Inputs
This section provides parameter estimates for the model when I do not control
for the unobservable correlation across the different decisions and outcomes. As
a result, the maternal psychological distress is assumed to enter exogenously in
the model. The same true about family income and the mother’s time with her
child, which are assumed to be exogenous in the child human capital production
function. The estimates presented in this section serve as comparison for the
results presented in the main paper.
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Table A.1: Psychological Distress
Constant 1.252 ( 0.146 )
Years of Education -0.041 ( 0.001 )
Age -0.053 ( 0.002 )
Age sqrd. 0.001 ( 0.000 )
Single 0.175 ( 0.008 )
# of Children 0.051 ( 0.002 )
Depressed at 17 0.449 ( 0.038 )
White Dummy -0.066 ( 0.006 )
Mental Health Parity -0.104 ( 0.008 )
Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table A.2: Cognition Production Function
Parameter First Dev. Stage Second Dev. Stage
Total Factor Productivity K 0.579 ( 0.004 ) 1.019 ( 0.010 )
Self Productivity α1 0.243 ( 0.026 ) 0.877 ( 0.074 )
Log-Family Income α2 0.108 ( 0.003 ) -0.010 ( 0.000 )
Log Maternal Time Investment α3 0.072 ( 0.001 ) 0.001 ( 0.003 )
Log Psychological Distress α4 -0.009 ( 0.010 ) -0.013 ( 0.011 )
Log-At1  Log-F.Income α5 -0.000 ( 0.000 ) -0.030 ( 0.010)
Log-At1  Log-M.Time α6 0.005 ( 0.002 ) 0.036 ( 0.051 )
Log-At1  Log-Distress α7 0.002 ( 0.000 ) -0.014 ( 0.021 )
Log-F.Income  Log-M.Time α8 -0.000 ( 0.000 ) 0.000 ( 0.000 )
Log-F.Income  Log-Distress α9 0.011 ( 0.005 ) -0.009 ( 0.007 )
Log-M.Time  Log-Distress α10 -0.076 ( 0.004 ) 0.002 ( 0.007 )
Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table A.3: Initial Child Ability
Constant -0.842 ( 0.393 )
Mother‘s Years of Education 0.001 ( 0.009 )
Mother‘s Age at Child‘s Birth 0.013 ( 0.001 )
Single 0.743 ( 0.128 )
# of Siblings 0.064 ( 0.030 )
White Dummy -0.031 ( 0.041 )
Female 0.136 ( 0.081 )
Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.4: Annual Hours Worked
Constant 272.423 ( 64.679 )
Years of Education 76.661 ( 7.358 )
Age at Child‘s Birth 0.039 ( 0.030 )
Single -84.558 ( 36.578 )
# of Children -307.750 ( 36.632 )
White Dummy 421.549 ( 41.582 )
Child is Female -40.016 ( 38.192 )
Child‘s Age 31.242 ( 7.017 )
Child‘s Age sqrd. -0.543 ( 0.380 )
Log Non-Labor Income -0.020 ( 0.015 )
Median State Service Wage Rate -18.494 ( 7.519 )
State % Employed in Serv. Sector 811.018 ( 58.033 )
State Variation in Welfare Rules 1 25.941 ( 26.690 )
State Variation in Welfare Rules 2 -14.711 ( 19.557 )
Child Younger Than 4 -81.770 ( 26.435 )
Psychological Distress 8.963 ( 15.367 )
Not Working Last Period -0.779 ( 2.048 )
Experience 2.471 ( 3.106 )
Hours Working Last Period 0.394 ( 0.015 )
Hours With the Child Last Period -4.725 ( 2.869 )
Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.5: Weekly Time Investments
Constant 32.774 ( 6.967 )
Years of Education -0.340 ( 0.434 )
Age at Child‘s Birth -0.067 ( 0.065 )
Single -5.192 ( 1.614 )
# of Children 0.059 ( 0.074 )
White Dummy -4.825 ( 0.745 )
Child is Female 2.297 ( 0.415 )
Child‘s Age -0.252 ( 0.287 )
Child‘s Age sqrd. 0.074 ( 0.005 )
Log Non-Labor Income -0.745 ( 0.574 )
Median State Service Wage Rate -1.599 ( 0.630 )
State % Employed in Serv. Sector 20.420 ( 7.774 )
State Variation in Welfare Rules 1 -2.590 ( 1.917 )
State Variation in Welfare Rules 2 19.946 ( 8.863 )
Child Younger Than 4 3.298 ( 1.939 )
Psychological Distress -0.654 ( 0.637 )
Not Working Last Period 1.147 ( 2.263 )
Experience -0.028 ( 0.020 )
Hours Working Last Period 0.001 ( 0.000 )
Hours With the Child Last Period 0.117 ( 0.050 )
Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table A.6: Hourly Wages
Constant -1.745 ( 0.325 )
Years of Education 0.216 ( 0.005 )
Age 0.016 ( 0.001 )
Age sqrd. -0.000 ( 0.000 )
Median State Service Wage Rate 0.015 ( 0.007 )
State % Employed in Serv. Sector 1.335 ( 0.645 )
Log Psychological Distress -0.024 ( 0.011 )
Not Working Last Period -0.148 ( 0.472 )
Experience -0.001 ( 0.001 )
Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Descriptive Statistics and Fac-
tor Analysis
Descriptive statistics for the full sample of observed 11-year-olds are found in
Tables B.1 and B.2. Also, descriptive statistics for the BSAG by SES used in
Section 2.5.2 are found in Table B.3 and the corresponding factor loadings are
found in Table B.4. The remainder of this Section of the appendix explains how
factor analysis is used in this paper (see Figure B.1 and Tables B.5-B.6).
In the National Child Development Survey (NCDS), childhood misbehavior
and maladjustment are measured as follows. Teachers read a number of phrases
and then report whether each phrase applies to the child in question. These
measures are then aggregated into 10 variables capturing childhood maladjust-
ment, known as the BSAG maladjustment variables.1 We use factor analysis, a
1There are actually 12 BSAG variables available. We exclude two of the original variables
from this study in order to maintain consistency with recent research using the same data
set (see Shepherd (2013)). The two omitted variables are called Miscellaneous Symptoms
and Miscellaneous Nervous Symptoms. Our main results do not change if these variables are
included in the analysis. Results from this robustness test are available upon request from
the authors.
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statistical technique used for data reduction to assess whether classroom mis-
behavior can be represented using fewer than the ten dimensions available from
the NCDS. These techniques reduce the number of dimensions by uncovering
linear combinations of the original variables that contain most of the informa-
tion in the data and that also have meaningful interpretations. Specifically, the
analysis determines the number of dimensions needed to adequately describe
observed variation in classroom behavior and which of the BSAG variables are
related to which dimensions of classroom misbehavior. From here on, we refer to
the original BSAG variables as measurements and each dimension of classroom
misbehavior as factors.
We begin by writing the measurements of classroom behavior as a linear
function of unobserved factors. If there are k underlying factors, we can write
our original 10 BSAG variables as:
BSAGji  lj1f1i   ...  ljkfki   εji, for j  1,    ,m, and i  1,    , n (B.1)
where BSAGji is the value of the jth BSAG variable for individual i, fqi is the
unobserved value of the qth factor for individual i, ljq represents the coefficient
relating factors to measurements (usually referred to as the factor loading) and
εji is a residual, capturing measurement error. For each individual, we can
rewrite equation (B.1) in matrix form as follows:
BSAG  LF   ε (B.2)
where BSAG is the (m  n) measurement matrix, L is the (m  k) matrix of
factor loadings and F is the (k  n) matrix of unobserved factors, where m is
the number of measurements, n represents the number of observations for each
measurement and k is the number of factors.
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The first goal of factor analysis is to find a small number of unobserved
factors (k   m) that sufficiently explain the variation in the measurements. We
are interested in the variation within and across the measurements instead of
the measurements per se. In other words, we are interested in explaining the
measurement covariance matrix (V ), which has size mm and is given by:
V  BSAG BSAGT  LLT   Ω (B.3)
The above expression is valid under the assumptions that (i) F and ε are in-
dependent and (ii) ErF s  0, with FF T  I, implying that the factors are
uncorrelated and Ω is the diagonal error variance matrix. Then, the factor
analysis problem amounts to understanding the symmetric positive semidefi-
nite matrix LLT . We can decompose this matrix using an eigen-decomposition,
so that:






where C is the (mm) matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of LTL and
D is the (m m) diagonal matrix whose entries are the eigenvalues. The key
‘trick’ of factor analysis is that we can reduce the dimensionality of F (or L) by
picking the k eigenvalues and eigenvectors that explain a lot of the measurement
variance U  pV Ωq. To accomplish this, we use Ck, the (mk) matrix whose
columns are the eigenvectors associated with the k largest eigenvalues, and
define as Dk the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues. The resulting (m  m)
matrix CkDkC
T
k is not equal to U , but will converge to U as k gets closer to m
and will be closer to U than any other matrix with rank k.
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Now that we understand the idea behind the factor analysis, we need to de-
cide on k, the number of factors to be used. There are three widely used criteria
in psychometrics. The first method is commonly known as Kaiser’s criterion or
Kaiser’s stopping rule. It stipulates that only the number of latent independent
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 should be considered in the analysis.
Recall, for a given factor, the eigenvalue measures the variance in all measures
that is accounted for by that factor. A low eigenvalue means that the factor
contributes little to explaining variance and may be treated as redundant and
therefore ignored. The second method is known as the scree plot method. In this
method, the researcher plots the relationship between the relative magnitude of
the eigenvalues and the number of factors. The researcher then examines the
scree plot and decides where the line stops descending precipitously and levels
out. The number of points along the precipitously dropping part of the line,
excluding the transition point, gives the number of factors that should be used
in the analysis. The third method is known as parallel analysis. In this method,
we create a dataset with random numbers and the same number of observations
and variables as in the original data set. Then we compute the eigenvalues for
each factor as we did for the original data using factor analysis. The researcher
should keep only the number of factors where the eigenvalues from the random
data are smaller than the eigenvalues from the factor analysis using the original
data as the remaining factors are effectively capturing random noise.
We use all three methods on the BSAG maladjustment variables in our
data and all suggest we should use exactly two factors in our analysis. Our
findings match those of Ghodsian (1977) and Shepherd (2013), who also studied
childhood misbehavior using NCDS data. To perform the test using Kaiser’s
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criterion, we compute the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix together with
the eigenvectors corresponding to each factor. We plot the eigenvalues of the
factors in descending order in Figure B.1. Factors 1 and 2 have eigenvalues of
3.69 and 1.78 respectively, whereas factors 3 to 10 have eigenvalues between
0.9 and 0.3. The Kaiser’s stopping rule suggests keeping only the factors with
eigenvalues equal or higher than 1, or the first two factors in our analysis. In
the same figure, we also notice that the line connecting the eigenvalues stops
descending and levels out after the second factor. The scree plot method then
suggests that we should keep and use only the first two factors. Lastly, in
the same figure, we plot the eigenvalues from the random data created by the
parallel analysis (dashed line). The two lines intersect before the third factor,
suggesting that factors 3 to 10 capture a level of variation in the data that is
generated by random noise. Hence, only the first two factors should be used.
Now that we have shown that two independent random variables or “factors”
explain the ten BSAG maladjustment variables, it remains to be determined
which set of BSAG variables are related to which factor. Deciding on which
measurement is related to which factor is less straightforward than deciding on
the number of factors. Since the two eigenvectors can be rotated in an infinite
number of ways, we rotate the original eigenvectors in order to maximize the
variance accounted for by the first two factors using the quartimin method. This
produces the rotated factor loadings shown in Table B.5. Clearly, there is an
association between the first 6 BSAG variables and the first factor. Coefficients
range from 0.53 for anxiety of acceptance by adults to 0.80 for inconsequential
behavior, which are fairly high. Moreover, intuitively, all these variables seem
to be measures of outwardly expressed behaviors. Similarly, there is a clear
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association between the 7-9th measurements and the second factor. Again, these
variables all represent inwardly expressed behavior. The last measurement is
less clear. It seems to be statistically related to both factors and it is less clear
intuitively if this behavior is inwardly or outwardly expressed. As a result, we
permit the 10th behavior to be related to both latent factors.
It turns out this particular mapping between measurements and factors is the
same as the one proposed by Ghodsian (1977) and used in other research (see,
e.g., Shepherd (2013)). The first six measurements, taken together with the last
measure, capture externalizing behavior and the last four capture internalizing
behavior. This leads to the mapping from the BSAG measures to the two factors
presented in Table 2.1. Finally, once we have decided on the mapping, it remains
to estimate the two unobserved factors for each individual conditional on each
individual’s observed measurements, to be used in our reduced-form analysis.
There are many methods available to compute the unobserved factor matrix F .
One widely used method to estimate the unobserved factor is the “regression” or
“Thompson” method, which constructs the weighting matrix b that minimizes
the mean squared error in Equation (B.2). The resulting formula for F is given
by:
F  LTV 1BSAG (B.5)
where the weighting matrix, also known as the factor score matrix, is given by
b  LTV 1. Table B.6 presents the factor scores, or weights, used to construct
each latent factor.
In the econometric model in the main paper we use a similar approach to
estimate the unobserved factors. There we take both the number of factors
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and the mapping between the measurements and factors as given. We also
re-estimate the factor loadings using the restrictions imposed by the mapping
and estimate the resulting distribution of each factor separately by gender.
The key differences is that we estimate the factor loadings together with the
other relevant outcomes. In a sense, the econometric model allows us to use
the outcome equations as additional measurements for the unobserved factors.
Moreover, the measurement error model by-passes the estimation of the unob-
served factors directly as we use the estimated distribution to integrate out the
unobserved factors in the estimation. Both modifications are beneficial. The
first modification allows us to use additional variation to identify the latent
factors. The second modification allows us to reduce the measurement error in
the construction of the latent factors.
B.2 Additional Reduced-Form Evidence
This appendix contains results from additional reduced-form specifications re-
lating externalizing behavior to earnings. Similar to what we did in Section
2.2.4, in all results presented here, we construct skills by summing up corre-
sponding observable BSAG measurements and test scores.
In Tables B.7 and B.8, we explore this relationship once we have controlled
for selection into education. In Figures B.2 and B.3 and Tables B.9 and B.10,
we explore possible non-linearities, non-monotonicites and interaction effects
in the relationship between the unobserved factors and earnings. The general
conclusion is the following: the positive relationship between externalizing and
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adult earnings holds under all specifications and, moreover, there is little evi-
dence of non-linearities in the relationship. Lastly, In Tables B.11 and B.12 we
explore if the positive relationship between externalizing behavior and earnings
still holds as individuals age.
In the measurement error model in the main text, we jointly model how
latent factors affect sorting into education along with other decisions and out-
comes. Here, we ask whether the positive reduced-form relationship between
externalizing and earnings discussed in Section 2.2.4 holds once we more for-
mally account for selection into schooling. We employ the widely-used Lee
(1983) and Dubin and McFadden (1984) methods for selection bias correction.
These methods are akin to a two-stage least squares approach when selection
is specified as a multinomial logit model.2 As in the measurement error model,
excluded variables include: class size, average class preparation, number of chil-
dren in the household, mother’s education and father’s education.
The first stage estimates can be found in Table B.7 and are not very different
from what has been shown in the rest of the paper. Cognition is the most
important variable for the schooling decision and both other factors describing
classroom behavior are negatively associated with educational attainment. The
second stage estimates (in addition to OLS estimates for comparison) can be
found in Table B.8. The effect of externalizing is positive among all educational
groups albeit less so for individuals in higher education groups. Moreover,
2The method proposed in Lee (1983) is a generalization of the two-step selection bias
correction introduced by Heckman (1979) that allows for any parameterized error distribution.
The method proposed in Dubin and McFadden (1984) is also a generalization of the method
proposed by Heckman (1979) with the further advantage in comparison to the method in
Lee (1983) that it does not make any assumption on covariances between the error term
in the outcome and selection equations. These and other selection methods based on the
multinomial logit model have been reviewed by Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007).
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controlling for selection into schooling does not alter the results in any important
way. If anything, the relationship between externalizing behaviors and earnings
becomes stronger after we control for selection into schooling.3
We do not allow for non-linearities and interactions between the unobserved
factors in the measurement error model estimated in the main text. Here, we
run additional regressions allowing for non-linearities and interactions. Figures
B.2 and B.3 plot the impact of the externalizing behavior on log-earnings after
we have controlled for additional regressors. In order to control for the other
variables we regress log-earnings on the other explanatory variables and use the
residuals from that regression as the dependent variable in the non-parametric
regression. The impact of externalizing on earnings appears linear, with a de-
cline in the effect for the few individuals with externalizing behaviors above 4
standard deviations from the mean. We also explore non-linearities in Table
B.9, where we separately regress earnings on those individuals with externaliz-
ing behaviors that are one standard deviation above the mean versus individuals
below that level. We do not find any difference in the relationship between the
two groups. Last, in Table B.10 we allow for a quadratic term and interac-
tions between the unobserved factors when regressing those on log-earnings.
Again, we find no evidence that interactions or non-linearities are relevant for
the factors capturing classroom behavior.
All labor market outcomes in the main paper were constructed when indi-
viduals were 33 years old. In this section of the appendix we explore if the
3Note that we use collapse education into three educational groups to increase each group’s
sample size. The reason is that the selection models we use automatically estimate different
earnings equations for each education level. Using six educational groups therefore leads to
many more coefficients and larger standard errors.
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relationship between childhood behaviors and earnings change as individuals
age. In Tables B.11 and B.12 we explore this relationship when individuals
are 42 and 50 years old respectively. The main patterns remain as individuals
age. That is, externalizing behaviors are positively related to earnings even as
individuals age. The relationship between externalizing and earnings seems to
peak at age 42 and then decrease when individuals reach age 50. It is possible
the relationship falls due to changes in the control variables since we use con-
trol variables measured at age 33. Nonetheless, these results show that nothing
special seems to be happening at age 33. We could have used labor market
outcomes from any survey and still obtain similar results.
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics - Full Sample
Both Males Females
No Formal Education 0.126 0.114 0.138 
(0.332) (0.317) (0.345)
CSE 0.124 0.111 0.137 
(0.330) (0.315) (0.344)
O Level 0.341 0.306 0.375 
(0.474) (0.461) (0.484)
A Level 0.141 0.184 0.0997 
(0.348) (0.387) (0.300)
Higher Education 0.142 0.144 0.139
(0.349) (0.351) (0.346)
Higher Degree 0.126 0.141 0.111 
(0.332) (0.348) (0.314)
Hourly Wage 6.749 7.645 5.666 
(3.063) (2.969) (2.815)
Weekly Hours Worked 36.71 43.54 28.71 
(12.54) (7.917) (12.23)
Weekly Earnings 259.8 329.2 175.9 
(152.3) (135.0) (127.8)
Experience 140.4 158.9 122.6 
(55.69) (50.80) (54.35)
In Paid Work 0.792 0.902 0.685 
(0.406) (0.297) (0.464)
Self Employed 0.142 0.176 0.0987 
(0.349) (0.380) (0.298)
Has a Partner 0.794 0.783 0.804 
(0.405) (0.412) (0.397)




Observations 15,356 7,899 7,457 15,356
Notes : Summary statistics for the full sample of 15,356 individuals observed
at age 11. Statistics are reported separately for both genders (Column [1]),
for males (Column [2]) and for females (Column [3]). For education categories,
employment and partnership, entries are in the form of percentages divided by
100. Experience is measured in months and wages and weekly earnings are in
1992 Great British pounds.
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics - BSAG Variables - Full Sample
Both Males Females
Hostility Towards Adults 0.904 1.079 0.719 
(1.946) (2.088) (1.766)
Hostility Towards Children 0.288 0.336 0.237 
(0.805) (0.892) (0.699)
Anxiety for Acceptance by Adults 0.559 0.545 0.573
(1.212) (1.188) (1.237)
Anxiety for Acceptance by Children 0.334 0.464 0.197 
(0.803) (0.953) (0.575)
Restlessness 0.229 0.286 0.169 
(0.568) (0.633) (0.484)
Inconsequential Behavior 1.433 1.887 0.953 
(1.999) (2.278) (1.513)
Depression 1.049 1.196 0.893 
(1.546) (1.614) (1.454)
Withdrawal 0.347 0.410 0.279 
(0.826) (0.910) (0.720)
Unforthcomingness 1.606 1.630 1.582
(2.137) (2.059) (2.216)
Writing Off of Adults and Adult Standards 1.019 1.263 0.760 
(1.703) (1.911) (1.406)
Observations 15,356 7,899 7,457 15,356
Notes : Summary statistics for maladjustment syndrome scores for the full sam-
ple of 14,158 individuals observed at age 11. Measures constructed using teach-
ers’ reports of misbehavior or misconduct in school. Statistics are reported sep-
arately for both genders (Column [1]), for males (Column [2]) and for females
(Column [3]). For each maladjustment syndrome, a child receives a score, which
is an integer between 0 and 15, with 15 indicating persistent display of behavior
described by the maladjustment syndrome. In the table, entries are averages
for each syndrome for the analysis sample.
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics - BSAG Variables, Subsamples by SES
Both High SES Low SES Diff
Hostility Towards Adults 0.765 0.700 1.108 
(1.756) (1.647) (2.210)
Hostility Towards Children 0.240 0.217 0.360 
(0.719) (0.676) (0.901)
Anxiety for Acceptance by Adults 0.515 0.483 0.686 
(1.152) (1.098) (1.386)
Anxiety for Acceptance by Children 0.298 0.285 0.369 
(0.762) (0.749) (0.820)
Restlessness 0.194 0.178 0.279 
(0.521) (0.497) (0.625)
Inconsequential Behavior 1.263 1.166 1.769 
(1.868) (1.774) (2.231)
Depression 0.932 0.857 1.324 
(1.452) (1.380) (1.728)
Withdrawal 0.307 0.292 0.387 
(0.771) (0.743) (0.902)
Unforthcomingness 1.477 1.414 1.810 
(2.035) (1.992) (2.221)
Writing Off of Adults and Adult Standards 0.908 0.855 1.183 
(1.586) (1.523) (1.859)
Observations 7296 6125 1171 7296
Notes: Summary statistics for maladjustment syndrome scores for our sample of 7,296 indi-
viduals. Measures constructed using teachers’ reports of misbehavior or misconduct in school.
Statistics are reported separately for all individuals (Column [1]), for individual that did not
experience financial difficulties growing up (Column [2]) and for those that did (Column [3].
For each maladjustment syndrome, a child receives a score, which is an integer between 0
and 15, with 15 indicating a persistent display of behavior described by the maladjustment
syndrome. In the table, entries are averages for each syndrome for the analysis sample. In
Column [4], ,  and  mean that differences between males and females are significant at
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table B.4: Measurement Error Model: Factor Loadings, by SES
Latent Skill Measures [High SES] [Low SES]
Externalizing Behavior
Inconsequential Behavior 1.000 1.000
Hostility Towards Adults 1.448 1.807
Hostility Towards Children 1.989 2.005
Anxiety for Acceptance by Adults 0.934 0.993
Anxiety for Acceptance by Children 1.570 1.665
Restlessness 1.697 1.577





Writing Off of Adults and Adult Standards 0.692 0.722
Cognition
Verbal Score on General Ability Test 1.000 1.000
Reading Comprehension Test Score 0.584 0.612
Mathematics Test Score 1.079 1.049
Non Verbal Score on General Ability Test 0.740 0.789
Notes : This table lists the factor loadings that express the relationship between
each observed measure and the underlying factor it identifies by SES groups.
Table B.5: FA: Rotated Factor Loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
Hostility Towards Adults 0.72 0.19 0.45
Hostility Towards Children 0.73 0.09 0.45
Anxiety for Acceptance by Adults 0.53 -0.23 0.66
Anxiety for Acceptance by Children 0.75 -0.12 0.42
Restlessness 0.61 0.04 0.62
Inconsequential Behavior 0.80 0.15 0.32
Depression 0.39 0.67 0.39
Withdrawal 0.12 0.79 0.35
Unforthcomingness -0.06 0.79 0.37
Writing Off of Adults and Adult Standards 0.53 0.54 0.42
Notes : This table contains the factor loadings to the two factors that we retain
using the quartimin rotation.
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Table B.6: Reduced Form: Factor Scoring Coefficients
Cognition Externalizing Internalizing
Measurement Coefficient Measurement Coefficient Measurement Coefficient
Verbal Score 0.27648 Hostility To Children 0.22625 Depression 0.34172
Non Verbal Score 0.26356 Hostility To Adults 0.22810 Withdrawal 0.35678
Reading Comp. 0.25578 Anxiety Adults 0.13640 Unforthcomingness 0.32127
Mathematics Score 0.27106 Anxiety Children 0.21961 Writing Off 0.30815
Copying Designs 0.13239 Restlessness 0.19218
Inconsequential 0.25119
Writing Off 0.19477
Notes : This table contains the scoring coefficients from the regression scoring
method, which are used as weights in the construction of proxies for the three
unobserved factors in the reduced-form analysis in Section 2.2.4.
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Table B.7: Reduced Form: Educational Attainment - First Stage




Notes : This table contains parameter estimates for the first stage IV regres-
sions in Table B.8. The coefficients are estimated by multinomial logit, where
the base group includes individuals with no formal education or with a CSE
degree. Instruments include mother’s education, father’s education, class size,
class preparation and number of children in the household measured at age 11.
We also include a gender dummy.
Table B.8: Reduced Form: Externalizing and Log Weekly Earnings
OLS IV-DMF IV-Lee IV-Lee [M] IV-Lee [F]
No Formal Ed. or CSE 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.017 0.048
O Level or A Level 0.059 0.062 0.057 0.042 0.069
Higher Ed. or Higher Deg. 0.010 0.017 0.019 0.070 -0.052
Notes : This table contains parameter estimates for the externalizing variable
from regressions used to link non-cognitive skills to earnings. We regress log
earnings of workers on a set of observable variables along with proxies for un-
observed skills. To construct proxies for unobserved skills, we apply principal
components factor analysis to all the variables used to measure that skill. Col-
umn 1 displays the coefficients obtained by OLS. In Columns 2, we perform
the Dubin-McFadden (1984) correction method in order to control for selection
on schooling. In columns 3-5, we perform the Lee (1983) correction method
for selection in schooling. Column 3 displays the results for the whole sample,
while column 4 and 5 displays the results for males and females separately.
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Table B.9: Extremes
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4]
Cognition .273 .091 .253 .078
Externalizing .156 .082 .173 .052
Internalizing -.006 -.051 -.061 -.071
CSE . .008 . .123
O Level . .092 . .134
A Level . .204 . .235
Higher Education . .421 . .230
Higher Degree . .664 . .689
london . .174 . .334
Female . -.816 . -.961
Has a Partner . .145 . .224
Number of Children . -.152 . -.053
Experience . .003 . .002
Const. 5.295 4.951 5.094 4.909
Obs. 3552 3552 378 378
Notes : This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to
link non-cognitive skills to earnings. This table examines the possibility of non-
linearities in the returns to externalizing behaviors. Models [3] and [4] include
all individuals with externalizing behavior 1 standard deviation above the mean.
Models [1] and [2] include the rest of the sample.
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Table B.10: Interactions
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4]
Cognition .090 .086 .089 .086
Cognition2 . .012 . .012
Externalizing .058 .069 .057 .069
Externalizing2 . -.005 . -.006
Internalizing -.053 -.063 -.052 -.064
Internalizing2 . .004 . .006
Ext. Cog. . . -.008 -.007
Int. Cog. . . .002 .009
Ext. Int. . . -.003 .001
Const. 4.940 4.917 4.937 4.915
Obs. 3930 3930 3930 3930
Notes : This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to
link non-cognitive skills to earnings. To construct proxies for unobserved skills,
we apply principal components factor analysis to all the variables used to mea-
sure that skill. All models include both male and female individuals and a
gender dummy.
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Table B.11: Log Weekly Earnings at 42
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Misbehavior -.098 -.028 . . . . .
Externalizing . . .036 .049 .054 .039 .072
Internalizing . . -.064 -.051 -.037 -.046 -.026
Cognition . .184 .186 .054 .040 .067 .016
CSE . . . .184 .131 .152 .153
O Level . . . .281 .189 .154 .238
A Level . . . .424 .297 .272 .289
Higher Education . . . .623 .385 .271 .503
Higher Degree . . . .779 .606 .475 .708
Has a Partner . . . . .018 .202 -.107
Number of Children . . . . -.007 .013 -.044
Experience . . . . .002 .001 .002
Skilled Manual Occu. . . . . .084 .094 -.010
Skilled Non-manual Occu. . . . . .108 .180 .094
Managerial Occupation . . . . .397 .331 .431
Female -.985 -.968 -.964 -.907 -.795 . .
London .155 .133 .134 .122 .090 .197 -.020
Const. 6.105 6.080 6.080 5.696 5.231 5.220 4.626
Obs. 4452 4452 4452 4452 4452 2226 2226
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to earnings at age 42. We regress log earnings of workers at age 42 on a
set of observable variables at age 33 along with proxies for unobserved skills. The controls
are all constructed for individuals when they were 33 years old. To construct proxies for
unobserved skills, we sum up all variables used to measure that skill in subsequent analysis
and then normalize each unobserved skill. Models [1]-[5] include all individuals and a gender
dummy, Model [6] includes only males and Model [7] only females.
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Table B.12: Log Weekly Earnings at 50
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Misbehavior -.101 -.033 . . . . .
Externalizing . . .019 .029 .031 .020 .040
Internalizing . . -.052 -.045 -.032 -.045 -.017
Cognition . .187 .188 .079 .067 .056 .079
CSE . . . .045 .012 .050 -.001
O Level . . . .135 .079 .028 .115
A Level . . . .302 .213 .210 .195
Higher Education . . . .457 .286 .252 .317
Higher Degree . . . .582 .452 .413 .472
Has a Partner . . . . .026 .154 -.067
Number of Children . . . . .025 .017 .031
Experience . . . . .002 .0008 .002
Skilled Manual Occu. . . . . .071 .081 .064
Skilled Non-manual Occu. . . . . .089 .106 .079
Managerial Occupation . . . . .329 .317 .322
Female -.745 -.735 -.733 -.681 -.609 . .
London .191 .169 .168 .156 .142 .220 .070
Const. 6.393 6.361 6.362 6.111 5.705 5.729 5.130
Obs. 3639 3639 3639 3639 3639 1723 1916
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link non-
cognitive skills to earnings at age 50. We regress log earnings of workers at age 42 on a
set of observable variables at age 33 along with proxies for unobserved skills. The controls
are all constructed for individuals when they were 33 years old. To construct proxies for
unobserved skills, we sum up all variables used to measure that skill in subsequent analysis
and then normalize each unobserved skill. Models [1]-[5] include all individuals and a gender
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Figure B.1: Factor Analysis
The solid line depicts the eigenvalues associated with each factor in descending
order in the principal component analysis. The dashed line depicts the eigen-
values computed from the random data created by the parallel analysis. From
the principal component analysis, both the Kaiser’s criterion and the scree plot
test suggest that we should only keep the first two factors. Moreover, since the
two lines intersect before the third factor, the parallel analysis suggests that
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Figure B.2: Non-parametric regression
Here we use a non-parametric regression method (lowess) to plot the impact of
the externalizing behavior on log-earnings controlled for cognition, internalizing
behavior and a gender dummy. In order to control for the other variables we
regress log-earnings on the other explanatory variables and use the residual of
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Figure B.3: Non-parametric regression with controls
Here we use a non-parametric regression method (lowess) to plot the impact of
the externalizing behavior on log-earnings controlled for cognition, internalizing
behavior, a gender dummy, educational choices, partnership status, fertility and
experience. In order to control for the other variables we regress log-earnings
on the other explanatory variables and use the residual of that regression as the
explanatory variable in the non-parametric regression graphed here.
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